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PREFACE
It is my pleasure to present to Mongolists and other interested readers the 
proceedings of the first North American Conference on Mongolian Studies, held 
in Bellingham on November 25-26, 1978.
The idea for such a conference occxirred to me about two years ago. As I 
recall, it was not some specific event that prompted my decision to organize 
the conference; rather, it probably was disappointment, slowly accumulating 
over the years, at seeing North American studies on Mongolia lagging behind 
those on China, Japan, and Korea in this respect. True, larger conferences, 
like those sponsored by the Association for Asian Studies and the American Ori­
ental Society, have often included panels dealing at least partially with Mon­
golia, and the Mongolia Society has done a signal service by holding its annual 
meetings in conjunction with those conferences. Yet I felt that the time had 
come to give Mongolists their own conference. The experiences of our colleagues 
in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean studies clearly pointed out the main advantage 
of holding a conference devoted to a single country or culture. It could pro­
vide a setting in which Mongolists felt "at home," undisturbed by the clamor 
of the bazaax-like atmosphere often prevailing at the larger all-Asian confer­
ences.
With this goal in mind, I started my preparations on May 1 of last year by 
sending out a first call for papers. The response was much greater than I had 
: expected and dashed my rather modest hopes of having one day of sessions. The
result was a busy schedule from 8:30 a.m. to 8:30 p.m. on Saturday with only 
r two short breaks, and from 9:00 a.m. to 1 p.m. on Sunday without any breaks.
An equally pleasant surprise was the great distances traveled by many partici­
pants, coming as they did from Southern California and New England, the Middle 
Atlantic states and the Canadian prairies, the Rocky Mountains and the Midwest.
I Professor Kimura hastened from Tokyo on his first journey to North America, and 
Mr. Dashtseren, the Mongolian ambassador to the United Nations, was all set to 
come but pressing business forced him to cancel at the last moment.
The verdict on this conference was passed in the concluding session in the 
form of two resolutions. One called for making such a conference an annual 
event. I stressed the importance of moving future conferences around the 
United States and Canada, and the idea was accepte'.. A committee, composed of 
Professors Larry Clark, Paul Hyer, Keith Scott and myself, was elected and 
given the task of selecting the site of the second conference, scheduled for 
this year. The other resolution instructed me to edit and publish the confer­
ence papers. The result is this book.
While I planned and hosted the first conference, its success could not have 
been achieved without the help of many individuals and organizations. My 
thanks go to all participants for their fine scholarly papers, lively discus­
sions, and enthusiasm. Professors Samuel E. Martin of Yale University, John 
Masson Smith, Jr. of the University of California at Berkeley, and John Street
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of the University of Wisconsin gave their wholehearted support to the confer­
ence even though they were unahle to attend. The National Endowment for the 
Himianities granted timely and generous financial assistance. Also supportive 
were grants from the Mongolia Society and from Dean James W. Davis of the Col­
lege of Arts and Sciences at Western Washington University. The Canada- 
Mongolia Society cooperated from the very start and repeatedly advertised the 
conference throughout Canada. Many of the technical chores were competently 
handled by Joseph Cucco, Bruce Ream, Linda Kaplowitz, Mary Crompton, Richard 
Chesmore, and Sharon Edinger. Finally, Mrs. Florence Preder once again pro­
duced a meticulous manuscript. To all these individuals and organizations I 
wish to extend my gratitude for their trust, support, and assistance.
Henry G. Schwarz
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LANGUAGE AND CULTURE
PAST AUD PERFECT IN MODERN MONGOLIAN




You may recall how in Stevenson's Treasure Island the "old sea dog" Billy 
Bones came to the Admiral Benbow Inn, thus setting off a series of events 
which led to the voyage of the ship Hispaniola to Treasure Island. Billy Bones' 
one great fear had been a blind sailor on a pegleg, who inevitably arrived one 
day to claim Bones' booty. Alas for Pew of the wooden leg and his confeder­
ates: Billy was already dead from rtun; his hoard and his treasure map had gone
with a very frightened Jim Hawkins. When Pew urged his men into the inn to 
look for Billy, bellowing in rage, "in, in, in!,"
Four or five of them obeyed at once, two remaining on the road with 
the formidable beggar. There was a pause, then a cry of surprise, and
then a voice shouting from the house: --"Bill uxcixjee!"^’^ (Stivenson 28.2.2)^ in the original they shouted, "Bill's 
dead!"
There are two interesting points about the translation of "Bill's dead!" by 
"Bill uxcixjee!" The first is that the English present tense is being glossed 
by a Mongolian past tense. The second point requires us to look further ahead 
to that magnificent chapter wherein Jim encovinters the unfortunate Ben Gunn who 
has been marooned for three years on the deserted island. Of course Gunn begs 
Jim to take him off and offers to lead him to the famous treasure if he will. 
But, as Jim recounts,
. . . at this there came suddenly a lowering shadow over his face, and 
he tightened his grasp upon my hand, and raised a forefinger threatening­
ly before my eyes.
"Now, Jim, tell me true: that ain't Flint's ship?," he asked.
(Chapter 15) ^ ^
To which Jim replies, "Flintijn xolog bis. Flint uxcixsen." (Stivenson 85.6.2) 
In the English he says, "it's not Flint's ship, and Flint is dead." Once again 
the English present becomes the Mongolian past, but in this instance, although 
the rootiJm- and stem affix -oix- remain the same, the translator uses -sen in­
stead of -jee.
Now why does this happen? We shall see that there is a method in the use of 
these two forms. In fact, this question is as good an introduction as any to 
the general question of the use of the Mongolian tenses, and specifically the 
three so-called past tenses, -Jee, -ev, and -Z-ee.5 At one point (p.92) Sanzeev 
was led to state that "the differences between Cthe three past tensei forms, 
which are almost imperceptible, are still debated by students of Mongolian; the 
three past tense forms are used interchangeably." I do not think, however, that 
Sanzeev meant to say this, since elsewhere, for example in his book on the
1
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comparative grammar of the verb in Mongolian languages, he clearly shows that 
they are not used interchangeably and that the difference between them is hardly 
imperceptible. In fact, the three forms are quite different in use, and one of 
my purposes here is to describe their differences and to place those differences 
within the context of a linguistic theory. This is not to say that an adequate 
theory of tenses exists, but there are certainly valuable observations which can j
he made within a self-consistent framework. j
Furthermore, as we have seen, there is a close connection between the so-called 
perfective ending -sen and these past tense endings. Is -sen (used predicatively) ; 
precisely equivalent to any one of these endings, or is it yet a fourth way of re­
ferring to the past? And if the English present (and perfect, as we shall see) 
can he translated by at least one of the past tense endings, in this case -gee, 
is there any distinction in Mongolian between the perfect and the past as tenses?
second purpose is to hazard an answer to this further question.
2. Meaning and use.
Let us start by demonstrating that the three past tenses are certainly not 
used interchangeably. First of all, every grammar book, including those written 
by native speakers in Mongolia, distinguish them. For example, the past {ongdrson 
aag) is split up into the ongoron togsson tense (the -ev form), the dngdrdn 
urgelgilsen tense (the -gee form), and the sagaxan togss’dn tense ("the -lee form)." 
In my informant work with a native speaker these forms were likewise shown to dif­
fer in numerous ways, some of which I will return to later.
Supporting these distinctions is the evidence of translations from or into Mon­
golian. The -Jee form is almost always coordinated with a present or the perfect 
which marks a result. Thus Vietze translates 'dngoruuVSee '1st stehengeblieben' 
(Vietze 26.3), and ene aag gavaxaa hoV'gee 'die Uhr geht nicht mehr. . . .'
(Vietze 1^5.3).^ Poppe translates, however, haidz 'es lebte' (Poppe 1955,188.1) 
and xidz 'veranstaltete.'9 In translations of Turgenev, Cervantes, and Mao 
seems consistently to gloss forms equivalent to the perfect;!*^ thus a sentence in 
Mao ending boloUee (Mao 3.5) ends in the English translation 'has brought' (l have 
not had the original Chinese checked). In the Treasure Island translation, —^ee 
is often used to gloss presents and perfects but also past tenses.
The -lee form also often glosses presents and perfects. Vietze translates 
nccmdloja 'hat sich gelegt' (Vietze 32.h) and Poppe dlirle 'ist zu Ende' (Poppe 1955> 
190.7); the common expression bagarlalaa is roughly equivalent to our 'thank you' 
(Vietze 23.9 ff.).^^ However, -lee has past and even future glosses as well.
While -ev can gloss or be glossed by present and perfect, as when Vietze trans­
lates juu bolov^'^ (Vietze 19.6) by 'was ist los?,' a past translation is more 
usual, and in the literary language at least there is generally a careful distinc­
tion between, say, suusan, glossed by Vietze 'steckengeblieben' (Vietze U1.6) and 
suuaixav, used to translate Turgenev (Sodov 3^0.12) where the English translation 
has 'sat down.'13
If further proof is required that the tenses differ, we need only consider 
their use in texts of different sorts. In folktales, for example, a great many 
sentences end in -^ee. Thus in the story Uraip Gud Dagin (Poppe 1955, 188-223), 
of the first fifty sentences in the narration, excluding the gene 'they say'
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which is purely a narrative device, eighteen end in —, twenty-five in —ev, 
and seven in other endings. It is interesting to note that most of the -eV 
forms occurred within the scope of gene. On the other hand, in the quotes em­
bedded in the story, —Qee is rare. Of the first fifty quoted sentences, only 
one ends in -'See, four in -ev, and forty-five in other forms. Clearly see is 
used here as a narrative-forwarding device. Compare this with the more descrip­
tive style of newspapers, specifically Unen.^'^ Here events in the past are 
almost as likely to occur with the ending -ev. In an article on the visit of 
a Russian dignitary to the Mongolian People's Republic (Montgomery 3—10), —eV 
ends four sentences, -jee nine, and other forms (including several -lee's) 
fif'ty. In the style of an author of a school textbook on foreign literature 
(Sandag)^ --;ee is preferred over -ev for such statements as Tomas Mor . . . 
dryddldgo bajSee 'Thomas More was an advocate' (Sandag 67) and 1564 ony 4 
dugeer saryn 23-nd tSrjee 'he Cthat is, Shakespearei was born on April 23, 136k'
(Sandag 68).
Are these purely stylistic devices? In part this may be so, just as our 
sportswriters, financial reporters, news reporters, and novelists prefer to use 
different perspectives in reporting events.15 Yet underlying these various 
usages there must be real differences, just as there is a real difference under­
lying the virtual synonymity of "is he back yet?" and "has he come back yet?" 
in English.
There are more substantive facts that argue to a contrast in usage for the 
various past tense forms. First, all of the forms can be used in questions, 
and to each statement there is a corresponding question, e.g., ted suusan 'they 
sat,' ted suusan uu? 'they sat?' However, the questions, like the statements, 
do not serve the same pixrposes. WH-questions seeking information, e.g., juu 
bolov 'what happened?,' and yes-no questions, asking facts, e.g., Ene cin' 
Flintijn xblbg uu? (Stivenson 85.6.1) 'that ain't Flint's ship?,' more literally, 
'this thing of yours, is it Flint's ship?,'l® take —ev. They are usually an­
swered with -sen in the colloquial language; thus the answer to Ta xaanaas 
irev? 'Where did you come from?' might be Bi xotoos irsen 'I came from the 
city.'ll (Hangin 10).
On the other hand, -lee is rarely used in questions. One example occurs 
when the rebelling (and superstitious) buccaneers, who have come to give Long 
John Silver the dreaded Black Spot, are chided by him for putting it on a sheet 
torn from a Bible:
"Ah, there!," said Morgan --  "there!
Wot did I say? No good'll come o' that,
I said." (Chapter 29)In Mongolian Morgan asks rhetorically, "Bi juu gej xellee?"^®
While most of the grammars and studies I consiilted have examples of See in 
questions, like those I am about to cite, examples of See in real questions 
seem uncommon in actual text. Consider Ramstedt's t'a ^nt'zxizy 'schliefen Sie 
(soeben)?' (Ramstedt l8);l" Beffa's ter gore uu 'est-il sortl?' (Beffa 83); 
Kasjanenko's xaa ocig 'kuda posel?' (Kasjanenko 20). Hangin notes, however, 
that in asking Ter xooloo ideg uu? 'Did he eat his dinner?' one is asking "Did 
you see or find out?," which differs from merely asking if he had eaten dinner. 
(Hangin llU) In fact, questions with See appear in texts mainly with the 
quotative verb ge- and are almost entirely either rhetorical or confirmation­
seeking echo questions, a notable exception in the texts being the folkloric
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20 21tscamd xamd baidzu 'Was geht es dich an?' (Poppe 1955, 152.5-2). ’ Mt in
nearly all examples only ge^ occurs. At one point in Fathers arid. Sons (Chapter 
27), for example, Bazarov asks his father for some caustic, saying that he had 
cut'his finger and it might become (or already had become) Infected. When he 
says that four hours have already passed,^his father asks, "Didn't the district 
doctor have any lunar caustic?": ... xosnuny emo'vd. tuttiyn ouZiiu bajsanguj yog 
UU? (Sodov 360.3),22 suggesting that he cannot quite believe that he had not. 
Similarly, Chairman Mao inquires, "Have people not seen or heard about these^^ ^
facts?" (English version, p. jU) --  xumuus edgeer barimtuudyg dvulg xaraaguQ
ge3 UU? (Mao TT.U).23 Notice the negative in the English translations, sug­
gestive of doubt, seeking confirmation: siirely the doctor had caustic, surely
everyone knows these facts. When he harangues his hostile crew. Long John^ 
Silver brings up their idea of killing Jim Hawkins. He says, "Are we a-going 
to waste a hostage? No, not us; he might be oiir last chance. . . . Kill 
boy? Not me, mates!" (Chapter 29). The Mongolian has Ene xuug alax gej uu. , 
as if he were questioning a siiggestion right before him. Questions with ge^ 
often correspond to English questions with negatives25 or which presuppose the 
hearer's previous statements or attitudes.2
Yet other facts are clear indications of the differences between the tenses 
and are reflexes of those differences, often being cited in grammars in con- 
jvmction with descriptions of purported uses of the forms. Thus Poppe 1951 a-nd 
Hangin, for example, observe that the -gee form usually occurs in the third 
person though, as we have seen, that is not invariably the case. Ramstedt,
Poppe 1951, and Street observe that -lee is not used with a second person sub­
ject. In fact, in its "future" use it is rather restricted to the first person, 
though Mao has Imperialistuud urt naslaxguj bolloo.^'l (Mao 80.2) 'Imperialism 
(lit. imperialists) will not last long. . . .' There are no such restrictions 
on -ev or -sen.
A similar fact has to do with negation. Generally, in the modern literary 
and colloquial languages, no finite indicative tense form ever occurs negated, 
though in the literary language one occasionally sees the indicatives with the 
old negatives es or u7.28 Instead, participles with the ending -gug '-less 
(from ugiXg, 'without') are used. The three past tenses all are negated with 
-sen, the perfect particple, plus -g^'. Thus when asked the negation of (la), 
the native informant gave (lb); a similar response occurred for (2). (lb) is
of course the negation of (3). 29 qo
(la) End olon xun bag'v. 'Here there were many people.' (Notes lU)^
(lb) End olon xun bagsangug.(2a) Olon xim tend baglaa. 'Many people were there.'
(2b) Olon £cwn tend bag'sangfy'.
(3) End olon xiXn bagsan.^^
It is interesting that while the -^se form likewise usually is negated with 
-sen + -gug, the informajat tended at times to negate it using the imperfect or 
continuous participle in -ee or the perfect converbal in -eed\
(Ua) OgWo bolgee. 'It became morning.'
(1+b) Oglbo boloo(d)gug. 'It hasn't yet become morning.'
(5) Bi idee(d)gug. 'I haven't eaten yet.' (Notes 26)^^
Another interesting fact is that the so-called future use of like the
non-past tense form in -ne, can be negated using the future participle or
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infinitive in -ex-, thus the informant negated (6a) as (6h):
(6a) Bi odoo javZaa. 'I'm going now.' (Said when you have not actually 
started.) ,
(6h) Odoo bi javaxgug. 'How I'm not going to go.' (Notes 22)^^ Note,
however, that (6h) while the negation of (6a), is not precisely its 
negation.
The foregoing arguments serve, I hope, to demonstrate that the verh forms 
in question do differ in use. But do they differ in meaning^ There is good 
reason, in fact, to helieve that they do not.
First, under negation, nominalization, and embedding, the distinction be­
tween the forms is neutralized, and the only past (or perfect) forms which 
occur are, respectively, the perfect participle in -sen and the perfect gerund 
in -eed. Thus all the statements in (7) receive, under general conditions, the 
negation (8), they all form relative clauses as in (9)i they all nominalize as 
in (lO), and when embedded in^an adverbial syntactic position, they all appear 
as in either (lla) or (llb).^°
(7a) Luvsan irev. |
(7b) Luvsan irgee. j 'Luvsan came.'
(7c) Luvsan irlee. J
(8) Luvsan irsengug. 'Luvsan didn't come.'
(9) Ter irsen xdm Luvsan gedeg. 'The man who came is called Luvsan.'
(lO) Irsenij n' bidmedeg bagna. '¥e know that he came.'
(lla) Luvsany irsend, bid tend bagsangug. 'When Luvsan came, we weren't 
there.'
(lib) Luvsan ireed, bid tend bagsangug. 'Luvsan came and we weren't 
there.'37
Rather than analyze this as neutralization of semantic oppositions, we should say 
that some distinction is being lost and ask ourselves what sort of distinction 
can be, and is, lost in these positions.
If the forms in question differed in meaning, it ought to be the case that 
there were conditions undor which at least one of them would be true and at 
least one of them at the same time faJ.se; that is, there ought to be at least 
one situation describable by one alone of the three fonns. If we examine the 
forms in question we see that in fact this cannot be. Any of the situations 
expressed by -lee or -gee can be expressed by -ev. It may be that not every 
sentence with one or the other of these forms is directly translatable into one 
in -ev-. there may be some adverbs, subject pronouns, etc., that can co-occur 
with-jee, say, but not with -ev. However, this need not imply a semantic dif­
ference.
As regards these two forms, they again do not describe distinct states of the 
world. If I say Luvsan ir'^ee or Luvsan irlee, outside of context there is simply 
no difference: all we learn is that at some time in the past a man called Luvsan
came. It is true that there are minor semantic differences between these forms, 
but I am concerned here with their central differences.
What we find is that the difference in use of these forms has nothing to do 
with the event described, as such, and those commentators who try to make it do 
so are wrong. Rather, as others have more correctly suggested, the difference 
is in the way the speaker views the event. If the event is something the
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speaker is vouching for, or is information which is well-known and stated not 
to convey new information hut for another purpose, the -tee form may he used.
If the event is presumptive or stated as suddenly acquired knowledge, the -jee 
form is used, -ev is attitudinally neutral.
We can now explain the difference between our earlier examples uxaix'See and 
uxaixsen. It is not that the pirate in shouting "Bill lixcixjee!" is making 
any claim about the time of Bill's death or its nature; he is stating that Bill 
has died, thereby implying that he ts dead, and incidentally informing us that 
he has just found out. ■ (But in context we know this.) It would be odd for him 
to have shouted, "Bill uxcixlee'"; this presupposes that^this is known already, 
not only to him, but to us. If he had shouted, "Bill iixcixev" or "Bill 
uxcixsen,"38 this would be a little odd, and probably would be more appropriate 
in a context where the question of Bill's death had already come up, though 
which he was, dead or alive, remained unknown. When Jim tells Ben Gunn that 
Flint is dead, wsoixsen, he merely states a fact; he neither assumes that Ben 
knows this nor does he state that it is new information to himself.
If we accept that the differences of use of these forms are not differences 
of meaning, but rather differences of what we should call discourse pragmatics, 
then we have a ready explanation for the contexts of their neutralization and 
for the highly marked nature of questions with these forms. It is the function 
of declarative sentences to make statements, but the force of statements may or 
may not be to provide new information. The function of questions may be to 
request new information, or it may not. Thus the questions xn ge^ do not re­
quest new information any more than rhetorical questions in English do.
The importance of the sort of analysis I have just given is, as I see it, to 
enable us to clarify the problems of the past tense forms in Mongolian. For far 
too long there has been no attempt to provide argumentation or a theoretical 
underpinning for the rather vague and impressionistic statements of scholars, 
however correct or important these statements may be. I do not pretend, as I 
have said, to provide an adequate theory or a definitive solution, but I hope 
that I have turned the discussion in a new and, I hope, more fruitful direc­
tion.
393. Perfect and past.
Let us return now to the perfect. claim is that the use of terms like
"perfect(ive) past" for the indicative forms is incorrect, and that they have 
no direct semantic content which such a term can explicate. At the same time 
I have admitted (a) that in numerous contexts -sen or -eed, the perfect(ive) 
verbal nominal (or participle) and gerund respectively, appear in place of the 
finite indicative forms, and (b) that in the colloquial spoken language -sen 
replaces -ev in statements (though not in questions, where -ev contrasts with 
-sen). How is it, if the finite indicatives really lack semantic content, that 
-sen can replace them? And what about the distinction between past and perfect? 
Is. it unreal? If not, what do these facts say about it?
Here we must observe that in fact the Indicative forms do not completely lack 
semantic content. Even if they do not assert aspectual (and hence semantic) re­
lations, they "implicate" them (here I am using a technical term). For example.
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if I am involved in the discovery of a fact, it is likely that the fact has 
only recently come about. But it is no part of the meaning of the -Jee fona, 
say, that this is so. More importantly, though, all three past tenses do 
assert that the event, E, preceded the time of the speech act, S. Otherwise 
we should be able to use the present-future form. But while at any given point
it might be true, say, that Billy Bones will die, or is dying, it is not 
necessarily true at that he has died or even has been dying.
This explains how the past tense forms can be replaced by -sen and -eed, for 
these forms are purely aspectual, and merely assert that E preceded some other 
event Ep. Normally the past indicative tense is used when Ep = S, but in the 
predicative use of -sen it can be assumed that E2 “ S; there is an implicit 
copula even when bajna 'is' is deleted which, in the colloquial language, is 
normal in unmarked situations. Aspectually the finite forms and the non-finite 
differ only in the assumption that E2 = S. Thus -sen and -eu are essentially 
fully equivalent, since -ev merely maps, atop the precedence relation of aspect, 
a relatively neutral temporality. Temporal oppositions, however, play no role 
in other than the positions finite verbs occur in, namely where they are used 
as main-clause verbs to make assertions, etc. (See Binnick concerning main- 
clause phenomena.)
I might note in passing that current semantics-based theories of tense can 
provide no explanation for these facts, since they do not refer to a relation­ship of E to S. Furthermore, they do not take into account pragmatics at all.^1
This leaves us one final puzzle. In the modern literary language -eV and 
predicative -sen are distinct in both declarative and interrogative sentences. 
Moreover, even in the colloquial language they are distinct in questions, since 
questions with predicative -sen do occur:
(12) Ci nogoo emee uusan biz? Ene er emee uusan uu, ta min'?
'Did you take that medicine? Did he take that medicine, 
men?' (Stivenson I66.T.8; Chapter 30)^2
(13) Xuu min', xaasaa javsan ve kk
'Vrhich way Cwas he walking], sonny?' (Stivenson 11.2.1; Chapter 2)
(14) Bie agzaj^ oiairsen uu? , ,^
'Have you had chills, too?' ^ (Sodov 360.I6.I; Chapter 27)
What these examples clearly show is that the -sen form has a distinction 
from the preterite that we have not mentioned, and that this distinction is al­
ways indicated in questions, though it need not be in statements. With uu, -sen 
is used roughly like the English perfect to indicate an event which happened 
prior to S but at no definite time, whereas -ev points to a definite point in 
time as in the following examples; thus some scholars, e.g., Bosson, refer to 
the -ev form as the "definite past tense."
klCompare the following examples:
(15) "5i dcigddr nom unsiv uu?
'Hast du gestern ein Buch gelesen?' (Vietze Uh)
(16) Mitjuxa ene erxem saja aamajg juu ge^ xocilsnyg duulav uu? 
'D'you hear that, Mitya? . . . Hear what the gentleman called 
yer?' (Sodov 3!+5.T.l; Chapter 2)^8
(17) Eeg nusd godzulsaip mu xug iidzewu ta?
'Haben Sie einen erbarmlichen Bengel gesehen, dem Rotz aus der Nase heraushangt?' (Poppe 1955, 192.2.12)^9
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(l8) Xagur xagur jauadz, soni-n saixav jum dulwu?
'Wo bist du gereist? Hast du CauchD irgend etwas Interessantes
und Gutes gehort?' (Poppe 1955, 208.2.5)
In (15) baigdSr provides a definite context; in (l6) the Just-uttered statement 
provides the definite context; (l8) is uttered in the context of a previous 
statement concerning the hearer's travels. Even (IT) may be explicable in terms 
of a definite period of time, since it doesn't mean "have you ewer seen. .... 
etc., but applies to a certain pragmatically defined stretch of time.
It should not surprise us that predicative -sen should differ in this way 
from -ev, which is neutral relative to -Jee and -lee, but clearly has this ad­
ditional force. Nor should we be surprised by the loss of-the distinction in 
statements which happens elsewhere, e.g., in American English where went can 
mean "has gone," although a precise explication of this demands further study.
1*. Conolusion.
I have been concerned here with investigating the uses and mutual relation­
ships of four forms used in Mongolian today to refer to events in the past. If 
I have done nothing else, I hope that I have demonstrated that these forms do 
not contrast in the time of the event referred to, nor in its aspectual nature, 
but basically differ in the discourse pragmatic function to which the speaker 
puts them. I hope that now we can begin to develop a deeper and more so^dly 
established theory of the Mongolian, and hence the Altaic, verb system.
Notes
1 Examples from the modern literary language in Cyrillic script have been 
transliterated as follows, the Cyrillic letters becoming^^respectively,
abvgdee3sijklmnooprstuufxcc_ssc"y'e JU Jorju)
2. Literal gloss: die(iJa;-)+suddenly/completely(-et^-)+FI. The following
































pluralyes-no question particle 
reflexive-possessive ("own") 
verbal noun (participle)
gen 1 sources are gives at the end oI the paper. Generally the first nmljeris tte p^rSriast ?he sentence or ewle, and the .iddle, if any, the p.r- 
iSL Thave given only the chapter or section for non-Mongolisn tents where
editions will differ in pagination.1*. Gloss: Flint+gen(-iyn) ship not. Mongolian omits the presen cop
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-sen is literally a pf VN; strictly speaking a present auxiliary cop has been 
deleted here, hut in the colloquial language, at least, -sen is often used 
predicatively and, as we shall see, normally substitutes for the past in -ev.
5. -Jee does not change for vowel harmony; -ev^and -lee have four forms each, 
with a, o, o, or e. -Jee also appears as -eee, -c, and -j. For details of the 
morphophonology, see Street, Poppe 1951, or Poppe 1970.
6. Literally, 'completed passing,' 'prolonged passing,' and 'just completed.' 
Slight variants of these terms are cited by several authors, e.g., Vietze, Beffa, 
and in various Mongolian publications, e.g., §. Luvsanvandaji, ed., Oraim Cagijn 
Mongol Xel Zilj (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), pp. 1L8-I53.
7-. Yidamjab Meng.
8. dngdruul- is actually the caus i-uill-) of dngdr- 'pass.' Gloss of second
example: this clock go(jau-)+inf(-ox)+RP cease(&oZ'-)+FI.
9. Poppe 1955 uses a phonemicized transcription; baidz = our fcczjJ {bag- 'be'); 
xidz = xigg {xig- 'do, make').
10. I have not investigated the originals, but this seems true from an examin­
ation of the corresponding English translations.
11. Bolgo- is the caus of bol- 'become, happen'; namd- 'calm down'; duur- 
(cf. note 9) 'end, stop'; bajarla- 'rejoice' (cf. bagar, 'happy').
12. Gloss: what happen+FI.
13. suu- 'sit, live'; -aix- 'suddenly/completely.' It should be noted that 
this stem affix also occurs with -sen, as we saw with iXxaixsen. The form in 
-sen has numerous non-predicative uses; -ev is only predicative. In its non­
predicative uses, -ev is unambiguously a perfect, i.e., bngbrsdngil means 'last 
year; the year (which is) past/has passed.' However, even here a preterite gloss 
is possible, e.g., tend suusan xun 'person who sat there.'
lit. This is the Mongolian equivalent of Pravda-, its name likewise means 'truth.'
15. See pp. 191-192 in Sanzeev's Sravnitel'naga Grammatika Mongol'skix Jazykov 
Glagol (Moscow: Izd. Vostocnoj Literatury, 1963) concerning the "free" use
of the -gee form as a purely stylistic device. For the "free" use of tenses, 
an interesting article on another Altaic language is Ozcan Bagkan's "inter­
changeability of tenses in colloquial Turkish" (Litera 9> Ankara, I968), pp. ^-8. 
Mso in H. E. Brekle and L. Lipka, eds., Wortbildung, Spraahe, imd Morpholoqie 
(The Hague: Mouton, 1968).
16. Omgdblo- 'defend'; -go is the agent nominalizer. Glosses: I56U year+gen
(-J/) i++-th month(<moon)+gen(-z/n) (Uth month = April) on-the-23rd(23-n<i) be-born 
(tor-). They sit/livefpf-VN; they sit/live+pf-VN Q. What happen+FI. This your 
Flint+gen ship Q.
17. Glosses: you(PL) where+abl(with -n-) come+FI. I city+abl come+pf-VH.
18. Gloss: I what g'e^(quotative particle) say+FI.
19. = our ta unta^ uu. Gloss: you(PL) sleeptFI Q.
20. Glosses: he(lit. the/that-one) go-out+FI Q; where go-to+FI; he food/meal
+RP eat+FI W. Poppe's example is camad xamaa bagj uu. Gloss: you+dat affair
be+FI Q. Here 'be'+dat = possessive, 'do you have any affairs?'
21. James Bosson in a personal communication suggested these might be impf CL 
forms in elliptical sentences. This is certainly possible, as the two forms are 
identical. However, the existence of -'^ee questions cited by various authors 
plus the distribution of the questions in dispute suggests that they are not 
elliptical; certainly the glosses do not suggest this.
22. Xosuu(n) 'district' + gen(-j/); emo 'doctor'; tamyn culuu is lit. 'stone
of hell' (lunar caustic is silver nitrate); bagsangug 'hasn't been'; geg 'saying'; 
flii is Q.
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23. Gloss: people these fact+PL(-ww<i)+acc hear+impf-CL see+impf-W say/mean
ige-)+FI Q.
2h. Gloss: This boy+acc(-g^) kill(aZ-)+inf say/mean-J-FI Q.
25. Thus in Stivenson 51.8.6 Ted tusguj dalajoid geo uu? 'Are they not good
seamen?' (literally: they useless seamen ge^ Q). Here the question is asked
by Dr. Livesay, attempting (Chapter 9) to clarify what Captain Smolett is say­
ing about the crew of the Hispaniola. "You say you don't like the crew," he 
summarizes and then asks the captain this question.
26. Thus in Chapter 30 (Stivenson 169.8.2). Dr. Livesay visits Jim who is
held by the pirates as a hostage; he is allowed to talk to the doctor on his 
honor not to escape. Jim suggests that he be abandoned to save Dr. Livesay 
and the others and tells the doctor where he has the ship hidden. The doctor 
says, "There is a kind of fate in this. . . . Every step, it's you that saves 
our lives; and do you suppose by any chance that we are going to let you lose 
yours?" [Xuu min', bid camaog busdyn gart aluulna geo uu?-, lit.: boy we
you+acc other+gen(-i/n) hand+-ed klll+caus(here = 'let')+FI. This is a rhetor­
ical question, pretending to assume that Jim does indeed think so.
27. Gloss: Imperlalist+PL(-UMii) long-time endure+inf(-aa;)+neg become+FI.
As past forms of bot- can be interpreted with present sense, this is not clearly 
a "future" use.
28. For example, bi band es xellilu, ezen min'! 'Did I not tell your
Grace. . . . (Sodov 83.lO) Note the use of xellee, here shortened to xett- be­
fore uu in a question. Lit.: I you(formal)+d.at neg(es) say/tell+FI+Q, lord-my.
An Interesting example where es occurs before a CL-main verb combination is 
Poppe 19555 19^.7: es xards tsadadzd, our es xar^ aaddSee. 'Sie konnten aber 
nicht schauen.' ('They could not look.') Lit.: neg look+impf-CL be-able+FI.
Another example of es occurs at Stivenson 138.U.3. occurs several times in 
Mao (16.3, 18.5, 62.5, 62.9, etc.) with non-finite forms.
29. The word order here is significant as to the relative discourse importanc 
of the modifiers. End oton xun bao'v means 'here there were many people.' 'Many 
people were here' would be Olon xun end baov. I believe this is ambiguous as to 
whether a definite or indefinite group is meant.
30. 'Notes' refers here to my Informant work notes of 1977. I have written 
elsewhere of the value of informant work and of the great difficulty of inter­
preting its results. Use 'Notes' examples with caution.
31. End 'here,' olon 'many,' xun 'person,' bao’- 'be.'
32. It is unusual for the converbal to be used non-elliptically predicatively 
and for -guo' to occur on a CL, rather than a VN, form, -uo' also appears on -eed 
for -guj. Apparently there is no difference in meaning between this form and 
the one with -eeguo•
33. OgWb 'morning,' bol- 'become,' id- 'eat,' bi 'I.'
3^. Bi '!,' odoo 'now,' jau- 'go.'
35. There is an apparent difference in adverbial scope here, perhaps relat­ing to a pragmatic difference. In (6a) odoo modifies j’au- 'go'; but in (6b) 
the entire sentence is within the scope of the adverbial, which expresses a sort 
of presupposed state of affairs. Thus the examples may not be strictly compar­
able, but this should not affect the basic argument.
36. I am writing here as if there were transformation of one form into an­
other in these cases. There is reason to believe, however, that this is not the 
case, that the nominalized forms, for example, are equally basic and underlying 
as the indicative ones. See Binnick for a discussion. This does not, however, 
affect the argument here.
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37. Glosses of (9-111):(9) the come+pf-VU person Luvsan is-usually-called;
(10) come+pf-VN+acc the/his we know+impf-CL be+FI; (lla) Luvsan+gen come+pf- 
VN+dat, we there be+pf-VN+neg; (lib) Luvsan come+pf-CL, we there be+pf-Vn+neg.
38. Usually a preterite assumes a definite time, whereas a perfect does not. 
Thus in British English "he went home" cannot answer (i), though it can answer
(11) ; "He's gone home" can answer (i), but not (ii).
(i) Where's Bill? (l don't see him.)
(ii) What did Bill do when Sue stood him up for their date?
(She was supposed to meet him at the club.)
I am not certain whether -eu and -sen differ in -this way in either the colloguial 
spoken or the more literary written languages of today.
39. The details of the pragmatic conditions on the use of the tense terms are 
omitted in this version. They are being prepared for a future, complete version 
of this paper.
UO. "Implicate" is used here in lieu of "imply" to indicate that the implica­
tion is by certain types of logical principles called "implicatures." See, 
e.g., Ruth M. Kempson, Presupposition and the Delimitation of Semantics (Cam­
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975).
Ul. I am thinking of both theories in the tradition of Otto Jespersen's 
Language and Hans Reichenbach's Elements of Symbolic Logic, and logical theories, 
be they model-theoretic approaches to natural language or modal/temporal logics. 
Recent work by Elizabeth Riddle promises, however, to provide a pragmatic theory 
of tense with considerable explanatory power. A fiiller discussion will be pro­
vided in the final version of this paper.
l2. 'you,' nogo'd 'this, that,' emee 'own medicine,' uu- 'drink,' biz 
(copular particle with a certain pragmatic force of supposition), ene 'this,' 
er 'man,' ta 'you,' min’ 'my.'
h3. Ve is described (Poppe 1951, 96) as a "copula" used in WH-questions.
Its precise syntactic analysis is unclear, though Street 126 ff. treats it as 
merely an interrogative particle like uu. He does note, however, that it usually 
appears in tr\incated sentences—thereby suggesting a treatment like Poppe's— 
though he also gives examples with copula, e.g., nom xaa bajna ve? 'where's the 
book?'
Xwl 'boy,' min' 'my,' xaasaa 'where to,' jav- 'go.' 
hb- Here the English translation is more useful than the Russian original, 
since the past ending in Russian also has perfect meaning.
1+6. Bie 'body/self,' agzaj- 'shiver,' aioir- 'tremble with cold,' uu Q.
1+7. Cf. the following example where bolov, although past, really has present 
force: Tany aldar nerijg medef boloxson bolov uu? Lit.: your family-name
name+acc(-tyg’) know+impf-CL become+inf+perfect become+FI Q. 'May I ask your 
name and patronymic?' (Sodov 31+1+.9.3; Chapter 2). Cf. Poppe 1955, 188.2.9, 
188.5.1+.
1+8. 'you,' 'dcigdbr 'yesterday,' nom 'book,' uns- 'read,' ene 'this,' erxem 
'gentleman,' saga 'just now,' camagg 'you'(acc), guu 'what,' ge'^ 'saying,' xocil- 
'give a nickname to'+pf-VN+acc(-z/g'), duul- 'hear.'
1*9. = our Beg nusaa goo'^uulsan muu xuug uzev uu ta? one mucous+RP dripfcaus+pf- 
VN bad boy+acc see+FI Q you(PL). The ta is a postponed subject, not merely a 
vocative. This is a rare exception to the rule that nothing can follow the Q.
50. = our Xaaguur xaaguur gavdf, sonin sagxan gum duulav uu?
where where go+impf-CL news fair thing hear+FI Q
51. I would like to thankfully acknowledge the assistance of Mr. Yidamjab
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Meng which contributed much to this work. It has been a pleasure to have the 
opportunity to pick his brains and native intuitions.
At the conference a number of interesting comments were made on the 
paper. Two by Professor Poppe are worth noting here. First, with the -jee 
form there is sometimes the sense ”it turned out that" or "it turned out after 
all that." The second comment was that example Ene cag javaxaa boZ'gee is 
literally 'has ceased to work' and could equally well have been glossed hat 
aufgehort zu gehen." He went on to say that often there is an interchange of 
meanings, as regards such Mongolian examples in English or German gloss, be­
tween present, perfect, or even preterite tenses. I thank all who had obser­
vations to make during the discussion period.
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A PROBLEM IN BURYAT HISTORICAL LINGUISTICS
Laxry V. Clark 
Indiana University
The Buryat Mongols are among those peoples of Siberia who may he said to 
lack historical profile prior to the early seventeenth-century conquest of Si­
beria by Tsarist Russia. Ethnonyms and toponyms with supposed connections to 
the Buryats rarely occur in earlier Asian sources, and those that do are at­
tended by ambiguity. Behind this historical obscurity follows the dark course 
of the Buryat language, which began to be recorded only in the eighteenth centirry 
when it hsid already by and large assumed its modern form. Lacking earlier con­
crete data, we might presume that the investigation of the historical develop­
ment of Buryat belongs to that kind of intellectual puzzle whose solution depends 
on arguments that cannot be supported by facts.
The present paper addresses only a fragment of this puzzle, namely, the Buryat 
developments of Mongol s, o, and
s : Sara "moon" B h: harasi: sira "yellow" S: Sara
-s: bos- "to rise" -d: bod-






These developments highlight that distinctive shape which all Buryat dialects _ 
share in contrast to other Mongol languages, and which is already characteristic 
of Buryat in the eighteenth century.
Thus we know the starting and the ending points of these developments, but 
on the face of it the lack of earlier data might seem to preclude knowing when 
these developments occurred. The present paper addresses the problem of the 
chronology of these developments, and attempts to outline a research strategy 
that takes into account various kinds of later linguistic sources for Buryat 
whose utilization may partially compensate for the absence of earlier materials.
Several assumptions may be made in regard to these developments. The firsts 





si > > s
sets! > *aLtsl > sjedsD > *jLdzl > z
ci > *cV >
ji > *ov >
Evidence will be cited below that supports the Intermediate states for c and ,
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while the others are postulated on the basis of probable phonetic developments.
A second assumption that is made is that the developments of the affricates 
occi^red in tandem; in other words, the changes which affected affected
j/ji in the same way and at the same time. This assumption is based on the 
fact that these affricates begin and end with the same primary phonetic shapes 
(differing only in the secondary feature of voicing) and thus ought to have fol­
lowed parallel developments.
Furthermore, it may be argued that at least some of these developments oc­
curred in a certain order relative to one another, that is, that they may be 
arranged in a relative chronology: (l) si > s occurred before s > h\ otherwise, 
si would have become h as well {*hara < *hira < sira, rather than sara) ■, (2) s > 
h occurred before c/J > s/s; otherwise, a would have become h as well {*hahar\ < 
*sasar\ < oasun, rather than sdhar\). Only if we suppose that o/'^ > s/s was a 
conditioned change before vowels other than i can we postulate: (3) e/j > s/s 
occurred before ai/Jji > s/s; otherwise, oij'^i would have become s/s as well 
[*sono < *aono < *aono < '5ino, rather than "Sono). The development -s > -d can­
not be ordered in this way, but in view of the existence of this development 
already in Middle Mongol (just as "/-breaking" and the contraction of di- 
syllabics to long vowels in Buryat), it potentially existed as a feature of the 
Mongol dialect base from which Buryat evolved. Thus, preliminary to its fur­
ther discussion below, -s > -d may be placed at the beginning of this ordered 
arrangement.
As a consequence of these considerations, the Buryat treatments of s, c^and 
"3 may be arranged in the following relative chronology where ik) is divided 
into two stages for reasons that will be evident below:
(1) -s > -d
(2) si > *si > s
(3) s > *e > h
(ka.) o!3 > *e/j
(Ub) ^clo > sjz
(5) ailoi > *cVl3V > s/S
For the evidence that might enable us to assign some of these changes to specific 
periods in time, we turn now to an examination of each of the linguistic sources 
of Buryat.
Written Mongol Among the Buryats
In the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries Lamaism was propagated 
by Olrat and Southern Mongol clergymen among the leading tribes of the Trans- 
Baikal area: the Khori Buryat who migrated there from the Sis-Baikal in the
seventeenth century; the Mongols of the Selenga River area, essentially the 
Congol and Sartuul who were emigrants from Mongolia; and the Barguzin Buryat, 
originally Ekhirit Buryat from the Sis-Baikal, who began to settle the Barguzin 
area in the seventeenth century. One of the significant consequences of the 
spread of Lamaism among these tribes was the introduction and adoption of the 
Written Mongol literary language.
The first mention of the existence of this literary language among the Buryats 
is located in the Noord en Oost Tartarye (1692) of Nicolaes Witsen who remarked
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that "the Bratsi have a special writing, although few of them know how to 
read."^ A number of texts in this "special writing" (i.e.. Written Mongol) 
have been edited or studied, from which it is evident that many manuscripts 
reflect Buryat phonetic shapes, grammatical forms, and lexica, that appear at 
the indiscretion of their scribes, in the otherwise Classical literary language 
in which they were written.3 While the importance of this body of texts for 
aspects of later Buryat linguistic history is incontestable, it is the case 
that no manuscript datable to before the late eighteenth century has yet come 
to light, so that this source cannot be utilized for the present problem.
Early Western Recordings
It was noted above that Buryat had developed in most respects its character­
istic modern shape by the eighteenth century. Our witness to this consists of 
some stray recordings made in 1723 by Daniel Gottlieb Messerschmidt and of 
several glossaries passed on in the compilations of Johann Eberhard Fischer (ca. 
1730) and Peter Simon Pallas (1786-1789).^ Of these, the Fischer glossary is 
especially important as it reflects in a relatively systematic fashion a Western 
Buryat dialect that is unambiguous in regard to most of the developments which 
concern us: (l) —s > —d, cf. F totaho "clay," B todxo "a fine dust," WM toyosqa
"brick"; (2) si > s, cf. F Sahara "yellow," B 'sara, WM sira\ (3) s > h, cf. F 
chakal "beard," B haxal, WM saqal-, {k) Cl'S > s/z, cf. F sfagun "snow," B sadum,
WM oasun',^ (5) ci/ji remains a/y in Fischer, but Messerschmidt reflects the 
change > s {sahonno "wolf," B 'Sono, WM "dino-, gusahyn "30," B guSa'^, WM yii&in) ■, 
while for ji it may be that Messerschmidt' s spelling dsh represents z (dsheron 
"60," B zarar], WM nadshir "summer," B nazar < *naSir) Taken together,
then, Fischer's and Messerschmidt's recordings establish that the major sound 
changes characteristic of all modern Buryat dialects were already in existence 
in the Western Buryat dialect area in the 1720s.T
Dialects
Although numerous problems and issues in Bixryat dialectology remain unresolved, 
we are in possession of basic monographs describing the major dialects. Without 
violating general views toward their classification, Buryat dialects may be 
divided into the following groups:®
I. Western-. Ekhirit and Bulagat, with Bokhan and Bar guz in (where z > y,cf. 
Siruya "ambler" > zor5 > yard). Alar, Kudara, Nizhne-Udinsk, Tunka, etc.;®
II. Eastern: Khori, which is the basis of the literary language, with Aga,
Ivolga, and other sub-dialects
III. Southern: Selenga, consisting of Congol and Sartuul; Bargu.
One might suppose that those dialects which have participated in all the 
major Buryat changes, and which are spoken by ethnic groups who are core com­
ponents of the present Buryat people, would be those dialects most pertinent to 
problems of the historical development of Buryat. However, it is the case that 
the Congol dialect, which linguistically stands closest to Khalkha, provides us 
with a key to the solution of the chronology of one of the Buryat changes.
An important aspect of Congol is that it is spoken by people whose movement 
out of Mongolia into the Selenga region may be dated with some precision. It
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is known, both from Russian administrative dociunents and from historical chron­
icles composed by the Selenga Buryats that the Congol clans migrated into the 
Selenga area in the contact zone with the Buryat language in the l680s, largely 
as the result of the war between the Oirat prince Galdan Busugtu and the Khalkha 
prince Sayin Khan.12 Another important facet of Congol is that in the seven­
teenth and eighteenth centuries it belonged to the Khalkha dialect group ac­
cording to features which it still retains: (l) s remains s in Congol, Khalkha 
Sara "moon," but B hara-, (2) 5/j become c/j in C, Kh cever "clean, pure," but B 
seber, and C, Kh jugan "thick," but B zuzan; (3) oi/'^i remain in C, Kh aono "wolf, 
but B Sono, and C, Kh ^oro "ambler," but B zord.^^ The Buryat influence on Con— 
gol shows up in certain phonetic details (-s > -d), and more pronouncedly in the 
lexicon.
One element of the latter kind of influence is the postposition—perhaps 
better described as an enclitic—co, which has in Congol an inessive-illative function meaning "in, within"; e.g., C gerco "within the house."1^ This 
enclitic, in the form so and with the same function, is found in all Buryat di­
alects, but in no other Mongol language.15 Consequently, its appearance in 
Congol may unequivocally be interpreted as a borrowing from Buryat. Moreover, 
on the basis of the initials of co and so, the immediately preceding form *co may be postulated.1^
What makes the Congol reflex of this enclitic so significant is that its 
adoption from Buryat can be dated to the period after the l680s when the Con- 
gols moved into contact with Buryat. Congol co cannot have been borrowed from 
Buryat so, that is, after the latter had undergone the change a > s, because in 
that case Congol would have the form so, since Congol had and has the phoneme 
s. Nor should it have been borrowed from the reconstructed Buryat *co at a 
stage before Buryat had made the change c > s, because in that case Congol would 
have the form c5, as the phoneme c has always existed in Congol.
Therefore, the only possible inference to be drawn from Congol co is that it 
was borrowed from Buryat *co. With this we are in a position to establish two 
facts of Buryat linguistic history:
(1) the intermediate stage a/^ > c/g, which was postulated as (Ua) above, 
was a reality in the Buryat dialect area at some point after the l680s (Congol- 
Buryat contact) and before the lT20s (Fischer-Messerschmldt);
(2) the sound change (l*b) c/j > s/z occurred between the l680s and the 1720s, 
since its starting point is entailed by the Congol reflex co and its ending 
point is attested in the Fischer-Messerschmidt recordings.
The Buryat Element in Yaqut
Among the problems connected with the Mongol elements in Siberian Turkic 
languages,17 none is more pertinent to the present theme than the Mongol borrow­
ings in Yaqut, at least one layer of which was thought to be of Buryat origin 
by the chief investigator of this question, S. Kaiuzyfiski.l^
The Mongol loanwords in Yaqut display two reflexes of Mongol c/g:
(a) cjg !■ s; cf. Y suguVdn "assembly" -<— M, WM ^ylayan, B sugldr]-, Y s-uarya
’"_sirya "sled" <— M, WM 'birya, B sarga-, Y subgdi "cream" -e- M, WM gbgekei, B 
xZxei; •
(b) S/J —> afg', cf. Y cayvlyan "lightning" -<— M, WM bakilyan, B saxilgar\-.
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Y Hoik "decoration” M, WM HHg "writing," B beseg-, Y Zfoyus '-^JaY^s "suit­
ability" ^ M, WM gokis, B zoxid-, Y gilai "resin" ^ M '*jilei, B zell. ^ 
Kaiuzynski supposed that the two reflexes indicated that the Mongol^loanwords 
entered Yaqut from different Mongol dialects; that, since Mongol o/g become 
sibilants slzjslz only in Buryat, layer (a) must be the Buryat layer in Yaqut; 
and that the Biiryat layer is the most recent.20 According to this view, then, 
Yaqut is a potential source for the linguistic history of Buryat.
However, it can be shown with some clarity that a different interpretation 
of the two reflexes of Mongol o/g must be correct. In the first place, the 
fact of intensive contact between predecessors of speakers of Buryat and Yaqut 
is indisputable. This is nowhere more evident than from the example of the 
designation of the "rainbow" in the two languages: B unegen sektete and Y saszl
iktSbif, literally "the fox pissed."21 Here the parallel expressions which em- 
idoy native words imply a connection that is deeper than ordinary borrowing, 
namely, the common conceptualization of an atmospheric phenomenon. Because this 
conceptualization is unknown elsewhere in Siberia, it is possible to infer some 
period of community among peoples who later formed components of the Buryats and 
the Yaquts.22
Even among the Mongol borrowings in Yaput, it is possible to detect specif­
ically Biiryat loanwords: Y Jars%n "thin; book" -<— B^*cdrsan > sarhar\, cf. WM
oayasun. Middle Mongol 'oa'alsun, Kalmyk oasy^, Ordos oasUj Khalkha cas(an)', Y 
gon "people" -t— B *gon > zor\, a word that is not found in other Mongol lan­
guages. 23 These borrowings alone prove that layer (b) S/U >■ 5/J is a Buryat 
layer in Yaqut.
The status of layer (a) o/g —> s must be evaluated in light of the sound 
changes which affected the Turkic portion of the Yaqut lexicon. By the time of 
the compilation of Witsen's Noord en Cost Tartarye (1692), but undoubtedly sev­
eral decades earlier, a small Yaqut word had been recorded that already reflec­
ted the major Yaqut sound changes, including the change 25/? > s in ^1 positions 
Us "3" < MC; Suis "face" < 'teSs < *guz \ Sili "marrow" <*ciH < *^ilik.'^'^ The 
Mongol borrowings of layer (a) show precisely the same reflexes in Yaqut as do 
the native Turkic words, from which it may be inferred that layer (a) existed 
in Yaqut prior to the Yaqut sound change 5/? > s and, of course, prior to the 
entrance of layer (b).25
As a result of these considerations, it can be seen that layer (a) borrow­
ings which, it goes without saying, are probably also to be attributed to those 
Mongol dialects which formed modern Buryat,26 cannot be utilized as a source 
for the present problem since internal Yaqut developments served to "mask^ the 
original phonetic shapes of the borrowed words. Layer (b) borrowings, which 
are demonstrably Buryat, cannot be assigned even an approximate absolute chron­
ology due to the still obscure historical relationship between the Buryat and 
Yaqut peoples. On the positive side, however, it has been established that 
layer (b) reflects a stage of Buryat that existed prior to the operation of the 
sound changes which concern us here.
Buryat Loanwords in Evenki
Several dialects of Evenki, a Northern Tungus language, are spoken on the 
territory of modern Buryatia.Of these, only the dialect of the Barguzin
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Evenki has been described in any detail, from which it is clear that it con­tains a substantial nximber of words borrowed from Buryat.28
One of these borrowings has immediate significance for the present problem. 
The name for the Russian Tsar in Barguzin Evenki is kSn, which represents
Mongol cayan qayan "White Khan."30 Since this term should not have come into 
existence prior to the first penetration into Buryatia by the Russians in the 
1620s, we may infer from its presence in Barguzin Evenki that a form *cagdr) 
existed in Buryat between the l620s and that point in the period between the 
l680s and the 1720s when a form *cagax\ would have regularly developed in Buryat 
(see above under Dialects).
Written Mongol Elements in Buryat
Although it is probably true that the use of Written Mongol accompanied the 
introduction of Lamaism among the Biiryats at the end of the seventeenth century, 
it is at least possible that Written Mongol was known in this area as early as 
the l660s since Witsen's information noted above could have dated from this 
time. Over several centuries. Written Mongol cannot have failed to leave its 
impress on Buryat, especially in the lexicon where borrowed elements may be 
identified on the basis of their phonetic and semantic characteristics. As an 
example, B el’gese- "to sympathize with" must be borrowed from WM eligese- "id.," 
both because we should expect B *el'gehe- and because this word is typical of 
literary, religious contexts. Indeed, many of the aberrant forms of Mongol 
words in Biiryat, that is, those which seem to have defied regular sound changes, 
probably reflect borrowings from Written Mongol.
Such is the case, it may be argued, with B tiibheri "level, smooth; peaceful, 
calm," which corresponds to WM tubsin "id." Had this word developed regularly 
as a part of the Buryat lexicon, it would have undergone the sound change (2) 
si > s and ended up as B *tubser\. Rather, B tubhen may be explained as a bor­
rowing from WM tubsin that occurred after (2) si > S and before (3) s > 
since it shows the effect of the latter change. Because this borrowing could 
not have taken place prior to the introduction of Written Mongol, whose earliest 
possible attested date is the l660s, and because the change (3) s > is known 
to have existed in the 1720s (Fischer-Messerschmidt), we can establish two 
further facts of Buryat linguistic history: (l) the change (2) si > s demon­
strably occurred before the change (3) s > h, as argued above; (2) the change 
(3) s > h occurred at some point between the l660s and 1720s.
Russian Loanwords in Buryat
Due to the fact that they cannot antedate the period of first contacts in 
the 1620s, the Russian borrowings in Buryat may eventually prove to be one of 
the most important sources of Buryat linguistic history. The Russian element 
is devilishly difficult to Investigate and no systematic effort to do so has 
been expended for the present paper. Here only one aspect of this question 
will be commented upon.
The Buryat sound change (l) -s > -d had certainly occurred by the 1720s, as 
it is reflected in the Fischer-Messerschmidt materials. Moreover, as Doerfer 
pointed out, the change is reflected in the name Fedot, which represents a
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Buryat form of the Russian name Feodosij and which is attested in a Russian 
document from 1701.31 Furthermore, certain Russian loanwords in Buryat also 
have this reflex: Rus' —> orod "Russian," roz’ —> orod "rye" (Bokhan dial.), 
peskar' —>■ pedger "gudgeon-fish; gobio gohio" (Mukhorshibir dial.).3 Barring 
mediation through Siberian Turkic languages, these words co\ild not have been 
borrowed before the l620s, so that one might suppose that the change -s > -d 
occurred after that time. However, several factors should be considered before 
reaching such a conclusion.
It was already noted above that the change -s > -d is attested in the Middle 
Mongol period and so could have existed in the dialect base of later Buryat.33 
More significantly, it may be posited that the change -s > -d in Buryat is 
morphophonemically determined, that is, that the phonetic structure of the 
Buryat word conforms to a constraint against the occurrence of final -s such 
that it automatically becomes -d. Support of this hypothesis may be foimd in 
the false back formations that occur in several Buryat dialects; e.g., Alar 
buidt "steel" ~ butahlye (Acc.) < *butdslye (WM bolod —Persian pulad), pdtdt ~ 
pdldhdr (Instr.) < *pdldsar Russ, plat) Such cases in which *s > h ap­
pears in declined forms could not occur, did not Alar speakers sense that they 
belonged with cases as utdt "people" ~ uldhd (Gen.) < *ulasd (V/M ulus Turkic 
ulus)—in other words, did they not sense that t{d) paradigmatically replaces s 
in final position.
Thus on the diachronic plane, the change (l) -s > -d probably occurred before 
the seventeenth century, while on the synchronic plane, the change -s > -d is a 
structural rule of Buryat that already existed in the seventeenth century.
Conclusions
On the basis of the preceding discussion, we may now attempt to assign an 
approximate absolute chronology to each of the sound changes which were aligned 
in a relative chronology above:
(1) -s > -d occurred before the seventeenth century
(2) si > ^ occurred before (3) (WM tubsin B tubhex])thus before some point in the period l660s-1720s
(3) s > h occurred at some point in the period l660s-1720s 
(WM tubsin B tubher\)
(ita) d/o > d/j occurred after the l620s (B *aagdr\ Barguzin Evenki
dagST]) and before (4b) (B *ao Congol oo), thus
before some point in the period l680s-1720s
(4b) o/o > s/s occiirred at some point in the period l680s-1720s 
(B *go Congol ao)
(5) oil'si > s/z occurred after (4) but before the 1720s (Messerschmidt), thus toward the end of the period l680s-1720s
It is significant that (l) and (2) are already attested in Middle Mongol
sources and thus need not be peculiarly Buryat at all. The uniquely Buryat 
features (3)-(5), on the other hand, all occurred over the course of a century, 
from the l620s to the 1720s, and are concentrated in the period from the l660s
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to the 1720s. Prior to this cluster of so^lnd changes, then, the special char­
acter of Buryat phonology had not yet taken shape, so that the dialects spoken 
in the Sis-Baikal area differed hut little from other dialects of the central 
Mongol group.
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gosudarstvennogo pedagog-i5eskogo Inst-ituta imena D. Banzarova l6 (1958) > PP- 
II3-1U3; id., "Turecko-burjatskle jazykovye parallel!,” ibid. 23 (1961), pp.
237-266.
18. Mdngolisahe Elemente in der jakutisohen Spraohe, Warsaw 1962 :Prace 
Orientalistyczne 10!.
19. Ibid., pp. U5-J+8.
20. Ibid., pp. 123-126.
21. I. A. Podgorb\mskij, Russko-mongolo-burjatskij slovar', Irkutsk 1909, 
p. 257; E. K. Pekarskij, Slovar’ jakutskogo jazyhx, I, St. Petersburg 1907, 
p. 911.22. This is hardly the place to broach the complex problem of the southern 
origin of the Yaquts which, since the fundamental researches of A. P. Okladnikov, 
Yakutia Before its Incorporation into the Russian State, Montreal and London 
1970 [Anthropology of the North: Translations from Russian Sources, 8!, has 
been localized in the Sis-Baikal region where the Buryats evolved, and where
the Mongol-Yaqut contacts presumably occurred prior to the northern migration 
of the Yaquts. Nonetheless, I should like to recall two facts that somewhat 
obscure this picture. First, on the basis of his study of the geographical and 
demographic distribution of Siberian peoples in the seventeenth century, B. 0. 
Dolgikh, Rodovoj i plemennog sostav narodov Sibiri v XVII veke, Moscow i960, 
was able to complete a map (between pp. 61U and 615) which shows a group of 
"Korintsy" (= Khori) and "Daury" settled in the region northeast of Yakutsk.
This important proof of probably Mongol elements co-existing with the Yaquts as 
late as the seventeenth century was first pointed out by G. Kara, Le glossaire 
yakoute de Witsen," p. 1+32. Second, it may be recalled that one of the com­
ponents of the Yaqut people were the Khoro who, according to Yaqut legends, 
spoke in the special xoro t%'la "Khori language”; cf. G. U. Ergis, Istorioeskie 
predaniga i rasskazy gakutov, I, Moscow and Leningrad i960, pp. I8, 100-103, 
2l|4-2l+5, 298. This suggests the presence in the north of a Mongol-speaking 
people, specifically the Khori who also took part in the formation of the 
Buryats, over an indeterminable period prior to and perhaps during the seven­
teenth cent+iry. _ . . , .23* Tliess exajnpl6s aj(*6 cited. Toy G. Doerfer in 0v%€Tii^cil/i'&'t'VSOnQ 
58 (1963), C. 506; cf. Kaiuzynski, op. ait., pp. 124-125.
24. Cf. Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute de Witsen," and note 2 above.
25. That layer (a) is older than layer (b) was already the conclusion reached 
by N. Poppe, "Das Jakutische," Philologiae Turaioae Fundamenta, I, Wiesbaden 
1959, P- 683, and accepted by Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute de Witsen," p. 434.
26. On the essentially Buryat character of both layers of loanwords in Yaqut 
I agree with Doerfer, in Orientalistisahe Literaturzeitung 58 (1963), cc. 506- 
507, although my conclusions concerning the chronology of Buryat so+ind changes
differ from his. , x • •
27. Cf. the recent sketch of A. S. Suhin, ooeTh etn'icesKO^j 'LSvow'L
evenkov Zabaghal'ga (XVII-XX vv.), Ulan-Ude 1973* _
28. Cf. N. Poppe, Materialy dlga issledovaniga tungusskogo gazyka. Narecne
barguzinskikh tungiisov, Leningrad 1927; W. Kotwicz, "Le dialecte tongous de 
Bargouzine (materia+ix recueillis par D. Rincino)," Rocznik Orientalvstyozny 16 
(1950), pp. 315-326; the work of V. A. Gorcevskaja, Kharaktervst^ka govora 
barguzinskikh evenkov, Moscow and Leningrad 1936, is based solely on the mate­
rials of Poppe. .
29. This example was brought to my attention by Professor Poppe during his
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my gratitude at this time. To my regret, I have not otherwise investigated the 
Buryat loanwords in Evenki.
30. Cf. Poppe, Materialy dlja isstedovanija tungusskogo gazyha, p. 59.
31. Cf. Doerfer, Oriens 18-19 (1965-1966), p. ^3^+; G. N. Rumjancev and S. B. 
Okun', Sbomik dokumentov po istorii Burjatii. XVII vek, I, Ulan-Ude i960, p. 
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and Doerfer, in OrientaZistische Literaturzeitung 58 (I963), c. 506, interpret 
the Mongol data in such Russian documents as Buryat. In the light of my new 
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to accept their view as the most probable, but have not yet examined this mate­
rial in detail; cf. my "Two eighteenth century Buryat glossaries," p. 6l Con 
p. 82, n. 33, I have wrongly criticized a statement of San2eev, which I simply 
misconstrued!!; also cf. the view of Kara, "Le glossaire yakoute de Witsen," 
p. k33.
32. Cf. M. P. Khomonov, "Bokhanskij govor," in Issledovanie, I, p. 6k-, T. A. 
Bertagaev, K issledovanigu leksiki mongol'skikh jazykov, Ulan-Ude 1961, p. 77 
Lnurai pedger "a fish of the carp species, a koras'-t±sh," but see G. U. Lind- 
berg and A. S. Gerd, Slovar' nazvanic presnovodnykh ryb SSSR, Leningrad 1972, 
pp. 157-159, for this species!.
33. Cf. my remarks in Mongolian Studies 3 (1976), pp. 123-125, and in "Turkic 
loanwords in Mongol, I. The treatment of non-initial s, z, s, S," Central 
Asiatic Journal 23 (1979), in press.
34. Cf. Poppe, Alarskij govor, p. 25.
THE ACTIVITIES OF THE MPR STATE COMMITTEE FOR TERMINOLOGY: 
BASIC PRINCIPLES IN FORMULATIWG NEW VOCABULARY
Hisao Kimura 
Asia University, Tokyo
Under the provisions of the Japanese-Mongolian Treaty for Cultural Coopera­
tion, a research team of Asia University was invited by the MPR Academy of 
Sciences to visit Mongolia in September 1977. The research theme of the group 
was "a Study of Mongolia's Modernization." My task was to investigate modern­
ization in the linguistic field of tenninology or neologisms.
As a result of the revolution in 1921, the Mongolian People's Republic (MPR) 
became the second socialist state in world history. Since then the MPR has 
exerted great efforts in building a modern socialist nation. It has been par­
ticularly successful in the educational field in the three decades since the 
second world war.
In spite of much turmoil immediately following the revolution in 1921, the 
Mongolian government mapped out plans for the national development of education. 
One problem that blocked the success of the plan was the lack of necessary vo­
cabulary due largely to the traditional nomadic background of the Mongols. It 
was therefore imperative to create or standardize academic terms essential to 
the modern development of education, particularly for ideological education.
To meet this necessity, efforts were made to create new terms by translating 
or adopting foreign terms. To promote and coordinate this task, the Mongolian 
government established a Committee for Terminology under the State Committee of 
Sciences (to become the Academy of Sciences in I961). At the first Great Peo­
ple's Khural, held in November 192U, Jamyan, chairman of the Committee of Sci­
ences reported; "Almost everyone is inventing new words or new terms as they 
please. To protect the purity of the Mongolian language and to meet a rising 
demand of the times, we have set up some ten specialized subcommittees and 
assigned to them the scientific study of needed new academic terms."
In 1930 a Translation Committee for Political and Economic Terms was organ­
ized under the Committee on Propaganda and Education of the Central Committee ^ 
of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party (MPRP). This translation com­
mittee soon published a Russian-Mongolian dictionary for political and economic 
terms containing some 6OO ideological terms from Marxist-Leninist works. A 
Russian-Latin-Mongolian botanical dictionary was published in 1931. In 1932 
an Academic Terms Committee was established within the Department of Philology 
and Phonetics of the MPR State Committee of Sciences. This committee later be­
came the State Committee for Terminology. In 1935 this committee published a 
Russian-Mongolian dictionary of mathematical terms and a Russian-Mongolian 
dictionary of geographical and meteorological terms. In 1937 it published a 
Russian-Mongolian dictionary for chemical terms, a Russian-Mongolian dictionary 
for physical terms, and in 19^5 it published a Russian-Mongolian dictionary of
26
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academic terms. Since 1959, the State Committee for Terminology has been pub­
lishing a quarterly periodical, "Supplementary Volume on Academic Terms," to 
announce newly adopted industrial and agricultural terms. To publicize and 
popularize new terms among the common people, the state committee publishes a 
quarterly, "News of the State Committe for Terminology."
It has published to date three volumes entitled "Collection of Academic 
Terms," containing more than 30,000 terms. The Political Bureau of the MPEP 
Central Committee adopted a resolution in 1963 entitled, "Work of the Language 
and Literature Committee of the MPR Academy of Sciences." The resolution di­
rected that in formulating or standardizing academic terms, the State Committee 
for Terminology should adhere to the principle of motivating and assisting the 
Mongolian people to understand the best scientific, cultural and technical 
achievements in the world, of facilitating the students' studies, and of con­
tinually enriching the vocabulary of the Mongolian language. The State Committee 
should constantly investigate actual usage of new terms in the society and if 
necessary, correct and improve them on the basis of public opinion. This resolu­
tion continues to be the fundamental guiding policy of the committee today.
On September 12-13, 1977> I had the opportunity of interviewing Professor 
Lubsandendeb, president of the Language and Literature Institute of the Academy 
of Sciences in Ulaanbaatar and concurrently chairman of the State Committee for 
Terminology. I also interviewed Professor Lubsanjab, dean of the Literature 
Department of the Mongolian State University and concurrently member of the 
State Committee for Terminology. They explained how new academic terms are 
formulated in the Mongolian People's Republic. The following remarks contain 
the gist of their statements and several articles written by Mongolian scholars 
on the subject of terminology.
There is presently a Department of Academic Terms within the Language and 
Literature Institute of the Academy of Sciences. Apart from this, there is the 
State Committee for Terminology consisting of nine scholars appointed by the 
central government. All government offices and affiliated agencies are required 
to propose new terms they desire to incorporate in their various activities.
They do so in cooperation with the above-mentioned Department of Academic Terms. 
The proposals drafted are then submitted to the MPR State Committee for Termin­
ology. Several subcommittees of specialists within the State Committee then 
study the proposals with the assistance of other specialists from various fields. 
If necessary, the subcommittee amends the proposed draft of terms and, after 
approving them, the State Committee for Terminology announces them officially. 
Official announcements of new terms are incorporated in the quarterly magazine 
published by the State Committee. From time to time, the State Committee also 
publishes dictionaries or collections of terms in various industrial, scientific, 
and cultural fields. The State Committee for Terminology strictly observes 
certain fiindamental principles in creating new academic terms so that the new 
terms are formulated on a scientific basis; they should be nationalistic, 
systematic, standardized and unifying.
The Mongols formulate new terms by borrowing from Indo-European languages. 
Almost all new or modern words come from or through the Russian language. This 
is an inevitable consequence under present circumstances. There is, however, 
a fundamental policy that the new terms should be derived from basic Mongolian
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vocabulary as much as possible.
1. New words or terms are taken from classical Mongolian literary words or from
local dialects. They include the names of animals, plants, minerals and 
social phenomena. Ebcample: ekh 'mother* + bari- 'to restore' + suffix -gch
= ekh harigch 'midwife.'
2. New words or terms are derived from old Mongolian literary words or local
dialects by giving them new meanings. Examples: old word nokhbr 'friend'
now means comrade; old word tsakhilgaan 'lightning' now means electricity, 
as in tsakhilgaan ermeleg 'electric medical treatment'; old word tengri 
'heaven' now means god.
3. New terms are formed by combining old Mongolian words in both subordinatlve
and coordlnative combinations. Examples: old words orlogo 'income' + zarlag
'expenditure' = orlogo zarlaga 'budget'; old words moljikh 'pluck' + yus 
'system' = n^ljikh yus 'exploitation.'
4. New terms are derived by translating the meaning of foreign terms. Examples: 
old words gerel 'flash light' + zurag 'image' = gerel zurag 'photograph'; 
old words nevterkhii 'detailed' + tol' 'dictionary' = nevterkhii tol' 'ency­
clopedia; old words surga- 'to teach' + khdrmujuulekh 'to raise, to bring up'
+ ukhaan 'knowledge' = surgan khdmuujuulekh ukhaan 'pedagogy.*
5. New terms are made by a simulated translation of foreign terms. Examples: 
us 'water' + t3r3- 'to give birth to' + suffix -goh 'element* = us t3r3goh 
'hydrogen'; klvXahil 'sourness' + t3r3- 'to give birth to' + suffix -gah 
'element' = kMiahil tor3goh 'oxygen.'
6. New words or terms are created by adding suffixes to old Mongolian words.
Examples: old word ukhuula 'to propagate' + suffix goh 'element or person'
= ukhuulagah 'agitator.'
7. Categories of foreign borrowings:
a. Foreign words or terms adopted with some phonological changes.
Examples: oktyabri 'October*; autobus 'bus'; tsirk 'circus.'
b. Foreign borrowings with explanatory term.
Examples: nisekh 'flying* + ongots 'ship' = nisekh ongots 'airplane';
niigem 'social' + juram 'system' = hiigem Juram 'socialism.'
c. Foreign borrowings with double meanings are translated differently.
Examples: the Russian term fizioheskaya nauka becomes Mongolian fizikiyn
shinjlekh ukhaan 'physical science.' The Russian term fiziaheskiy trud 
becomes bieiin 'body' + kh3d3lmor 'labor' = physical labor.
d. Terms are created by combining foreign borrowings and Mongolian words.
Example: khushuuoh 'vanguard leader' + general = major general; kino
'cinema' + zurag 'picture' = movie; zuragtai 'with picture' + radio = 
television.
As one may see from the above examples, the neological technique is ingeniously 
developed with the priority given to the basic Mongolian vocabulary. Only when 
deemed unavoidable are foreign borrowings or terms adopted. Even in adopting 
foreign terms, it is done in a consistent, sophisticated manner. That is to 
say, instead of simply adopting a Russian word or term as is, the item in ques­
tion is traced back to its original meaning or original form in Greek or Latin. 
Then it is translated into Mongolian directly from its original meaning or it 
is adapted in its original form from the Greek and Latin.
In spite of the fact that Russian is presently playing a leading role in the 
development of a modern Mongolian vocabulary, it appears that deliberate, studied 
efforts are being made to avoid borrowing terms directly from Russian. Foreign
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borrowings of Greek and Latin origin adopted into Mongolian through Russian are 
defined by Mongolian linguists as international words. It is noteworthy that 
the number of Mongolian words borrowed directly from pure native Russian is far 
less than the number of so-called international words or terms. Mongolian lin­
guists are very aware of this phenomenon. They welcome the Increased use of 
international terms in the political, economic, scientific and cultural fields 
to enrich the Mongolian vocabulary. Nevertheless, in order to avoid confusion 
in the practical field of technical or academic terms, these linguists emphasize 
the absolute priority and importance of formulating terms from basic native Mon­
golian vocabulary.
After going through dozens of articles written by the Mongolian linguists on 
the subject, I have come away with the impression that all of them shared a 
firm and profound nationalistic respect for Mongolia's traditional culture, 
particularly of its language. Today the MPR is conducting advanced education 
and academic research on its own language. It is true that a modern Mongolian 
vocabulary is still in the process of being developed, but there can be no doubt 
that the Mongolian vocabulary has already been improved and modernized to the 
extent that higher education and academic research can be conducted in the lan­
guage.
It is instructive to compare Mongolia's experience with that of other moderniz­
ing countries. In Japan such words as society, individual, freedom, rights, 
philosophy, insurance, and company had not been formulated until the Meiji era 
(1868-1912). Although Japan had a long tradition in the use of Chinese char­
acters {kanji), it was not an easy task to create precise or apt words or terms 
expressing certain abstract concepts because many such expressions had never 
existed in Japan. Traditional Mongolia, too, lacked many abstract expressions. 
Mongolia, therefore, also experienced great difficulties in developing abstract 
terms. In spite of the differences in the political and social systems, I can 
see many common problems and similarities in the experience of Mongolia and 
Meiji Japan in the rapid adoption of foreign culture.
The MPR State Committee for Terminology is playing a leading role as a driv­
ing force in formulating, standardizing and popularizing new terms in Mongolia 
in a comparatively short period of time. Judging from its activities in the 
last half century, the role and achievements of this committee in promoting the 




Jurchen (.Jiiraen) is a language very close to Manchu and can be regarded 
either as the older form of Manchu or as a dialect very close to Old Manchu.^ 
The speakers of Jurchen appeared in history in A.D. 1115, and their dynasty 
bearing the name of Chin ruled over Northern China until 123^.^ The oldest 
available monument of the Jurchen language is an inscription of II85 which was 
followed by a number of other steles, but the most important source is the col­
lection of materials, i.e. documents and a glossary, known as Hua-i 
which contains, inter alia, a petition of 1526.^
Jurchen has been studied little. The first investigation of Jiirchen was 
published by Grube^ which remained the only one until the appearance of Ligeti 
articles.^ There is also a brief description of Jurchen by Menges."^ The most 
recent edition of Jurchen linguistic material is that by Kiyose cited in note 
3. The present article is based on it.
's
As mentioned above, the Jurchen appeared in history in the twelfth century, 
i.e. at the end of the Ancient Mongolian period or at the beginning of the 
Middle Mongolian period.^ However, their contacts with the Mongols or the 
ajicestors of the latter began at a still earlier time. As it will be seen be­
low, some Mongolian elements in Jurchen go back to Ancient Mongolian.
Ligeti has discussed the old Mongolian elements in Manchu and found that a 
number of such words already occurred in Jurchen.9 It is true there are AMo 
loan words in Manchu which, for chronological reasons, cannot be regarded as 
direct borrowings from Mongolian but must have been inherited from Jurchen.
Being close to Manchu, Jurchen has, however, preserved many features which 
are considerably older than the respective developments in Manchu. Thus Jurchen 
still had t before *i, whereas in Manchu the affricate a corresponds, e.g.,
J 805^® tatiburu 'to study' = Ma tacibu- 'to teach.Some words in Jurchen 
have preserved the second syllable which has disappeared in Manchu, e.g., J 209 
fa'a 'window' = Ma fa id.^^ etc. Consequently, one should expect Jurchen, a 
language much more archaic than Manchu, to be an important source for the study 
of Ancient Mongolian. Indeed, as it will be seen shortly, Jurchen has preserved 
a niimber of the oldest reconstructable forms of Mongolian words.
Before we proceed to the discussion of AMo loan words in Jurchen, let it be 
said that the Mong. elements in Jurchen can be divided into two main groups.
The first group is composed of such words which lack features characteristic 
of any particular stage of language development. Thus, JJ^a^YaGU 'the brother 
of the mother'13 is a Written Mongolian prm, cf. Mo nagacu 'maternal uncle' 
which is identical with MMo nayaau id.,1^ but, on the o^her hand, almost identi­
cal with Ord naga't’si 'maternal relative.'^5 Another example is J ^asa- 'to 
rule, order, de$ree'^° which is identical with Mo and MMo ^asa-and Ord 
DZasa- (phonetically the same as ^asa- id.).l® If it had been unknown that the
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J forms in question are attested in the J section of the Hua-i i-yu, the words 
in question could not be regarded as old borrowings from Mongolian. It goes 
without saying that such J words as irge-n 'people,' arki 'liquor,' ^asa- 'to 
r\ile,' naya^ 'maternal uncle,' and yuvixan 'lamb'll do not contribute any­
thing to historical phonology of Mongolian, and are important only as proof 
that they existed at that time in the forms attested in the Hua-i i-yu.
The other group of Mong loan words in Jurchen comprises words which display 
features characteristic of particular periods of language history. Thus,
J xdlin 'sea otter'20 is certainly a MMo form, cf. MMo qali'un 'beaver,'21 Mo 
qaliyun 'otter' etc. This is a rather new form which might have penetrated 
into JiiTchen no earlier than in the twelfth or thirteenth century. Another MMo 
form is J 170 ajir morin 'stallion,' cf. Mo a^irga, MMo a^irya id.22 As for 
the AMo form of this word, it is *adin’ga attested as a borrowing in Solon.23 
A MMo form is also J J*57 dauli- in dautimei 'to snatch,' cf. SH da'uli- 'to 
plunder, capture,'2^ H da’uli- 'to plunder,'25 L daulin 'enemy raid,'^6 mo 
tayuli- 'to chase, attack, seize.'2T
The above examples demonstrate that Jurchen was under Mong influence both 
in AMo and MMo periods. No wonder that Manchu, the continuation of Jurchen or 
its closest relative, has also many old and new Mong loan words. It is sur­
prising, however, that Mongolian does not have borrowings which could be re­
garded with certainty as taken from Jurchen, although one would have expected 
to find such loan words in view of Jurchen's importance at a time when the 
consolidation of the Mongolian tribes was in its very initial stage. This 
might be another proof that the reason for borrowing of words is not the politi­
cal or cultural Inferiority of the speakers of the borrowing language. The 
most convincing other examples are Russian and Persian, both of them possessing 
a large number of Turkic loan words, notwithstanding the fact that both of them 
were culturally and otherwise considerably superior to the Turkic tribes.
After these preliminary remarks, we proceed to the AMo loan words in Jurchen.
1. Preservation of AMo *i in the second syllable
In many cases the original *i in the second syllable was assimilated to the 
vowel of the initial syllable as early as in Ancient Mongolian.28 Cf. Mo 
gedesun < AMo *gedelsun ~ *gedilsicn < *gudilsun 'intestines' but Vio gVt^ige <
AMo *gudige, cf. Ev gudiy'e 'peritoneum'29 < AMo; Mo gede < AMo *gede ~ *gedi 
'occiput, nape,' cf. Mo gegige <AMo *gedike 'queue.'30
Jurchen has preserved AMo *i in the following words: J U83 medige < AMo
*medige 'tidings,' cf. Mo medege < *medige 'information,'31 J 228 hudila < AMo 
hudila < AMo *kudirkd 'crupper' > Mo qudurga id.32 Although Middle Turkic has 
only qu&uryun 'crupper,'33 i.e. an assimilated form. Ancient Turkic may have 
had *qudtryin 'crupper.'
2. Preservation of AMo *d before *i
In Ancient Mongolian *d before *i was still preserved, cf. AMo *gudige 
'stomach' > Ev gudiye 'peritoneum.'3^
J\u’chen has preserved several AMo forms with *d before i, cf. J 383, k&9,
756 dirgala- 'to take pleasure, enjoy, be cheerful' < AMo *dirga- > Mo ~giraa- 
'to be happy, be joyful,' cf. Yak s'iryd- 'to enjoy food' (a later borrowing 
from Mong);35 j U83 medige 'tidings' < AMo ’’‘medige > Mo medege, Kh medke
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'information,' cf. the younger loan word Ma medege ~ medexe 'information, news' 
id.;36 j 228 hudila 'crupper' < AMo *kudirka Ma quduryan id. and Ev
kudurga id. being new borrowings from Mong.3°
However, there occur also two typical MMo forms with 3 < *d which are to be 
regarded as later borrowings taken at the end of the Jurchen period. These ^e 
J 225 cQir a^il 'deed' < MMo, Mo d^il < AMo *adil 'work,' and J 170 dSir movin 
'stallion' (see above).
3. Preservation of AMo *f-
Ancient Mongolian had the strong stop *p or the bilabial voiceless fricative 
*<l) at the onset of many words.39 it developed into h in Middle Mongolian, 
and is still preserved as x in some Mongolian languages.
Jurchen has at least one AMo loan word with cf. J jtlO fute- in futemei 
'to see off < AMo *pUde- (or *^ude~) id., MMo (H) hude-^^ Mo ude- id.^ This 
word occiars also in Manchu-Tungus languages, cf. U1 pudeai- 'to expel ("see 
off") an evil spirit,' Nan pude- ~ fude- id., Ma fude- 'to see off.' It occurs 
in the Northern T\ingus languages only as a new borrowing from Mongolian, cf. 
ude-.^^
w
The other Jurchen word with f- is J 2k3 fila 'dish,' but this is certainly 
not an AMo loan word because Mo has bila 'dish, bowl' which is a borrowing from 
Turkic, cf. Osm, Crm piyald 'bowl, mug,' Uzb piyala 'tea cup,' Cum piala 'gob­
let,' Kaz piyala < Pers piydla?^'^ Therefore J fila is to be regarded as a word 
of Pers origin but borrowed via Turkic together with such words as Ma gindana 
'prison' < Pers zinddn etc.^^
4. Initial AMo *k
The initial *k has developed into J h /x/ in most cases both before back and 
front vowels, cf. J 393 halabi 'to alter' = Ma xala- 'to change, exchange, 
alter,' Neg kala- 'to replace,' Ud kala- 'to replace, change,' etc.;'*5 J lt6T 
hendu- 'to say' = Ma xendu- 'to speak, explain,' Or feen- 'to speak, converse,' 
etc.;**^ J 508 hefuli 'abdomen' = Ma xefeli id., Ev kSal 'stomach,' cf. Mo 
kebeli < AMo *kepeli 'belly.On the other hand, there are very few Jurchen 
words with k-.
There are the following AMo loan words with initial h: J 272 hagan (ha^tmni
genitive) 'emperor,' cf. Mo qayan, MMo ga'an ~ gan id., cf. Ev kagan etc.;
J 92 halgun 'hot' < AMo, cf. Mo qalayun, MMo qala'un id.; J 112 hudila 'crupper 
< AMo, cf. Mo qudurga id.; J 336 huldhai niyarma 'burglar' < AMo, cf. Mo 
qulagai id.; J 258 'cup' < AMo, cf. MMo quduga, cf. Mu quduya 'pitcher;
Il^iiihoni 'sheep' <AMo *konin^ MMo Mo qonin id., cf. Ma x^^dn, Ev konin 'sheep, 
xuani 'ram,' etc.50 < Mong; J huo-li-han /xurixan/51 or /quriqan/ < AMo, cf.
MMo (H) quriqan 'lamb,'52 mo quraqan. Bur xurigan id.
An exceptional development *k- > Zero is found in J 655 orin 'twenty' which 
also occiors in Manchu and most Manchu-Tungus languages 'without a consonant at 
the onset, the consonant having been preserved only in Ul, Or, and Nan.53 
Tsintsius reconstructs a deep velar stop in cases like this.5
5. The medial AMo *k
The medial. *k is likewise represented by h in Jurchen, cf. J 336 andahai (in
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andahai niyarrm) 'guest' < AMo *andakait cf. Mo anda^i 'oath, sworn statement,' 
Kh andgag id., cf. Ma anda 'friend,' Nan andaxa 'guest,' Neg andaxa 'guest, a 
good fellow,' all < Mong;55 j mahila < AMo *makllai, cf. MMo (Mu) mcuqalai 
'cap,' Kalm ma\Vd id.. Mo malagai id., cf. Ma ma\ala id. < Mong;56 j 519 turha 
'lean' < AMo *turka(n) 'lean, emaciated,' MMo (Mu) turqan id., cf. Ma turxa id.
< Mong.
6. Preservation of AMo -^g-
Intervocalic *g has been preserved in Mongolian before an original short 
vowel (strong position), but it has disappeared before an original long vowel 
(weak position).57
In Ancient Mongolian -g- was still preserved in all cases.
Jurchen has preserved -*g~, cf. J lk6 bugu 'deer' < AMo *bugu (strong position) 
id., MMo buyu (cf. buyuyin tuyul 'fawn,'lit. 'the calf of a deer'). Mo bum 
id., Kh bug id.; J 92 halgun 'hot' < AMo *l<alagun (weak position) > MMo qala'un.
Mo qalayun, Mog qaloun id., Dag \alo id.; J 9^ dulgan 'warm' < AMo *dulugdn <
Mo dulayan, Kh dula<m id., cf. Ev *dul- 'to warm,' duli 'warm'; J 93 sergun 
'cool' < ^o *serigun > Mo serigun, Kalm serun id. Cf. Ma serguven, U1 seuruli.
Nan sgrguQ id. < Mong; J 137 temge 'camel' < AMo ^temegen. Mo temegen, Kh temee 
id., cf. Sol t^ege, Ma temege id. 59 < Mong;_J 597 Tiegun 'left' (in the glossary
incorrectly translated as 'right') < AMo *gegiXn, Mo gegun, Kalm zUn id. Cf. Ev 
^eyin 'left,' Neg Jiyinidgg'dg 'left side,' ^a.n '^euntu 'left-handed,' possibly 
all < Mong; J 287 degun 'younger brother' < AMo '^degU > MMo de'Vi, Dag dgw, Mog
Mo. deguu, Kalm dU id., cf. Ma deo id. < MMo; J 523 badgai 'meal' (probably 
a genitive) < AMo *budaga 'grain, cereal, millet, gruel' > Mo budaya(n), Kh 
budaa id. Cf. Neg buda 'millet,' U1 'millet, gruel,' Nan boda 'gruel,' Ma buda
7. Syllable- and word-final r in AMo
The syllable-final r in Mong loan words in Jurchen has been preserved: J 83
erte 'early' < AMo *erte. Mo erte id.; J k83 dirga- 'to take pleasure' < AMo 
*dirga- > Mo girgp.- 'to be happy, to enjoy'; J 6U9 durhon 'fourteen' < AMo *d3r- 
(in *dbr-ben 'four') + *hon 'ten,' cf. AT on 'ten'; J 6J*8 gorhon 'thirteen' <
AMo *gur- (in *gur-ban 'three') + *hon 'ten'; J 8U3 irge-be 'populace' (acc.)
< AMo irge(n) ■> MMo (Mu), Mo irgen 'people'; J 519 turha 'lean' < AMo *turka(n)
> MMo, Mo turqan id.
The word-final r has been preserved only in J 329 nekur 'friend,' cf. Mo 
nbkur, KaJjn nblpg id., cf. however, J 8OO nekulemai 'to keep company,' cf. Mo 
nokiirle- 'to befriend, to be friends with someone.' Otherwise, word—final r has 
been replaced by n as in all Tungus languages, cf. Ev hirugen 'blessing, bene- 
diction' < AMo *piruger^ An example in Jurchen is J 18T 'binkoan 'falcon' < AMo 
*sinkor. Mo scirijor, Kh sonxor id. This word was borrowed from Jurchen into 
Manchu, cf. Ma sonqon 'peregrine falcon.'
The substitution of n for r is also found in medial position in J 6hl ningu 
'six' < *girgu, cf. Mo jirguyan < *gir-gu-bdn 'six' which has undergone the same 
development in all Manchu-Tungus languages, cf. Neg, Ev ftunun, Lam etc.
< *girgi4T^^ < Mong.
It is obvious that > Zero, -*r > n, and the preservation of -*r as such 
date from different times. It is possible that the words with the final n were
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borrowed from Ancient Mongolian, i.e., J sinkoan < AMo *sinkor 'falcon.' The 
words with final r in Jurchen must have been borrowed later, i.e., from Middle 
Mongolian, i.e., J nekur 'friend' < MMo. As for nekulemai 'to keep company,' 
this goes back to ’^nokuvle-, the cluster vt having lost its first component.
In J ningu the medial *r> has developed into nfr\/ under the influence of the 
initial n, and was assimilated (velarised) to the following g, i.e., *givgu > 
*nirgu > ningu /ningu/.
8. On some Jupohen numerals
The Jurchen numerals 11 through 19 are of interest for two reasons. First of 
all, some of their components are of Mongolian origin and second, the numerals 
in question display a non-Altaic order of components. The Jurchen numerals were investigated for the first time by Laufer,^3 and from the Altaistic point 
of view by Miller.
The numerals in question are:
J 6U6 amso 'eleven' = Ma omson (in Ma omson biya 'the 11th month')
J 647 girhon 'twelve' = Ma gor^on (in gor^on biya 'the 12th month')
J 648 gorhon 'thirteen' < AMo *gur (in *gur-ban) 'three' + *hon 'ten'
J 649 durhon 'fourteen' < AMo *d3r (in ddr-b^) 'four' + *hon
J 650 tobohon 'fifteen' < AMo *tabu (in *tabu-n) 'five' + *hon 
J 651 nilhun fnirhuni 'sixteen' < AMo *^ir (in *gir-gu-bdn) 'six' + *hon 
J 652 darhon 'seventeen' < AMo *dal (in *dal-u-ban > Mo doluyan 'seven' + *hon 
J 653 niyuhun 'eighteen' < AMo *nai (in *nai-bdn > Mo naiman) 'eight' + *hon 
J 654 oniyohon 'nineteen' <Juyun 'nine' + *hon
Of these numerals nilhun 'sixteen' is of interest because it has preserved 
the syllable-final *r {nilhun stands for *nirhun) whereas J ningu 'six' is an 
assimilated fonn.
The other interesting form is 652 darhon (probably /dalhon/) 'seventeen.'
It corroborates our reconstruction of Mo doluyan 'seven' as *dal-u-ban. 5
On the other hand, the numerals mentioned are interesting because of the order 
of the components, namely, the smaller mmibers precede the niimeral ten as in 
English or Latin, an order quite unusual in the Altaic languages.
The general conclusion from the above discussion is that Jurchen is an im­
portant source for the study of the history of the Mongolian languages in that 
it has preserved a large body of AMo forms. On the other hand, Mongolian data 
can be useful for the reconstruction of Jurchen and other Manchu-Tungus forms.
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STHOrPAJM VERSUS VTCAATHU 3YP1
Mary Prances Weidllch 
Takoma Park, Maryland
Since 1921 many loan words have been introduced into the vocabulary of the 
Mongolian language in order to bridge the gap between the vocabulary of a no­
madic society and that needed to express twentiety-century cultural, economic, 
political, sociological, scientific and technical concepts.
The following questions come to mind in conjunction with the introduction of 
foreign words: To what degree do loan words survive in Modern Mongolian? Are
they always accepted? Or are they used synonymously with native counterparts 
which over a period of time have absorbed the essence of the meaning of the loan 
word? Or are they displaced by indigenous terms?
The purpose of this paper is to examine the current status of the loan word 
3THOipa4iH with respect to its acceptance into Modern Mongolian, its alternation 
with native terms, and/or its displacement by indigenous terms.
The occurrences of 3THOrpaJ>H and its native counterparts were observed for a 
consecutive seventeen-year period—that is, from 1961 through 1977—in articles 
focusing on social science topics or in sections of general articles dealing 
with social science subjects.
The data presented in this paper were taken from available issues of IlbHJKJBX 
yxaan (Science) published in Ulaanbaatar from I961 through 196h, its successor 
IUHHHcn3X yxaau aMBHpan (Science and Life)^ published in Ulaanbaatar from I965 
through 1977, and BHMAV IlhtBKJisx AKafleMHftH Msfl33 (Transactions of the MPR
Academy of Sciences)2 published in Ulaanbaatar from 1962 through 1977.
"Ethnography" is expressed in Modern Mongolian either by the loan word 
3THorpaJ)H or by the following two native terms: yrcaaTHH literally trans­
lated "science of peoples," and YHtPCTHyYWtiiH a» 6alinan, Sc saHUMn 6a coSnar 
cynnax yxaan,^ literally translated "studies of the way of life, customs, and 
cultures of nationalities."
During the seventeen-year period studied, 3THOrpa<i)H was noted once in 1962, 
three times in I963, once in I96U, twice in 1966, once each in I967 and 1970, 
four times in 1971> once in 1973, twice in 1975» and six times in 1976 for a 
total of twenty-two times.
yrcaaTHH ayftj the first indigenous term examined, was observed seven times 
in 1962, nine times in 1963, thirty-four times in 1965, eight times in 1966, 
nine times in 1967, seven times in 1968, eight times in 1969> six times in 1970, 
seven times in 1971, once each in 1972 and 1973, four times in 197^ and once 
each in 1975 and 1976. Thus, yrcaaxHbi syft occurred for a total of 103 times.
Neither 3THOrpaiJ)H nor yrcaaTHH syft were observed in 196I and 1966.
During the seventeen-year period investigated, the other indigenous rendition
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YHrpcTYYflH0H aac 6afwaji, Sc aamiHn 6a coSnar cyxinax yxaan vas never noted.
Of its twenty-two occurrences, STHOipa^H appeared in the genitive case 
fourteen times. The genitive form of 3THOrpa$H modified both loan and native 
words. Examples of 3THorpa$H in the genitive case as a modifier of loan words 
include the following:
3THOipa$HftH MaTepHan "ethnographic material"
3THOrpa$HfiH fiysefi "ethnographic museum"
3THorpa4>HflH 3KCTiaE(Hij; "ethnographic expedition"
Examples of 3THOrpa$H used in the genitive case as a modifier of native words 
include the following:
3THOrpa4)HfiH cyjpiaraa "ethnographic research"
3TTOrpaI)HaH Y33CT3J13H "ethnographic exhibition"
3THOrpa(J)H0H ntHHaoinr33 "ethnographic investigation"
Furthermore, seventeen of the twenty-two occurrences of 3THOrpa$H were in 
the immediate vicinity of another loan word, such asapxeQqora and najieoHTcnorn.
Of the 103 occurrences of the indigenous term, yrcaaTHtJ 3 0 occurred in the 
genitive case fifty-two times and modified both loan and native words. Examples 
of yrcaaTHU 3Y0 used in the genitive case as a modifier of loan words include 
the following:
yrcaaxHbi syftH axjiac "ethnographic atlas" 
yrcaaxHH sYfe Maxepsiaji "ethnographic material" 
yrcaaxHfcj syflH oxp55i "ethnographic unit"
Examples of yrcaaxHU ayfi in the genitive case as a modifier of native terms 
include the following:
yrcaaxHU syKn 3ypar "ethnographic map"
yrcaaxHH syKH cywian "ethnographic study"
yrcaaxHH sySH xoji6ornan "ethnographic significance"
The ratio of use of 3XHorpa$H to yrcaaxHtasyft was 1:7 in 1962, 3:9 in 1963, 
1:0 in 196k, 2:8 in I966, 1:9 in 1967, 1:6 in 1970, h:^ in 1971, 1:1 in 1973,
2:1 in 1975 and 6:1 in 1976.
It is evident from these ratios that in 1963 and 1966 there was a slight 
tendency to use 3XHOrpa4>H interchangeably with its native counterpart. However, 
this tendency became stronger in the seventies, especially in the years 1971, 
1973, and 1975. In 1976, 3XHorpa$H for the first time actually challenged the 
indigenous term.
It is clear from the above discussion that 3XHOrpa<I)H, both as an independent 
word and as a modifier, is gradually being accepted in Modern Mongolian and 
that its use seems to be somewhat dependent on whether another loan word is 
nearby. It is too early to predict whether 3XHOrpa4>H will only be used synon­
ymously with the indigenous tem or whether it will ultimately advance to the 
role of the preferred term.
Maxy Frances We-idtichko
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THE THREE SORROWING HILLS, MONGOLIA’S FIRST OPERA: 
AN EXAMINATION OF LITERARY AND MUSICAL GENRE*
Winston Wu
University of California, Berkeley
Although Mongols had loved song, music and dance as a form of domestic enter­
tainment for centuries,! the appearance of more highly developed secular forms 
of synthetic art"^ resembling theater as we know it came relatively late with the 
consolidation of Manchu power in Outer Mongolia. In the beginning of the eight­
eenth century local pang-tsu opera from the Chinese province of Shansi 
was mported by Chinese traders into several urban centers, and in all probabil­
ity indigenous court theaters in several outlying districts3 sprung up as a 
result of this. By the second half of the nineteenth century social ballads and 
dialogue operas, built on a four-line folk song form often on the theme of so­
cial protest or longing for a lover known as hariltsaa duu, came increasingly 
into vogue, to the extent of becoming a type of nucleus for the creation of a 
national dramatic theater in the initial decades of the twentieth centiiry.
Lubsan Huurchi, the famed epic singer and musician turned people's artist and 
composer of revolutionary songs, was the key person responsible for these social 
ballads and dialogue operas to become "urbanized" and "professionalized" in the 
capital and to be developed on stage right up to the opening of the State Music 
and Drama Theater in 1931. Stage plays fashioned on Chinese opera and employing 
Chinese dramaturgical effects en masse were performed side by side with classical 
repertoire of the regional variant of Chinese opera mentioned above. These plays 
often portrayed khans, princes and lamas as buffoons exploiting the arats. They 
generally circulated among "amateur circles" and, while successfully conveying 
political messages, were simplistic with regard to plot line and staging.
The Seventh Congress of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party in November 
1929 a.nd the Fifth Great Khural in January 1930 discussed the raising of cultural 
and educational levels in the country. It was pointed out that the "amateur cir­
cles" in question had indeed furthered the development of theatrical creativity, 
but were still unable to fashion a new theatrical art.^ As a result, new reper— 
toire was not planned as such from then on, but rather intended as an experimental 
arena for new dramatiorgists. With the closing of Chinese theaters^ in 1929, a 
lacuna had somehow to be filled.
The Resolution of 1932, insuring Party control over new literary and artistic 
organizations in the Soviet Union, and Zhdanov's defining the aims of socialist 
realism at the First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers in 1934 had inevitable 
repercussions on Mongolian literary and ciiltural life of that decade.
following the successful performance of Noi I by the Mongolian State Music 
and Drama Theater at the International Olympiade of Revolutionai^ Theatrical 
Collectives in Moscow in 1933 and its participation that same year in the tenth 
anniversaiy of the Buryat Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic in Ulan-Ude, the 
director of this work, D. Namdag, approached its author, today known as the
4l
h2 Winston Wu
7founder of Mongoliaai national dramaturgy, D. Katsagdorj, once again with a re­
quest for more new repertoire.
Natsagdorj chose as the theme of this musical tragedy the legend of Yunden 
Googoo which is found in a hook hy B. Sodnom about Natsagdorj.” It goes as fol­
lows:
In the middle of the nineteenth century lived the master craftsman 
Tsend. He had a tall, handsome son by the name of Yunden. Yiinden was 
twenty-five years old when he set out on a caravan for China. He sud­
denly fell ill on the way and was farced to sojourn with the Khorchin 
tribe in Inner Mongolia. Having gotten well soon after, he could not 
depart from his host's house without a horse. But before long, when it 
was discovered that he was a literate person, he was assigned to the 
local clerk's office and made many acquaintances. Eventually he fell in 
love with Siriima who lived with her poor family in the neighborhood.
The pampered Garva from a rich family, it turned out, was in love with 
Yunden. At that time the local Prince Bal was trying to marry off his 
son, but could not find a suitable bride. Garva heard about this and 
presented Siriima to him. Feaxing Yunden, Prince Bal summoned him, 
bestowed on him an official title, made him a retainer and quickly sent 
him off to China on official matters. Thus ridding himself of Yunden, he 
married his son to Siriima. Yunden got the news of what transpired through 
his trusted comrades, returned and angrily attacked the prince. For this 
offense the youth was sentenced to death. Upon hearing of Yunden's death, 
Siriima took her life as well.
Natsagdorj carefully preserved the poetic origins of the legend in the course 
of writing the libretto for his new opera. He exalted above all the loftiness of 
true and undaunted love in the first version of the opera which appeared in 193U. 
The name of Yunden was retained from the legend; his beloved was called Nansalmaa 
The rich feudalist Baldan resembled Prince Bal in the legend. However, this 
legend was reworked on a grand scale following its premiere in 193^ in order to 
present a clearly defined class viewpoint and to stress the psychological makeup 
of the characters. The perfidiousness of Garva was personified with greater 
detail in the character Khorolma, now a procuress. The relationships between 
Khorolma and both Yunden and Balgan were focused on in particular by the author 
with the intent of sharper delineation of the plot line.
In the period of autonomy in Mongolia (1911-21), a three-stanza social ballad 
of protest was composed about the fate of Yunden and is known to this day through 
out Mongolia.9 Its lyrics are as follows:
With a braid down his back 
Walking with a confident stride 
The infinitely handsome Yunden Googoo Da-wang.^*^
Walking with a sedate stride
With his braid plaited in three locks
Noble and light-hearted
Wonderful you are, Yunden Googoo.
Da-wang of a Khorchin banner,You sit at the place of honor in a yurt^"^ for naught
Hy beloved so far away
Why not return, Yunden Googoo?
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It is evident from Namdag's memoir on The Three Sorrowing Hills that Natsagdorj 
was so inspired by this song that he was determined to create a brand new genre 
with his work.12 It took him only two days to write the first act and to have 
it ready for rehearsal. Only a half month elapsed from the first rehearsal to 
the premiere performance of this unique musical drama. With personal concern 
for its success NatsagdorJ often went to rehearsals to listen to advice from the 
artists.
Curiously enough, the original producer of The Three Sorrowing Hills, E. Oyun, 
is also the author of Ardyn Hariltsaa Duu, Tuiinii Ulamjlal (The Four-line Folk 
Song and its Traditions). In non-Mongolian sources hariltsaa duu is called 
^Vechsellied or "Dialoglied” by Heissig,13 "conversation song" by Bawden,!^ and 
four-line song" by Saiga.15 Oyun basically agrees with Heissig that the founda­
tions of indigenous Mongolian literary theater lie in this highly versatile song 
form. She divides the genre into six categories: robber's songs, satirical and
jesting songs, laments, lyrical songs, epic songs and odes. She is of the belief 
that repertoire in all six embodies national, class and ideological content to 
varying degrees and that its heroic-dramatical formsl^ reflect the struggle 
against the oppressor class. Mention is made of lyrical-humanistic songs and 
those instructive in love which reflect the social problems of the day.
The theme of humanism is touched on briefly in the secondversion of our opera 
where mothers rock their children to sleep with cradle songs and gather young 
lads for a hunt at sunrise the following morning. The young maidens now enter 
and join them together in a chorus about the sun overcoming darkness and emitting 
golden rays of happiness to people. On the other hand, in the Buryat ballet 
Blossoms of Life the central theme is this very dualism of light and darkness 
where the noble and valiant folk hero Bator overcomes great odds to lead Mother, 
her three daughters, and the people to light and happiness.
In resolving the problem of thematic content in both versions of The Three 
Sorrowing Hills, another Bviryat ballet In the Home of Love, composed by Zh.
Batuyev and others in 1956—7, provides parallels more focal to the main themes 
in both. In very broad terms, this ballet, known as lyrical-heroic drama,^'( in 
effect combines the lyrical-melodramatic of the first version of our opera with 
the heroic-epic of the second version staged in 19^+2, for it unites the fate of 
the protagonist Zorigto with that of the people amidst tragedy, the death of 
their beloved Seseg. It stands in contrast to the first version of The Three 
Sorrowing Hills which concludes in semi-tragedy with Nansalmaa killing the 
wicked feudalist Baldan and the wounding of the hero Yunden, but with the common 
people playing no role in it. The second version does unite the fate of the 
protagonists with that of the people throughout the entire opera, but amidst 
comic relief provided by the joyous wedding of Yunden and Nansalmaa.
The theme of eternal love and the presence of the so-called masses on stage 
are not unfamiliar phenomena in theater elsewhere in the world. The I93I* version 
of The Sorrowing Hills is quite appropriately termed romantic-pathetic
melodramal° with a theme of eternal love on the order of the very popular Chinese 
legend and opera Liang Shan-po and Chu Ying~t'ai ^ and, to a
lesser extent, of the Uzbek poetic legend Farkhad and Shirin.^^ Strangely enough, 
when we revert back to the original legend of Yunden Googoo, Siriima takes her 
own life upon hearing of the death of Yunden - the same fate befalls Juliet upon 
the death of Romeo.
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When examining such heroic-epic classics of Russian opera as Borodin’s Pvinae 
Igor and Glinka's Ivan Susanin, we note that the traditional amorous-intimate 
plot line is seldom an essential part of these operas. Yet once it becomes an 
integraO., subordinate component of them, it is transformed into a domestic- 
verismo plot line. These two operas, and ours as well, do not fit well into the 
standard mold of amorous love, seen by Stalinist opera critics as a Western petty 
bourgeois aesthetic tendency.20 Thus the Mongolian hariltsaa duu form, instruc­
tive in love, somehow found its identity with such classical tragedies as Romeo 
and Juliet, Othello, Hamlet, and Boris Godianov which in the eyes of these critics 
all focus on inevitable or probable consequences of various social problems.
As Mussorgsky puts it, the developmental aim of tragedy is the common fate of 
the individual and the people.21 Seen in a broader Soviet context with regard 
to both classical Russian and the best of Soviet opera, the experiences of the 
individual become an organic peirt of the depicted social events, with the inner 
conflicts of the protagonist transformed into conflicts of his society. As ap­
plied to our opera, it was death as a natural consequence of a sequence of causes 
rather than a portrayal of eternal love which made Ivan Susanin acceptable in 
Stalinist eyes but not the first version of our opera staged in 193^.
The appearance of mass scenes in Mongolian and Buryat opera is particularly 
vivid in the 19^2 version of our opera, in which we find amazing similarities 
with Glinka's legendary opera Ruslan and Ludmilla. In place of Chernomor's 
slaves and servants are the khan's servants and Yunden's warriors. At the end, 
instead of the people of Kiev rejoicing and glorifying Prince Ruslan's awaken­
ing Ludmilla, it is the arats who joyously celebrate the marriage of Yunden and 
Nansalmaa. In both operas a fair5rtale atmosphere is evoked with magnificent 
stage sets depicting magical castles and palaces.
Right up to the beginning of the 1930s the highly skilled art of improvising 
on musical core units known as hariltsaa duu by huurchis with Lubsan Huurchi at 
the fore continued hand in hand with the spontaneous composing of lyrics, now 
increasingly in step with the times. The accompaniment to new so-called revolu­
tionary songs still remained heterophonic, characteristic of a number of tra­
ditional musics of ^ast Asia and medieval EJuropean music. The traditional 
pentatonic scales,^ more or less intervallically equivalent to the Dorian and 
Mixolydian modes, remained intact up to this time.
After the State Music and Drama Theater was founded in 1931, such traditional 
plays as Prince Sian'ya, known as one-actor dramas23 because all the performers' 
parts were sung in one and the same motif, began being actively reworked. Satir­
ical dramas in a semi-improvised style such as Deceptive Trust, The Avaricious 
Lama, and Conversation of the Old Man and Woman were simiiltaneously staged. 
Perhaps the first time anything resembling operatic art song was used was in the 
play Dark Force by Buyannemekh in what B. Smirnov, a co-composer of The Three 
Sorrowiiw Rills, terms pesennoye nachalo spektaklya, the vocal beginnings of 
drama.2^
193^ and 1935 were a turning point in Mongolian theatrical history for they 
marked the beginnings of a new art form with a new aesthetic basis.25 The Three 
Sorrowing Hills was already a considerable step forward from Prince Sum’ya in
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that it contained four, instead of merely one, distinct motifs based on folk 
songs. This increase, however, was not matched by a corresponding increase in 
the number of individual character traits. Moreover, it was premature to intro­
duce feelings of the characters in terms of psychologism into such a work.^^
In the second version of The Three Sorrowing Hills B. Damdinsuren and co­
composers added leitmotifs to the original motifs, yet the same monotony of mu­
sical expression prevailed throughout the work. What the composers did accom­
plish, musically speaking, was to introduce Western-style duo singing, for 
example, in the dialogue of love between Yunden and Nansalmaa which was wholly 
constructed in parallelism, the most widespread manner of folk poetry discourse.
It was actually a musical realization of the call-and-response character of the 
hariltsaa duu which was traditionally always soloistically sung.27
Poetic lyricism and imagery are well known in the works of D. Natsagdorj who 
employed them generously in the libretto of his first opera. Natsagdorj drew 
from the rich treasure of epithets, similes and metaphors in folklore, especially 
from aiigers, and utilized his own techniques of pastoral lyricism. He expanded 
as well on themes from folk songs of different genres. In the newly conceived 
second version he attempted to show as vividly and graphically as possible the 
basic principles which distinguished the main characters of the drama. Nansalmaa' 
poetic image was now to become the embodiment of the finest traits of Mongolian 
women and could perhaps be likened to the psychological depth and fidelity to 
life of Natasha in Dargomyzhskii's Rusalka. All we are able to say about musical 
imagery in the opera is that it is watered down and lacks the maturity of form 
the libretto had attained.
In spite of the Buryat opera In the Name of Love being composed in a much later 
era and thus being more musically sophisticated than our opera, we see a potential 
for musical maturity in an opera such as The Three Sorrowing Hills, as was the 
case in subsequent Mongolian operas. The Buryat ballet makes extensive use of 
polyphony, in particular a device known as contrastive polyphony (polymelody ?) 
or modulatory imitation of key pitches. The theme of love in the solo arias of 
Zorigto and Seseg is conveyed in a light type of major tonality against a bus­
tling backdrop, whereas the opening measures of Dalyu's theme employ the salient 
tritone of B minor in sharp contrast. In general, dissonant harmonies in the 
form of unstable, clashing tonalities bordering on the grotesque depict the cold- 
hearted and implacable Dalyu.
In 193^ and 1935 two new theatrical works. The Three Sorrowing Hills and Prin­
cess Dolgor and Arat Damdin, appeared under the appelation hogjimt jujig "music- 
drama play." However, it was not by coincidence that these operas, also called 
ayalguut jufig, were quite similar in the style to the so-called song-operas pre­
vailing in the thirties in the Soviet Union. The Three Sorrowing Hills, very 
broadly speaking, shares with song operas like Khrennikov's Into- the Storm such 
basic principles as simplicity, directness and folkishness, and with Asafiev's 
ballet music a concreteness in musical language with regard to national color 
and popular customs. Nonetheless, our opera was set in pre-revolutioneiry Mongolia 
and thus could not identify with very concrete aspects of thematics in Soviet 
operas and the developing of appropriate artistic devices for them. The short­
comings of The Three Sorrowing Hills were consequently of a very different nature 
from those of many short-lived Soviet song operas of the thirties. We may draw 
a few analogies from the Ukrainian historical opera Bogdan Khmel'nitskii by K. 
Dankevich, presented at a dekada of Ukrainian art and literature in Moscow.
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Although its libretto and historical genre were quite different from our opera, 
it was likewise an underdeveloped music-drama play or musical folk drama.28 as 
in our opera, its operatic episodes were based on authentic national melodies 
{dumas), and it had little variation with respect to musical characterization of 
the main characters. As opera critics saw it, downplaying the role of the people 
in Bogdan Khnel'nitskii end omitting it altogether in the first version of our 
opera surely fell short of the great historical-folk drama traditions of Glinka, 
Mussorgsky and Tchaikovsky.29
Similar tasks of overall revision, enriching the thematic content and raising 
the ideological and aesthetic levels, lay ahead of these two operas. As Stalin 
formulated the task of creating a classical Soviet opera, so Mongolia was obliged 
to create a classical Mongolian opera.
To achieve this meant reverting to or repeating the prior classical cycle of 
development of Russian music culture30 or, more specifically, using folk melodies 
in art music, a trend having its origins in nineteenth-century European national­
ism. We sho+ild recall a review of Glinka's first opera in the Moscow Observer 
in 1836 where a talented composer of the time, G. Verstovskii, postulated that 
to create an opera meant employing unadulterated folk motifs and sometimes imi­
tating them, whereas Glinka would study the character of the folk music and sub­
sequently employ full freedom to musical creativity. This level of creativity 
was impossible to attain in the initial versions of The Three Sorrowing HiVLs, 
not to mention those first operas of several of the Soviet Central Asian repub­
lics where so-called professionalism in music was non-existent prior to 1917.
What these initial attempts at opera amounted to were loosely strung sequences 
of medleys, often sharing with Soviet operatic fiascos such general musical 
traits as insufficient expressivity in arias.
Natsagdorj did not change the first version of the libretto of The Three Sor­
rowing HiZZs enough to conform to the positive hero type in modern Soviet operas 
and thus to insure its subsequent success although, as we have seen, positive 
heroes had already existed in classical Russian opera. We might add here that 
Prokofiev was looking for less schematic librettos about positive and heroic 
types and suitable to be set to music to avoid creating mere "dramas set to mu­
sic, whereas in our opera it was the musical motifs rather than those in the 
libretto which fell short of the norm in terms of schematism.
By way of concluding, let me say that The Three Sorrowing HiZZs became fore­
most among several stage plays covering a wide range of love themes, from the 
traditional dialogue opera Prince Sian’ya to several others featuring arats, 
often female, as central characters. Unlike the Soviet song-operas of the thir­
ties mentioned earlier, o+ir opera served as a model for subsequent Mongolian 
operas and has survived to this day as a major work of national operatic reper­
toire. Because it contains a good deal of folkloric idiom and imagery not un­
familiar to the common people, our opera has been widely performed by amateur 
circles on club stages outside the capital.
The new budding Mongolian opera at the same time was very far removed from 
such schools as expressionism, formalism, primitivism and exoticism contending 
in the Soviet Union at the time. They were avoided in Mongolia in order to 
nationalize various musical forms within the country and to train theatrical 
cadre in conformance with Soviet norms.31
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A gap in Mongolian performing arts had now been essentially filled, some­
thing so vitally needed upon the conclusion of the International Olympiade of 
Revolutionary Theatrical Collectives in 1932. Suddenly such new paraphenalia 
as stage sets, stage presence, lighting and applause made their first appear­
ance on the Mongolian thea^i^ stage, yet the aura of the Chinese "costumed 
drama {ku-ohuang hsi-ohu ^ ) still lingered on.32
Analysis of the Music Transcription
Our opera consists of a prelude, an Interlude, a battle scene and several 
songs, including arias and duets.33 The two solo arias we are examining are 
basically constructed in two pentatonic (five-tone) scales, Baldan's song being 
in the so-called Dorian mode (E G A B D) and Nansalmaa's song in the so-called 
Mixolydian (Bb C Eb EG). In the former, brass and percussion predominate to 
depict evil, whereas in the latter the warm timbres of strings (pizzicato is 
utilized to accentuate beats) and woodwinds in occasional imitation of the 
vocal line convey a lyrical-amorous quality.3^ Both are constructed in strophlc 
form, disregarding the orchestral tuttl at the beginning of Baldan's song. The 
Russian terms kuplet and pripev are used to denote this particular form.
The use of motifs in both songs are of particular interest. Baldan's song 
is totally in the style of the Soviet mass song employing a dotted rhythm in 
the first four measures and a syncopated rhythm thereafter as recurring rhythmic 
patterns or rhythmic motifs to evoke a march rhythm feeling. In Nansalmaa's 
song we find a melodic or folk song motif beginning with BCE, which G.
Uvarova erroneously calls maiTnachenskiye notivy, 35 This recurring pattern is 
then transposed a fifth higher, becomes a reverse motif in measure 3, is inverted 
in measure 4, then is finally resolved in measure 5- Nansalmaa's song generally 
takes on the character of a lyrical-romantic song with measure 9 briefly making 
an incursion into the relative minor of Eb major, then reiterating the notes of 
the scale one last time in the style of the long song with the last two six­
teenths reminiscent of a laryngeal trill. The usual dominant—tonic resolution 
then follows.
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The Three Sorpoaing Hills 
Libretto by D. Natsagdorj and Ts. Damdinsuren 
Music by B. Damdinsuren and others
Accompanied by the Mongolian State Theater Orchestra, 
Chuluun, conducting
3ALDAN ^ S S-OHS------ soio ma i e ana sung by Hoioonjav
Tm Hi X;____________________ ^__________ ____________3^__________________ +
J r=^^ _____L
■■ n n:± 1 J n - 1- :
NANSALMAA'S SONG - solo female aria sung by the Merited Art Worker Tsogzolmaa
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Text of the ballad Yunden GddgdS 
(B. Smirnov, Mongol’skaya Narodnaya Muzyka)
53. K)Hfl3H reeree 
K)Hfl3H roro'>
Animate ■
J^OnO.lbHO >KRRO, C HyBCTHOM '-112
1) ?•! \ J^. C « ex* MM*.
C 54b K
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Aanarap Aa»arap ajixaaTaiiJia, xee! 
Aajiaa 6yt3’3C^h ra*j'jrTaMc3, x«e!
Jl& BaHTMMH IOhadh re&reo 
^aaHH u3B3px3H T6p>K33, xee!
Tywarap rywarap aJixaaraMBa» xee! 
Typsaap AapcaH r333rT3M63, xee! 
PyHxcaH caMxaH K)h;i3h reeree 
TyHMrrYM u3B3px3H Tepx<33, xee!
XopMvtH xyuiyyHbi fla-Ban MMHb, xee! 
XoMMpoop MopMJiox Hb loyHbix B3, xee! 
XojiA BBcaH K>ha3H reeree MHHb, xee! 
XoHropxoo Mp3x Hb Haraa b3, xee!
C KocOK), naASKSLueii Ha cnwHy, 




C KOCOM, aanjicTCHHOM M3 Tpex npaACM,
Mmctbim m 6e33a6oTHbiM, 
ripeKpaceH Tbi, K)ha3H Toro.
Jla-BaH xopHMHCKoro ye3Aa,
Hero paAM pacnojiaraeiubcB Ha xoMMope^\ 
Jla.ieKo yexaBmiiM Moii B03JiK>GjieHHbiii, 
IlOMeMy He BOSBpamaembCH. KDha3h Toro?
1) AjIMMHMCTPilTMkIKUH SHH 8 CT8pOH MoHrO^HM.
2) rioseTHOt MecTO b wpre.
c &4A K
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5. Uvarova, p. 60.
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ll+. Charles Bawden, "The Mongol 'conversation song,'" in Aspects of Altaic 
Civilization (Bloomington, I963), pp. 75-83. On p. 80 he uses an alternate 
term "ballad-opera" and speaks of "not a very wide variety of theme, as far as 
can be judged" dealing with bold warriors, dissolute girls and lamas, the 
parting of lovers through death, marriage to another, and the returning of a
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Review 2:2 (1976), pp. 120-126.
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Sketch of Contemporary Mongolian Musical WorksH (Ulaanbaatar: Mongolian Com­
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are frequently used to specify song and opera, as well as mention literary 
genre of one kind or another.
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tonic systems which in actuality consist of seven tones will not be dealt with 
here.
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with various northern Chinese baUad-operas as single-instrument accompaniment with Pei-ohing ah'in-shu ik. % ^ % or tan-oh'in ta-ku (Peking
ballad-opera) and singing from a sitting position with tsuo-oh'iang mei-hua
(Mei-hua "sitting vocal style" ballad-opera)^ See Shan-tung ta- 
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our opera.
27. In this connection we should take note of the appearance of duo singing
as a distinct musico-literary genre in Inner Mongolia in the second half of the 
eighteenth century. This "two-actor theater" both with singers and dancers 
became particularly known with the works of Erzen'tei (Smirnov, p. 65). I 
believe it is now called holboo shuleg (couplet poetry). See G. Kara, Chant 
d'un barde mongol (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1970).
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32. In the premier performance of The Three Sorrowing Hills the actual ward­
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See D. Namdag, "Uchirtai Gurvan Tolgoi" CThe Three Sorrowing Hillsi in D. 
Natsagdorjiin Tuhai Durtgal, Temdeglel [Accounts and Memoirs Relating to D. 
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Batuyev {Muzykal’naya Kul'tura Bnryatii, p. 65)-
HISTORY
IMPRESSIONS OF INNER MONGOLIA, 191*5-1950
Frank B. Bessac 
University of Montana
The following essay briefly chronicles three trips I took to Inner Mongolia, 
some events, serious and humerous,which took place on these trips, and some of 
my impressions cast in terms of Chinese-Mongolian relations.
The trips to and within Inner Mongolia were made for various reasons, to dif­
ferent areas, and by diverse means of transportation—by plane, jeep, horse, 
truck, and camel. Nfy first trip was by jeep and plane from Peiping to Kalgan, 
Dolon Nor, and Peitzemiao and back in the late winter and early spring of 191*6. 
The second trip was from Peiping to and throughout the Ordos (ikechou) and 
Ulanchap areas and return from May to October of 19l*8. The third trip I took 
as a Fulbright scholar from Lanchow to Ninghsia and Tlng-yiian-ying, the admin­
istrative center of the Special Alashan Banner, and from there by camel across 
the Gobi to Shan-tan in the Kansu Corridor in the summer of 191^9.
Each trip was made under different auspices and for different purposes. At 
the time of the first trip I was a member of the organization which was a con­
tinuation of the wartime Office of Strategic Services. There were a series of 
administrative changes which those of us in the field paid little attention to 
as we still thought of ourselves as members of the O.S.S. I recall that at the 
time we were as yet not called the Central Intelligence Group and that the re­
organization into the Central Intelligence Agency was to occur months later. I 
had just returned from a mission to the Chi-Chung Liberated Area south and south­
east of Peiping, where we studied the type and causes of truce violations taking 
place.
At this time the peace talks between the Commiinists and Nationalists, luider 
the auspices of the United States and the personal guidance of General George 
Marshall, were still taking place but were steadily losing impetus for a number 
of reasons. One of these was the continual skirmishing between small units of 
Communist and Nationalist forces. From what I could observe, the skirmishing 
in the Chi-Chung was set off by groups of foragers on the Nationalist side.
These troops were not well provided for, seemed to resent the villagers for 
harboring the Communists, and apparently felt little compunction about taking a 
moderate amount of hay for their animals and grain for their own consumption 
from the countryside. The Communists, on the other hand, could hardly allow 
foraging of this type to take place as it would show a lack of Communist ability 
to protect areas iinder their control and because it could be interpreted as a 
form of taxation. The Chi-Chung at this time was a well-establsihed Communist 
area even though it had been surrounded by the Japanese for years. As such it 
had developed a history as a guerrilla base. Both the intricate system of tun­
neling and the sense of unity testified to this history. With the completion 
of this mission we learned that the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base area wished some sort of 
liaison with our unit, perhaps because of the flexibility with which we could
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operate and, at that time at least, impartiality in the civil war. Thus the 
stage was set for additional trips into the Chin-Ch'a-Chi area.
My first trip was precipitated, from the American point of view, hy events 
taking place in Inner Mongolia. Mongols living in the area, to a large extent 
former members of the Japanese-sponsored semi-autonomous political organization 
in Manchuria, held a meeting in a village near Wang-yeh-miao in the west-central 
Hsinggan Mountains and authored the rationale for an Eastern Mongolian Autono­
mous Government. This was hardly a revolutionary act as the area, as I came 
to linderstand it, was largely self-governing although more hy default than hy 
the assertion of independence or autonomy. Representatives of this government 
were sent to various powers in the region in order to secure sponsorships. The 
Soviets replied that the time was inappropriate but that at a later date the 
Mongols might indeed benefit from Soviet influence. Authorities within the Mon­
golian People’s Republic (M.P.R.) replied in very similar terms. At that time 
the M.P.R. was very concerned for its own standing as an independent government 
and wished to secure recognition from the United Nations. The representatives 
who traveled to Peiping to discuss the issue of sponsorship with the Chinese 
Nationalists had hoped to travel on to confer directly with Chiang Kai-shek, but 
were not allowed to do so. They were mostly met with indifference. In part as 
a consequence of these failures, a meeting was scheduled for March 19^6 in 
Ch'eng-te with the permission and probably with the encouragement of local au­
thorities within the Chinese Communist political organization which controlled 
this part of southern Manchuria.
It was agreed upon that I leave for Kalgan, the administrative center of 
the Chin-Ch'a-Chi base area, to learn more about this Mongolian movement and 
the Chinese Communist responses to it.
Upon my arrival in Kalgan I asked Ulanfu about the meeting at Ch'eng-te and 
was astonished to learn that he had not heard of the eastern Inner Mongolian 
movement. The next morning Ulanfu departed for Ch'eng-te. Ulanfu gave me the 
impression of a Chinese Communist official although he wore a Mongolian gown 
during our second meeting. It was said that he did not speak Mongolian which 
was not surprising for a Tiimet of his generation. The Independent Provisional 
Mongolian Republic which had come into existence in the fall of 19^5» upon the 
arrival of troops from the M.P.R. and the Soviet Union, had been terminated 
when the Chinese dominated the area. Leaders of the Independent Provisional 
Mongolian Republic allegedly were executed hy the Chinese after they had been 
invited by Ulanfu to leave Shangtu and come to Kalgan.
Not only Ulanfu but no one else seemed to be knowledgeable about the situa^ 
tion in those areas of Inner Mongolia inhabited chiefly by Mongols when I visited 
Kalgan. Therefore I decided to travel to Dolon Nor by jeep, accompanied by rep­
resentatives of the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Liberated Area to discover for myself who was 
in control.
Dolon Nor turned out to be a Chinese town on the margin of the area inhabited 
by Mongols. We visited the temple just outside of town which the Chinese Com­
munists said had been saved from total destruction by troops from the M.P.R. 
Soviet troops had apparently begun to burn down this temple when M.P.R. troops 
surrounded the temple and thus saved it from further destruction.
There were no representatives of any Mongolian government at Dolon Nor and
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no one who seemed to have any information about the situation in the Mongol 
regions. Amazingly I was able to persuade a U.S. Army plane to fly to Dolon 
Nor, pick us up and take us to Peitzemiao to the northwest of Dolon Nor in 
Shilingol League and then to return in a few days to pick us up again at 
Peitzemiao and bring us back to Dolor Nor. We would have used the jeep instead 
if we had carried with us or been able to obtain sufficient gasoline, but this 
rather bizarre means of transportation turned out to be the only way. The air­
fields at both Dolon Nor and Peitzemiao were emergency landing fields, built by 
various military forces, Japanese or Soviet, that had passed this way. The one 
at Dolon Nor had more of the outline and structure of an airfield than that at 
Peitzemiao. As there were no communications between Kalgan and Peitzemiao, let 
alone between Peitzemiao and Dolon Nor, we could only hope that the field at 
Peitzemiao was operational and that we woiild be welcomed when we arrived.
All came off splendidly with the Chinese in our party excitedly pointing out 
yurts below us on the steppe as we skimmed over them, slowly circled the temple 
complex, and landed on a field outlined by the red gowned lamas from the temple. 
After jumping from the door of the plane to a friendly welcome, pilot and crew 
were invited to take tea at the temple. This they declined. The plane took 
off and we settled down for an interesting time.
Government in Shilingol was in local hands, considered itself temporary and, 
for the most part, consisted of members of Prince Te's (Demchukdongruba's) 
former Meng Chiang government. These officials had the reputation of not favor­
ing one side over the other in the civil war nor of committing themselves to any 
other government or movement. I suspect they would have welcomed the return of 
Prince Te as their leader, but this was not actually stated. The Chinese 
Communist-sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement had a representative in 
the area who was staying at the temple. He was a considerate and knowledgeable 
young Mongol who seemed to be well liked but not much listened to. He held 
what seemed then only a remote chance of representing a movement or government 
that would ensure peace in the region, let alone dominate it.
While at Peitzemiao, we rode camels about twenty miles (twenty ip'ao-Vi) to 
visit a Mongolian encampment, one of the closest civilian encampments near the 
temple at that time. In hindsight, it seems that the family we visited may have 
been more than usually sympathetic to the arguments of the Inner Mongolian 
Autonomous representative. The family had lost both husband and father and was 
in strained circumstances. This impression would not have occurred to someone 
who had seen poverty in China proper. In comparison, the Mongol family seemed 
quite well off.
During our visit the son of the Mongol family felt called upon to deliver 
what seemed an impromptu lecture. He chided the Chinese Communists and their 
representative for allowing so much power and wealth to remain in the hands of 
the elite of the Meng Chiang period. The representative appeared embarrassed.
He was in no position to make promises, denials, or apologies.
During the academic year of 19^7-19^8 I was no longer in intelligence. I 
was enrolled at Fu Jen University in Peiping studying Classical Chinese and 
spoken Mongolian. In May 19^+8 I went to Paot'ou as the executive officer of 
the Paot'ou branch of the China Relief Mission, an interim organization which 
filled the gap between the demise of UNRRA and the creation of the Economic Co­
operation Administration which later came to be called A.I.D. I had several
Inner Mongotiai 1945-1950 57
reasons for accepting this position. For one, it offered a job and a break from 
school during the summer months. It also promised to allow me to increase my knowl­
edge of Mongolia while doing something worthwhile. I^y main reason, though, was 
more subtle. For the past several years, and especially during the academic year 
when my contacts had been almost entirely with Chinese, I had come to see sit­
uations largely from a Chinese point of view. Through my brief experience with 
the Mongol way of life the previous year, my studies of the literature on Inner 
Asia and of the Mongolian language, and my discussions with Mongolian acquaint­
ances, I had begun to realize that one could look at China and Inner Asia from 
points of view other than those of the Westerner looking at "Orientals" or of 
the Chinese looking at "barbarians." It was time to qualify my sinification, 
and so I took this position which would allow me to travel some more in Mongolia.
There existed a very real need for the China Relief Mission in the China of 
19^8. In meiny places in North China the 19^7 harvest had been inadequate. Spring 
and early summer of 19^8 were lacking in sufficient moisture. It appeared that 
another crop failure was in the offing. The hardest hit population in the area 
of Paot'ou were the almost totally agrarian and industrialized Chinese and thus 
the bulk of relief went to Chinese people. A part of the relief goods, however, 
had been set aside for Mongols, to be distributed from a small branch station 
at Paot'ou. We had been able to obtain trucks for transporting grain and other 
materials. These trucks were specially designed with a very high clearance to 
enable them to overcome flash floods, dry sand and even quicksand on occasion.
They had to be driven from Peiping to Paot'ou by way of the Southern Gate (Nan- 
k'ou), through Kalgan and Northwest Shangtu southwest to Kueisui where the 
trucks and some Mongolian refugees were placed on railroad cars and then shipped 
to Paot'ou.
Transporting the trucks to Paot'ou did not take us through Mongolian ter­
ritory, strictly speaking, although the region leading to and from Shangtu was 
a border area. The town of Shangtu, the one-time summer capital of Kublai Khan 
and now largely inhabited by Chinese, was a small town surrounded by a wall 
which enclosed mostly empty space. Maybe the empty space had at one time been 
covered by imperial palaces. Now it was used as a place of refuge by Mongols 
and their flocks from raiding parties. Perhaps the wall had originally been 
built with this purpose in mind, an alternate means of assuring safety to the 
flocks of vassals, similar in function to the twin cities built by the Khidat 
(Chin) deeper in the steppe.
Upon arriving in Paot'ou the great need of the Chinese to the south became 
very apparent. A grain distribution center was established for this purpose 
south of the Yellow River for a few days. Expecting people to come to the dis­
tribution center proved a hardship for them, so we simply shipped the grain to 
different points south of the Yellow River which were operated by other relief 
agencies. Fu Tso-yi, the commanding general of the area, refused to allow 
refugees fleeing the famine area to cross the river.
Grain, including buckwheat for late spring planting which it was hoped would 
replace the ruined winter wheat crop, was distributed to the banner administra­
tions or directly to Mongols living on banner lands. Some Mongolian banners 
were almost entirely pastoral. None were as dependent upon agriculture as the 
Chinese living in this region, and thus the Mongolian need was not as acute as 
that of the Chinese.
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During this period I made trips by jeep and truck to most of the Ulanchap 
and Ordos areas. When distributing grain to UJin Banner of the Ordos we half- 
emptied each sack of grain and tied the sacks to the backs of cows which were 
then herded to the points of distribution. The half—filled sacks balanced well 
on cow back. We relied on cows rather than on camels for transportatidn be­
cause the Mongols like to rest their camels during the summer, allowing them 
to recuperate from the winter and to accumulate fat. The men rode horseback.
Ujin had no roads because the land was sandy but also as a result of deliberate 
policy. The absence of roads plus the negative attitude of the banner govern­
ment helped deter Chinese colonization.
Ujin Banner was the first area where I was personally responsible for relief 
distribution. It made a deep impression on me. Even though there were no roads 
the people of Ujin Banner practiced both pastoralism and agriculture. From 
what I could observe, they lived in well-built houses of Chinese style, open to 
the swallows which built their nests along the rafters and kept down the fly 
population. In back or to the side of the baishing, as the Mongols called them, 
a yurt was generally set up either for storage or to accommodate guests or grand­
parents. The Mongols preferred goats to sheep here for both milk and wool as 
they found goat wool of greater commercial value.
As the people of Ujin Banner were both pastoralists and farmers, there was 
really no rationale for settling Chinese on banner lands. The banner administra­
tion allowed the settling of Mongols from other banners to farm Ujin Banner 
lands while discouraging Chinese encroachment. The movement of Chinese onto 
banner lands elsewhere was not simply the result of Chinese land hunger, although 
without this the strategies of both Chinese provincial governors and banner 
governments could not have been accomplished. The Chinese strategy was to en­
courage enoiigh Chinese to move onto Mongol lands so that, in due time, the area 
would come under direct Chinese administration and be incorporated into a hsien, 
the approximate equivalent to our county.
The Mongolian banner government's strategy was to allow Chinese settlement 
to a limited extent. This would allow greater income through taxation to the 
banner government and could be used to Increase the banner nrince's personal 
expenditures. I saw a small palace built in the middle of the steppe
with various gimcracks. These funds also allowed the support of banner 
schools (cf. Lattimore, The Mongols of Manchuria, 193^*K In the long run, these 
strategies worked to Chinese advantage and the gradual erosion of Mongol control 
of their lands.
One point which became strikingly clear was that the Mongols, on the whole, 
had a higher standard of living than the Chinese. The comparison is somewhat 
difficult to make with regard to housing. A well-built yurt cost as much as an 
ordinary Chinese house. The frame-built houses, such as those found in Ujin 
Banner, were of the middle range of Chinese homes. I did not see evidence of 
extreme poverty in any of the yurts or houses I visited while I had seen a great 
deal of poverty in Chinese villages. The Mongols dressed better and also ate 
better than the Chinese.
There was an obvious difference in wealth apparent among the Mongols. A sharp 
difference existed between the ordinary Mongols and members of princely families 
and some administrators. So-called palaces were not very elaborate, about on a 
level with well-to-do Chinese households, if one does not include space and
Inner Mongolia, 1945-1950 59
buildings used for administrative purposes, the banner school, and space used 
for markets and workshops. Taking into account differences in subsistence base 
between the Mongols and Chinese, the one depending on pastoralism and mixed 
animal husbandry and agriculture, the other dependent on intensive agriculture, 
the Mongol population was relatively less dense than the Chinese population in 
China proper. The Chinese living in Mongol areas as farmers, artisans, or 
merchants appeared well off or even wealthy.
To the north of the Yellow River, where the Meng Chiang government had oper­
ated under Japanese auspices, various tactics had been attempted to limit the 
movement of Chinese onto banner lands and to limit Chinese influence. In one 
case, lands along the Chinese ethnic border had been given to Mongolian families 
who were supposed to fann the land, thus creating a buffer zone through which 
Chinese settlers could not move. In this area Chinese were prohibited from 
owning banner land. This did not work as planned. The Mongols rented their 
lands to Chinese farmers and moved further into the steppe with their flocks.
In a neighboring banner lands occupied by Chinese were simply cleared of all 
residents, Mongols and Chinese alike, creating a great habitat for gazelles.
In addition to limiting the influx of Chinese farmers, some banner officials 
also set about to control the number and occupations of other Chinese allowed 
to live in the area. In many banners permits had to be obtained for a Chinese 
artisan or trader to enter Mongol land. Naturally these controls varied. In 
Ujin Banner trade was reportedly controlled by one Chinese merchant who was 
making it a lucrative business. In other banners the large temples were the 
main trading centers. Here access was limited by the banner government and by 
the frequency of temple fairs. It may well have been too difficult for a trader 
to wait out the time between temple fairs. In at least one banner, artisans 
were not allowed to bring their families. By this time, then, the Mongols in 
most areas tried to control Chinese access to Mongolian lands. The Mongols had 
obviously realized that there were vastly more Chinese than Mongols. If the 
Mongols hoped to maintain their identity as a people they had to limit access 
to their banner lands.
While the Mongols were trying to regiilate Chinese colonization of Mongol 
lands, the Chinese on their part were trying to control the Mongols themselves. 
The Mongols naturally resisted these attempts. On one level these attempts 
were mostly to integrate the Mongols into the Chinese socio-political concerns 
rather than a simple desire to dominate the Mongols. The organization of Mon­
gols into the Chinese Communist sponsored Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement 
can be seen in this light as can the efforts made by the Kuomintang to ensure 
Mongol representation within the party and national assembly.
The younger brother of the former prince of Ujin had reportedly become so 
engrossed in Kuomintang affairs that he seldom was to be found within the ban­
ner, leaving its administration to appointees selected by his brother or, to a 
lesser extent, to those of his underaged nephew. The princess of Mu Mingan was 
engaged in a somewhat similar manner in Chinese political affairs, leaving that 
administration to a relative. An example of a less subtle means of exerting 
control was to be found at Dsassak Banner where the former prince supposedly had 
tried to bring the Ordos into the Meng Chiang state. The Chinese Nationalists, 
not surprisingly, opposed this scheme, put him under house arrest, and placed a 
more "reliable" brother in charge of banner affairs.
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At a lower level, opium was used to control banner policy. In one case the 
Nationalists and in another the Communists were said to have ensured a steady 
flow of opium to key personnel in their efforts to secure policies favorable to 
them. In still another case, a Kuomintang party representative, a Chinese, 
had been assigned to a banner in order to enlighten banner personnel about 
national goals as distinct from the provincial aims of the banner p;v;vernment.
This particular very personable individual had, however, found himself so much 
in agreement with the Mongol point of view that he did not dare leave the Mongol- 
controlled area for fear of being arrested by the Chinese. There is an equation 
here. The more a banner administrator was concerned with the welfare of the 
banner, the more power he had in the banner and the less he had with the Chinese 
authorities. This was well exemplified in the Alashan, Ordos and in Ulanchap.
third trip was as a Fulbright scholar in 19^9. I entered the Alashan 
from Lanchow, or rather from Ninghsia, past the crumbling walls of the Hsi-hsia 
capital and a small city commemorating the fall of the Tanguts and their city. 
This city, empty now, had remarkably well-preserved walls and gates. After 
studying Mongolian for several months at Ting-yuan-ying, the capital of the 
Alashan, I set out by camel across the Gobi to Shan-tan, a trip of nineteen 
days. I was accompanied on this trip by a young American who was permanently 
stationed at Shan—tan, working in the Cooperative School, and by two Mongol boys 
who planned to attend this school in order to learn a trade and other virtues.
It was necessary to leave Ting-yuan-ying at this time because we feared the 
retreat of defeated and disorganized Chinese Nationalist troops pursued by Chi­
nese Communists through this area. I feared that the Chinese Communists would 
have made me study about Inner Asia from the greater safety of Peiping.
The prince of the Alashan, a cultivated gentleman, spoke little Mongolian 
but excellent Chinese and some Manchu. His linguistic hybridization had come 
about because the princely family had been marrying daughters of Manchu noble 
families for generations, thereby tightening their ties with China, Chung Kuo, 
the Central Kingdom. People at Ting-yuan-ying had told me that the prince, as 
a young man, had tried to thwart the power of a Muslim warlord at Ninghsia and 
had spent several years under detention for his pains.
When I was in the Alashan he had become largely a spokesman for the banner 
to the Chinese and to Westerners. The banner was meanwhile run by a tostokahi 
or administrator from a collateral family. The Mongols of the banner were 
naturally well aware of this sharing of responsibility and gave little credit 
to the prince. The prince derived his income from lands specifically allotted 
to him and from hay provided by bannermen for his horses. The Mongols resented 
this gift, or tax, of hay. The lands allotted to him were actually looked after 
by his Manchu relatives. The tostokahi, on the other hand, understood little 
Chinese, had little to do with foreigners, but had allegedly some ties to the 
Mongolian People's Republic.
These two, dichotomized in terms of responsibility and viewpoint, exemplify 
the point I made earlier, that the more power a man had in the banner, the less 
he had with outside powers, especially the Chinese. In the Ordos and the Ulan­
chap symbols of this dichotomy varied, with language being an important marker. 
Another was the type of home the leader lived in. In three cases families ad­
ministering the banner, who were thought of as especially solicitous for banner 
welfare, lived in yurts. Sometimes they even lived next to a closed "palace"
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vhich had heen built in the past by some relative.
Inner Mongolia in the period 19^5-1950 was an area quarreled over by the 
Nationalists and the Communists. The Mongols were generally not committed to 
either side but, instead, were committed to Mongolian nationalism. This ex­
plains the frequency with which the Mongols changed allegiances in the civil 
war. I remember one man who when I first met him was affiliated with Ulanfu. 
Troubled by some of the latter's tactics, he turned to the Nationalists, only 
to return in time once more to the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Movement.
The Mongols sought three guarantees from the Chinese. One was the right to 
be represented as a unit in the central government rather than through provin­
cial governors. Another was their right to speak Mongolian and the use of 
Mongolian as the primary language in their schools. The third was the right to 
retain banner lands and develop them for their own benefit. The Chinese Com­
munists spoke to all three points while the Kuomintang did not take these 
asperations seriously. The Chinese Communists have maintained the first two 
points, but as to the retention of Mongolian lands for Mongols, this seemingly 
was dropped during the Great Leap Forward and the Great Proletarian Cultural 
Revolution. The man in Inner Mongolia who best symbolized these Mongol goals 
was Prince Te.
Before my first trip to Kalgan and Peitzemiao I was quite ignorant about Mon­
golian issues. I did not become aware of the importance of Prince Te and his 
associates until Ulanfu suggested that I had learned of the Wang-yeh-miao meet­
ing from some of them. My friendship with associates of Prince Te strengthened 
through the years. We decided to increase the understanding of Mongol affairs 
in the Western world. To this end, we organized a Friends of Mongolia Society. 
This fledgling organization metamorphosed into the Mongolia Society. Now the 
Mongolia Society has structure and substance while that earlier association had 
only the ideal. The Friends of Mongolia initiated the migration of several 
Mongol intellectuals to the United States. The ultimate success of this venture 
was due to the backing provided by established American scholars like Lattimore 
and Lessing.
It was with pleasant surprise and considerable puzzlement that I learned while 
in Ting-yiian-ying of the impending meeting of Mongols which was to take place 
there for the purpose of proclaiming an independent Mongolian government. This 
event which took place in the summer of 19^8 was based, I think, on the belief 
that the civil war would weaken China, thus allowing the existence of an inde­
pendent Mongolian government. Delegates from different Mongol areas came to­
gether but especially associates of Prince Te and those who had maintained con­
nections with the Nationalists, perhaps only because they lived in regions 
controlled by the latter at that time. This independent Mongolian government 
was not sponsored by either the Nationalists or the Communists. Neither had 
sent an official delegate.
The formation of an independent Mongolian government was based upon several 
factors. As already stated, the Mongols hoped that a divided China would be 
unable to control them. Another was a somewhat natural result of dissolving 
ties between Mongols and Chinese Nationalists, but a reluctance to join the 
Communist side. Some of the most faithful apologists of the Nationalists could 
be observed at the meeting as they were in the process of changing allegiances 
from the now nearly defeated Nationalists to the soon-to-become dominant
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Communists. A third factor was an effort to proclaim to the world that move­
ments for Mongolian independence and autonomy were not simply projections of 
Soviet, Japanese, or Chinese Communist political maneuverings, hut the expres­
sion of the wishes of the Mongolian people themselves. Some of the delegates 
hoped that should Ting-yuan-ying he overwhelmed hy Chinese forces, they could 
first retreat into the Gobi and then make their way to the M.P.R. That is exactly 
what some of the delegates finally did. The M.P.R. did give most of these Mon­
gols asylum, hut there were some tragic exceptions. It must he remembered that 
the M.P.R. was soon to establish close ties with the Chinese People's Republic, 
even if these proved to he temporary. Finally, the meeting seemingly took 
place due to inertia. Men who had been trying to form Mongolian governments 
ever since 19^5, hut who had constantly been frustrated in this, went ahead and 
formed a government even though it dissolved before its functions could be 
exercised.
l^ty trips to Mongolia were of course not only somber lessons in realpolitik.
This was hardly the case. They did force me, however, to realize the importance 
of ethnicity and of inter-ethnic relations and their influence on intra-ethnic 
social organization, ideas developed by Lattimore in his Inner Asian Frontiers 
of China (l95l). One of the less somber memories which floats to mind is/the 
crippling effect of riding a camel between thirty and forty miles a day. On 
that first camel ride the insides of my thighs were rubbed raw by the long 
strides of the camel. And then I remember the delightfully lonely sound of the 
long trumpets rising from a lamasery as one nears it at night; or the feeling 
of homesickness for Chinese things after a month on horseback in Mongol areas; 
or amusement with a British friend, a journalist, who overindulged in Mongolian 
summer cheese (a type of half-dried irgen, I believe) which almost did him in.
Then there was the relief at recovering from severe sunstroke contracted while 
setting up a grain distribution center south of the Yellow River. Some wise 
guy suggested aspirins and whisky luntll my temperature rose to lOU degrees and 
a Chinese doctor finally cooled me off. Other memories: the flash of wolf or
gazelle in front of vehicle or horse; yurts on the steppe or a lamasery nestled 
in the foothills; receiving a ceremonial scarf at Edsin Khoro, supposedly the 
tomb of Genghis Khan; long and earnest discussions with the Chinese who tried 
to understand the Mongol point of view. And most of all I remember with grati­
tude the open-handed acceptance of a Westerner by the Mongols, even though he 
could speak their language only haltingly.
THE ROLE OF THE SINO-MONGOLIM FRONTIER ZONE 
IN THE RISE OF CINGGIS-QAN
Paul D. Buell 
Seattle
Crucially important in the rise of Cinggis-gein seems to have been his close 
and continued connection with the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.2 The connection 
was significant for him in three ways. First of all, during his earliest years 
as chieftain, the frontier zone and the frontier system, established by the 
Chin dynasty (1125-123U) to secure its outer limits and prevent nomadic in­
cursion into China, provided a backdrop against which his Mongol tribal group- 
ings3 took shape. Second, as Cinggis-qan*s influence expanded, the frontier 
zone, which he conquered in the face of an eroding Chin 5>osition, provided a 
ready-made power base of great potential, one strategically positioned, like a 
dagger pointed at the heart of China. Finally, as Cinggis-qan laid the founda­
tions for an empire during the period of rapid Mongol expansion after 1211, the 
peoples of the frontier zone, mostly mixed societies with mixed cultures based 
in both the pastoralism of the steppe and the sedentary world of China, provided 
the experience and expertise needed to get the fledgling structure off the ground. 
In particular, the peoples of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone were most im­
portant vehicles of Chinese influence upon the Mongols. The form of this in­
fluence was subsequently to have the most profound impact upon the shape and 
development of the political system of the Mongol empire.
Frontier Zone and Frontier System
In East Asia the second half of the twelfth centiiry was marked by the apogee 
of the powerful Chin dynasty, founded by the Tungus-speaking Jiirced of Manchiiria 
after 1125.^ Under the Chin a level of development unattained in North China 
since the heyday of Northern Sung (960-1125) was achieved. Population exceeded 
fifty million,5 industry was well developed, and agriculture reached new plateaus 
In particulax, the century of Chin rule witnessed the culmination of a period of 
broad agricultural penetration of previously non-agricultural or mixed marginal 
areas in and around China, including much of the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.
As a result, steppe areas there seem to have been more agricultural in late Chin 
times than in any period of Chinese history until the coming of the railroads 
and the great migration of farmers in the late nineteenth century.
At the beginning of the thirteenth century, for example, the registered, 
sedentary population alone of what is now the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region 
seems to have numbered more than one million persons.^ The non-sedentary pop­
ulation of the area was generally not included on taxation rolls and therefore 
not included in our sources either.^ The total population of the area was thus 
probably much higher than one million at that time. By comparison, the total 
population of Inner Mongolia in 1957, after more than a century of massive mi­
gration from the Chinese interior and of industrialization, was only slightly
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greater at 4,200,000 persons, 0.6 percent of a total Chinese population at least 
seven times larger than that in 1200.8
Evidence from available population data for laxge-scale penetration of the 
marginal territories of Inner Mongolia by farmers and other non-pastoral people 
during this period is fully supported by archeological findings. Inner Mon­
golia is dotted with ruins from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Among them 
are the remains of many small settlements, towns and even small cities, contained 
within the area protected by the remnants of several lines of outer fortifica­
tions constructed by the Chin government in the twelfth century to protect the 
expanded agricultural areas of its subjects from nomads of the deep steppe (see 
map).9
Perhaps the best example of the type of settlement found is provided by the 
small city known until recently as Olon-siime but now identified with the QnggiitlO 
capital of Tenduc (T'ien-te ^ Although no complete excavation has been
undertaken, preliminary surveys indicate that the site, which is a walled set­
tlement about 1,000 by 600 meters containing houses, palaces and even a Catholic 
church, flourished twice, once around 1200 and again around l600.12 other 
words, the city flourished just when agricultural penetration of the steppe 
reached its high point on the eve of the Mongol invasion and again in late Ming 
(1368-1644) times as a new period of Chinese agricultural penetration reversed 
the trend of a declining population loss in these marginal areas.13 Systematic 
surveys of other sites in the area would most likely reveal much the same pat­
tern. 1^
To secure this expanded agricultural pale the Chin government, as already 
noted, undertook the construction of a series of fortification lines reaching 
far out into the steppe, well beyond the traditional Great Wall line. In con­
junction with these fortifications the Chin government set about organizing the 
frontier zone into a frontier system. By the late twelfth century this frontier 
system comprised three distinct layers, an inner layer made up by primarily 
Chinese forces based along and behind the Great Wall line, an outer layer con­
sisting of various groups of the steppe proper allied with the Chin, and a middle 
layer formed by organizational units containing the various inhabitants of the 
frontier zone itself.
The most important frontier zone inhabitants were what Owen Lattimore has 
called the "auxiliary peoples of the inner frontier," who as
by-products of the total Impact on each other of China as a whole and the 
frontier as a whole . . . were not genuinely rooted in either the economy 
and society of China or those of the forested Manchurian mountains, the 
steppes of Mongolia, or the Tibetan plateau.15 
They were, however,
in spite of their limited absolute power . . . of the greatest relative 
importance. In passive phases they represented the balance, at any 
given time, between China and the frontier; but in active phases they 
were the agents of ferment in frontier relations, causing new adjust­
ments of the balance and preventing it from ever becoming static and 
permanent.1°
In the late twelfth century there were four major ^groupings of these "auxiliary 
peoples" in the frontier zone, the semi-pastoral Onggiit, the nomadic Khitan and 
Tang’ut and the ethnically diverse bodies known collectively as Jiiyin people 
{Juy-Ln irgen).!'(
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Cinggis-qan and the Frontier Zone
When Cinggis-qan first associated himself with the Chin frontier system is 
unclear, but this association was certainly an established fact by the 1190s.
At that time the Mongol chieftain, then known as Temiijin, was a close confederate 
of the Kereyid To'oril-qan, the most important Chin ally in the steppe. In II96 
Temiijin and To'oril campaigned at the behest of the court against a group of re­
calcitrant Tatars led by one Megiijin-se’ultu. As a reward for their successful 
efforts To’oril was granted the title ong-qan {wang i -qan, "prince qan") and 
Temujin was made a ja'ut (sive oa'ut)-quri,^^ a conferral probably expressive 
of his formal recognition as an allied chieftain by the Chin government. Temujin 
seems to have also requested but not been_ granted the powerful office of frontier 
military commissioner [ahao-t'ao shih on the same occasion.
Temiijin’s association with Chin frontier organization, in particular his 
formal recognition as a chieftain by the court, could not have failed to give 
form and definition to what must have been a rather amorphous following. As a 
recognized component of the Chin frontier system, Temiijin’s following could take 
on a definite political shape and a more formal "tribal" character just as the 
institution of the razza, involving the organization of various border communi­
ties to fight the enemies of the Faith, greatly helped in the formation of the 
tribal" bands of the Seljuq Turkmen.21 This development recalls the fact that 
in the view of many anthropologists tribes, as the distinct and self-conscious 
bodies that we visualize them, were not the natural groupings of primitive so­
cieties but came into being only when those primitive societies came into con­
tact with more developed societies. In this view, for example, the Germanic 
tribes noted by Greek and Roman writers were not the natural political forma­
tions of the Germanic world but products of contact between the society of the 
Roman frontier and the Germanic peoples.22 Likewise, the American Indian tribes 
were products of similar contact or even reservation realities.23 The apparent 
role of Chin frontier organization in the definition of Temiijin’s following 
would seem to support this view.'^^
The "tribalization," however, of Temiijin’s followers was of even greater im­
portance than might be readily apparent since it took place at a critical juncture 
in the history of steppe-sedentary relations. At the end of the twelfth century, 
just as Temiijin’s followers and, for that matter, his superior, To’oril ong-qan, 
and the many other steppe allies of the court gained new definition and solidity 
as part of a well-organized frontier system, relationships within and without 
China began to undergo rapid and extensive changes.
These changes, as well as their causes, differed from place to place. In 
China itself the crucial factor seems to have been the traditional dynastic 
cycle of prosperity and collapse which by 1200 saw the Chin regime past its 
prime and beset by many difficulties. Rot the least of its problems were endemic 
civil disturbances promoted by acrimonious and lengthy disputes over succession 
to the throne.25 One result of Chin preoccupations with such internal matters 
was a relaxation of its control in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone. At the 
same time, the frontier zone was the scene of increasing conflict^^ which may 
have been generated, inter alia, by ecological competition between nomadic and 
sedentary users of the same lands.2T in any case, unsettled conditions within 
China went hand in hand with unsettled conditions in the Sino-Mongolian frontier 
zone.
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In the deep steppe the weeikening of Chin influence soon touched off a major 
power struggle among leaders formerly allied with and dominated by the Chin 
court. One great prize in this struggle was control over the frontier zone 
which a nomadic power could use as a base for adventures in China just as the 
China-based Chin regime had used it to meddle in the steppe.
Temujin and his ally To'oril ong-qan, as major allies of the court with well- 
organized followers, soon were primed for this great struggle and, as a resiilt, 
their power and influence grew rapidly after their victory over the Tatars. In 
1201 the two allies fought off a powerful league headed by Jamuqa, a former 
associate of Temujin,28 and gained a momentary position of dominance.
Progressive elimination of rivals, however, soon strained relations between 
Temujin and To'oril, and in 1203 a second league was formed against Temujin alone, 
this time with the participation of To'oril ong-qan. Despite initial difficul­
ties, however, which reduced the future Mongol conqueror's fortunes to their 
lowest ebb, Temujin soon mastered the situation and in a series of decisive bat­
tles eliminated his enemies or forced them to leave Mongolia.29 By 1206 none of 
Temujin's former rivals remained in a position to influence events, and in that 
year he gained formal recognition of his power and position through his election 
as qan, with the reign title Cinggis-qan, by a great assembly iqwri.ltai) of his 
family and supporters convened at the headwaters of the Onan river. With his 
position in the steppe secure, the new Mongol ruler then set about acquiring 
the prize for his labors, control over the strategic Sino-Mongolian frontier 
zone.
The Crisis of 1207
The Mongol qan did not have to wait long for his reward for in 1207, only a 
year after the formal establishment of his power, a large uprising broke out in 
the frontier zone, ein uprising that was to sweep away the last vestiges of Chin 
control in almost all the territory lying outside the Great Wall line. The 
primary catalysts in this great uprising were the so-called Jiiyin peoples.
In the Ta Chin kuo-ahih the role of Juyin peoples in the
revolt is related in the context of the campaigns mounted against Hsi-hsia and 
Sung of the previous year:
Before this, in the sixth year of T'ai-ho CI206I, the emperor made
a general levy of troops to invade the northwest. The various Jiiyin 
lahiu 3^^ and uncivilized fan ^ 32 fact bordered on the north.
They were called the "martial riders" and numbered 30,000. They were 
totally mobilized. CThe emperor! invaded Chiang-nan^i$7 CSungi. Next 
year the troops were demobilized and peace was reestablished. The 
various Jiiyin were sent back. Because the rewards were not equitable 
they all revolted and went over to the north. 33
But in the earlier and probably more reliable Meng-Ta pei-lu 
the revolt is described in connection with the construction of a new line 
of fortifications, a line most likely intended to cut off the Jiiyin peoples from 
the deep steppe and to facilitate agricultural penetration of their pastures:
Chang-tsung ^ Hr.^1190-12083 then built a new long wall35
north of Ching-chou'H’l . He garrisoned it with Tang'ut Jiiyin 
people. Their chiefs, because the Tang'ut Juyin had revolted.
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^ 3 6established connections with the Yeh-la tu Jiiyin, the Mu-
tien Juyin, the Mien®-^ Jviyin, the Hou-tien Jiiyin, and
others and all revolted. The Chin sent troops to pacify them. The 
Jiiyin people scattered and went over to the Mongols C"Tatar"i.3T 
Here it is specifically the Tang'ut Jiiyin, who apparently comprised a major por­
tion of the Jiiyin peoples, who are made the leaders of the revolt. But whatever 
its immediate causes, the uprising led to the Chin court's loss of control over 
several pivotal and strategically located groupings on its frontiers.
It was apparently in response to the Juyin uprising that the Chin court at­
tempted a coup against the Tenduc Onggiit, who had long maintained a good relation­
ship with Cinggis-qan without, as far as can be determined, openly breaking with 
their overlords in the capital of Chung-tu In 1203, for example, the
Tenduc Onggiit prince Alaqus-digit-quri38 had sent his representative Asan 9 to 
Cinggis with a gift of sables and squirrels,^® and later that same year he under­
took to warn the Mongol ruler against the plans of his rival, Tayang-qan of the 
Naiman, who had sought unsuccessfully to establish an alliance with Alaqus.
As a result Alaqus was recognized as one of the chiliarchs 2 of the Mongol em­
pire, heading a chiliarchy of some 5,000 of his Onggiit, at the time of the g^eat 
reorganization accompanying Cinggis-qan's election to supreme^power in 1206.^^ 
Moreover, in the list of chiliarchs contained in the Secret Htstory the Onggiit 
prince is called son-in-law (guregen), indicating the first of a long series of 
dynastic alliances between the Onggiit princes of Tenduc and the Mongol ruling 
house.With the uprising of 1207 the Chin court could no longer afford to 
tolerate such a close relationship between the Onggut and Cinggis-qan and under­
took direct action to shape events in its interest.
The fullest account of the Chin coup against the Onggut is contained in the
Ta Chin kuo-ohih:
Also formerly there was those CTatarsI neighboring Chin boundaries.
Their chief was established as prince of Pei-p'ing -f- .He was 
killed. His younger brother succeeded him and was established as prince.
The elder brother's son was Po-ssu-p'o /iJ, and was just two
years old. The Great Chin took him up and brought him to the capital.
He was brought up in the household of the chiliarch Hei-shui ^ • In
the spring of ting-mao J i)p , the seventh year of T'ai-ho of Chang- 
tsung 11207:, the younger brother of the Cformeri prince of Pei-p'ing 
presented tribute at Huan-chou The Chin took advantage of his
carelessness and killed him while he was drunk. They reestablished 
Po-ssu-p'o as prince and sent him back to his country. Before, when 
Po-ssu-p'o was in the household of the chiliarch Hei-shui, he had seen 
Hei-shui's daughter and liked her. At this point he wished to marry her.
The capital did not allow it. Po-ssu-p'o was grieved and angry and re­
volted and went over to the Mongols C"Black Tatar":. ' They were all the 
stronger because of this and gradually brought under their control the 
lands of the various peoples. They consequently mobilized troops at­
tack Ho-hsi7^>^ :i.e., Hsi-hsiai. In not many years all the 'J'li
and chun % of Ho-hsi were crushed by them. They got a false 9 impe­
rial princess of the IHsil hsia ruling house and departed. The :Hsi: 
hsia people, on the other hand, served them as tributaries.5 
A textual note the,n adds that this account refers to the "White Tatars 
Onggut.52
or
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The information in the Ta Chin kuo-ohih is supplemented by other sources.
From the Persian historian Rashid-ad-Din we learn that the younger brother of the 
prince of Pei-p'ing killed by the Chin was Maqus-digit-quri:
The leader (moqaddam) and amir53 of the Onggiit during the time of Cinggis- 
qan was a person whom they called Alaqus-dlgit-quri ... He secretly had 
partiality and inclination towards Cinggis-qan . . . When Cinggis-qan made 
an attempt upon China Alaqus-digit harbored a grudge against the Altan-qan Cof ChinH5^ and therefore yielded Cinggis-qan entry Cthrough the frontier 
walls]. 55 For this reason Cinggis-qan showed great favor to Alaqus and 
ordered that a daughter be given him. Alaqus said: "l am old but I had 
a brother, Binui by name, who was ruler {padsah)When he died the 
Altan-qan of China took his son, Senkui by name, to China as a hostage.
Perhaps you should give this daughter to that one so that it may be that
he will come. Cinggis-qan instructed that it would be possible. Alaqus- i
digit sent a message secretly to his nephew that he would come. He came
and when he had reached Kenduk Ci.e., Tenduc],5T which was near to that
place,5° the amirs of his uncle and father sent a message to him saying:
"It is not advisable for you to come since your uncle Alaqus would kill 
you. You keep away until we have destroyed him. §enkui halted and the 
amirs of Alaqus-digit killed him. Later Senkui arrived and entered into 
the service of Cinggis-qan.59
In Rashid-ad-Din's account of the assassination of Alaqus the Po-ssu-p'o of the 
Chinese sources is called Senkui, nothing more than a Persian transcription of 
Po-ssu-p'o's Chinese title ohen-kuo, "fortifier of the dynasty,"^0 but 
the description is clearly of the same events narrated in the Ta Chin kuo-ahih.
To summarize, in the spring of 1207 the Chin court, alarmed by the great 
Jiiyin uprising that apparently took place during the earlier part of that same 
spring^! and the rapid growth of Mongol power in the steppe and probably aware 
of the Onggiit prince's duplicity, assassinated Alaqus-digit-quri with the active 
collaboration and cooperation of a faction from within his own followers. But 
this last-ditch effort on the part of the court in Chung-tu to regain control 
of the situation on its northern frontiers soon foundered on the unwillingness 
of Alaqus-digit-quri's nephew and successor Po-ssu-p'o, alias Senkui, to be the 
tool of his Chin overlords. He, too, became an ally of Cingiss-qan in that 
same year of 1207 when "Alaqa-beki Cdaughter of Cinggis-qan] was given to the 
0nggut"^2 to be the wife of Po-ssu-p'o.53 Thus in this one crucial year of 1207 /
Cinggis-qan gained control over two pivotal groupings resident in the Sino- 
Mongolian frontier zone, the so-called Jiiyin peoples and the Tenduc Onggiit, and 
with them dominance over almost the entire frontier zone.
The Frontier Zone as Base
After 1207 the whole relationship between the steppe and China changed since 
it was now the Mongol qan who increasingly assumed a position of dominance and 
pushed his own organizational system deeper and deeper into the sedentary world 
just as the Chin court had formerly expanded its own influence and its frontier 
system far into the steppe world.
The first expression of the changed relationship was the Mongol advance against 
the Hsi-hsia capital in 1209-121o5*+ but the following year the great raids against 
the Chin heartland began. They ended in the first Mongol siege of Chung-tu in
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12lh and the subsequent removal of the Chin court south to K'ai-feng M#} and 
the comparative safety of the Yellow river, an event marking the virtual abandon­
ment of almost the entire northern portion of the Chin empire to the steppe con­
querors. Most raids and campaigns of these years were mounted from or through 
the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone, and it was Mongol possession of this strategic 
area, more than anything else, which forced the Chin to move their capital.65
By 12lh the conquerors felt strong enough not only to raid but also to begin 
a piecemeal conquest of North China with the former Chin capital of Chung-tu it­
self which fell in the spring of 1215 to a force comprised largely of local 
allies of the Mongols.66 During the years of conquest the Sino-Mongolian fron­
tier zone continued to play a most important role.
As I have shown elsewhere,6? throughout much of its existence the Mongol em­
pire was structured and ruled as a gigantic tribal federation. Its various 
provinces, including Mongol China, first emerged as little more than regional 
outgrowths of this great tribal structure, as branch federations of the main 
federation of the steppe.
To rule such branch federations certain chiliarchies of the Mongol levy were 
associated with various reliable local elements to form a tanma, "nomadic gax- 
rison force,"6° and stationed in or as near to the territories of the branch 
federation as possible. In the case of Mongol China, the tanma, organized in 1217 or 12186^ under Muqali,'^0 centered in the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone 
which thereby became, and remained for almost the entire period of imperial rule, 
the military and organizational center of Mongol domains in China.
But the frontier zone was more than Just a physical and logistical base for 
Mongol power in China. Imposition of a tribal system of rule did not preclude 
or prevent development of bureaucratic elements as well. As time passed the 
utility and productiveness of local methods for governing and exploiting a given 
local area became all too cleeLr for many influential Mongols. For China and 
other more developed portions of Mongol domains, local methods were generally 
local bureaucratic methods. This fact, coupled with the effects of changes 
taking place within Mongol society itself, soon gave rise to a gradual but defi­
nite "bureaucratization" of Mongol r\ile that ultimately culminated in the largely 
bureaucratic administrative structures of the various successor qanates after 
the breaJtup of empire."^2 The process of "bureaucratization," however, created 
problems for the comparatively primitive Mongols who lacked adequate sources of 
the new kind of administrative talent within their own ranks and were forced to 
turn to the conquered peoples to provide the bureaucratic administrators neces­
sary for ruling themselves. In China, the various nationalities of the Sino- 
Mongolian frontier zone, with their experience in both the pastoralism of the 
steppe and the sedentary traditions of China, proved culturally and politically 
a particularly acceptable and reliable source of talent for the conquerors. Con­
sequently, as conquest continued inhabitants of the frontier zone performed an 
increasingly important function in the day-to-day administration of the areas 
brought under control.
Typical of the many administrators from the frontier zone in Mongol service 
during the early years of the empire, although in his special case the associa­
tion was by reason of ancestral culture rather than of actual residence, was the 
Khitan Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai (II89-I2U3) ."^3 Entering Mongol service in
the aftermath of the fall of Chung-tu and the virtual collapse of Chin authority
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in much of the Chin empire, he first held office as a court astrologer, in which 
capacity he created a Chinese-style calendar for court use, then as state sec­
retary {hvavkoi)'!'^ for Chinese affairs in the imperial chancellery and finally 
under qan Ogodei (r. 1229-12^1), son and successor of Cinggis-qan, as head of 
the imperial tax system for occupied China that was largely organized in accord­
ance with the Khitan's own proposals to the qcm.1’̂
In all his various roles Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts'ai was instrumental in introducing 
Chinese administrative practices and Chinese institutions among the Mongols, 
thereby considerably enhancing the overall effectiveness of Mongol government 
at all levels. Clearly the Khitan was one of the most important cultural medi­
ators between the Mongols and China and the early decades of Mongol rule there. 
Significantly, however, the Chinese administrative practices and institutions 
which Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai, and many others like him, transmitted were not passed 
on unchanged. Rather they reflected the particular cultural environment peciiliar 
to the transmitters themselves, namely the mixed, semi-Sinified environment of 
the Sino-Mongolian frontier zone.76
In conclusion the Slno-Mongolian frontier zone was very important for the 
Mongols. It began as the backdrop against which the Mongol tribes of Cinggis- 
qan took shape and it later became the springboard for the Mongols' conquest of 
China. Finally, when the process of conquest itself was complete the people of 
the frontier zone became important cultural intermediators guaranteeing rule just 
as Mongol arms guaranteed conquest.
Notes
1. Mongolian names and terms are given in their Middle Mongolian forms tran­
scribed according to the system employed in Igor de Rachewiltz, Index to the 
Secret History of the Mongols, Uralic and Altaic Series, v. 121 (Bloomington,
1972).
2. By Sino-Mongolian frontier zone I am referring to an area approximately 
equivalent to contemporary Inner Mongolia. See map.
3. By "tribal grouping" or "tribe" I am referring to what Sahlins calls a 
"chiefdom." See the discussion in Marshall D. Sahlins, "The segmentary lineage; 
an organization for predatory expansion," American Anthropologist 63 (1961),
pp. 322-3^*5.
1*. For a survey of Chin history see the study by M. V. Vorov'yev, Chzhurahzheni 
i Gosudarstvo Tszin' (Moscow: Nauka, 1975).
5. On the population of China at the time of the Mongol invasions see Ho Ping-
ti, "An estimate of the total population of Sung-Chin China," in F. Aubin, edi­
tor, Studes Song, Series I, 1 (19T0), pp. 33-53. .
6. According to figures given in the Chin shih JL 3^ (Peking: Chung-hua shu-
chu ^ ^ , 1975; henceforth CS), chuan 2k, pp. 557-569, there were ap­
proximately 150,000 families or about 850,000 persons, assuming an average^ 
family size of 5.5, registered in those parts of Hsi-ching lu outside
the present Great Wall line and in the frontier portions of Pei-ching lu^'f-'S^ 
at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The breakdown is as follows:
. Hsi ching lu
Feng-chou ^ ’)•'■) 22,683 families
Ching-chou ‘H-l 5,938 families
Huan-chou 578 families
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9,319 families 67,907 families 
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The number of persons inhabiting those portions of the Sino-Mongolian frontier 
zone controlled by the Tang'ut of Hsi-hsia is not known with certainty, but if 
population densities in the Hsi-hsia border areas were approximately the same 
as those in Chin domains, about 20,000-30,000 families or 110,000 to 165,000 
persons lived in the Hsi-hsia portions of the frontier zone. We may thus esti­
mate the total registered population of the frontier zone to have been about one 
million at the txirn of the thirteenth century.
7. On the basis of Chin population registration see Ho, op. ait. That tribal 
population was generally not included in the 1207 canvass (the basis of the CS 
figures) is clear from such things as the low total (578 families) for Huan-chou, 
an area known to have a large Khitan, i.e., tribal, population. The so-called 
Minggan-muke census of II87 recorded a total of some 127,5^^ persons within the 
jurisdictions of the Juyin units (see the discussion in Ho) and it is unlikely 
that any of these appear in the figures from the 1207 canvass.
8. This figure for 1957 is from the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, People's 
Reprublia of China: Atlas (Washington, 1971), P- 37- It is an estimate based on the 
results of the 1953 census. Ho, p. 51 gives a total population of about 110,000,000 
for China in 1200.
9. On these "reservoir walls" see Owen Lattimore, "Origins of the Great Wall 
of China: A frontier concept in theory and practice," in his Studies in Frontier 
History (London: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. 97-119, henceforth Lattimore 
1962a.
10. On the Turkic-speaking Onggiit see Sakurai MasuoJp > "Oko buzoku
ko" pi . Toho gakuhd 55" 6 (1936), pp. 659-680; Paul
Pelliot, Reaherahes sur les Chretiens d'Asve Centrale et d’ExtrSme Orient (Paris: 
Imprimerie Nationale, 1973), pp. 239-288; and Owen Lattimore, "A ruined Nestorian 
city in Inner Mongolia," in his Studies in Frontier History, pp. 221-2^0, hence­
forth Lattimore 1962b.
11. On Olon-siime see Pelliot; Lattimore 1962b; Walther Heissig, Ein Volk suaht 
seine Gesohichte (Diisseldorf and Vienna: Econ Verlag, I96U), pp. 282-295; and 
Namio Egami, "Olon-Sume et la decouverte de I’eglise catholique romaine de Jean 
de Montecorvino," Journal, Asiatique 2k0 (1952), pp. I55-I67.
12. See Heissig, pp. 282-295.
13. On Ming attitudes towards their northern frontiers see the discussion in 
Edward L. Farmer, Early Ming Government; The Evolution of Dual Capitals (Cam­
bridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 86 ff. and passim. However, to a large 
extent, the growth in the number of cultivators in Inner Mongolia in the six­
teenth i^nd seventeenth centuries was more a reflection of growing Manchu rather 
than Ming influence. On this period see Franz Michael, The Origin of Manahu
Rule in China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 19^2).
lU. See Heissig, p. 288.
15. Lattimore 1962a, pp. 115-6.
16. Lattimore 1962a, p. II6. .
17. On the Jiiyin peoples see Wang Kuo-wei ^ , "Yiian-ch'ao pi-shih chih
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38: 5 (1927), pp. 1-15> henceforth Wang 1927-
18. For a discussion of this title see G. Doerfer, Tupklsohe vend mongolisahe 
Elemente im Neupersisohen, vol. I (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, I963),
pp. 282-3; and Paul Pelliot, Notes on Marco Polo, vol. I (Paris: Imprimerie 
Nationale, 1959), pp. 291-295-
19. Under the Chin there were four ahao-t'ao shih, each assigned the duty of 
subduing rebels and resisting external assault in a given jurisdiction.
20. These events are recounted in the following terms in the Secret History
(ahuan 13^): "Cinggis-qahan and To'oril, the two of them, went to meet Ongging- 
cingsang saying that they had killed Megujln-se'iilte. Ongging-cingsang, re­
joicing greatly after he had learned that it had turned out that they had killed 
Megiljin-se'ultii, when he gave the title ja'ut-quri to Cinggis-qahan he then gave 
the title ong to To’oril of the Kereyid. The title ong-qan thus arose from 
Ongging-cingsang's title giving. When Ongging-cingsang spoke he said: 'Yo\ir
attacking and killing of Megiijin-se'ulte has been a very great assistance to the 
Altan-qan. I wish to report to Altan-qan this assistance of yours. The enhance­
ment of the title greater than this for Cinggis-qahan, the giving of the title 
geutau Lchao-t’aol to him, Altan-qan must see to.' After that Ongging-cingsang 
immediately returned, rejoicing. Cinggis-qahan and the Ong-qan, the two of them, 
having made captive, divided and carried off the Tatar together, returned to 
■their yurts and camped." The Ongging-cingsang, or Wan-yen ch'eng-hsiang
, mentioned in the text is apparently Wan-yen Hsiang ,
the Chin official in charge of frontier operations during the campaigns against 
the Tatar. On the campaigns themselves see the discussion in Wang Kuo-wei,
"Ta-ta k'ao" in his Meng-ku shih-liao ssu chung
(Taipei: Cheng-chung shu-chii, I962), henceforth Wang I96I, pp. 58U-6OO.
21. See the discussion in Claude Cahen, "La premiere penetration turque en 
Asie-Mineure," Byzantion I8 (I9i8), pp. 5-67.
22. See the discussion in E. A. Thompson, The Early Germans (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1965).
23. See Morton H. Fried, The Evolution of Political Society (New York: Random 
House, 1967), pp. 170-17^.
2U. For a general discussion of what I call the process of "tribalization" 
in late twelfth and early thirteenth-century Mongol society see also Paul D.
Buell, "Tribe, Qan and Ulus in Early Mongol China: Some Prolegomena to Yuan 
History," unpublished doctoral dissertation. University of Washington, Seattle,
1977 (order number 78OO908), henceforth Buell 1977, pp. 26 ff.
25. On late Chin history see Tao Jing-shen, The Jurahen in Twelfth-Century 
China (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976), pp. 8^; ff.
26. The Jiiyin uprising of 1207, discussed below, was only one of many similar 
revolts. In 1201, for example, the Khitan Yeh-lii Te-shou led his people, numbeilng 
several myriads, against the Chin overlords who mobilized an even larger force
in suppressing the rebellion (see Yu-wen Mou-chao ^ 0S , Ta Chin kuo- 
chih, Kuo-hsiieh wen-k'u , henceforth TCKC, ahuan 20, p. l4). See
also Wang I961, pp. 58I ff. for a recitation and discussion on Chin involvements on 
and beyond its northern frontiers.
27. On the role of similar conflict in the rise of the Kalat qanate of 
Baluchistan see Nina Swidler, "The development of the Kalat khanate," in W.
Irons and N. Dyson-Hudson, eds., Perspectives on Nomadism (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 
1972), pp. 115-121, and her unpublished doctoral dissertation, "The Political
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Structure of a Tribal Federation: The Brahui of Baluchistan," Columbia Uni­
versity, 1969«
28. On Jamuqa and his conflict with Cinggis-q.an see Sh. Natsagdorj, ed.,
Bugd Hayramdax Mongol Ard Ulsyn Tiiux, vol. I (Ulaanbaatar, 1966), pp. 203 ff.
29. On the history of this period see Sh. Natsagdorj, pp. 16T-21U.
30. The Ta Chin kuo-shih purports to be a private history written by the 
Jurced scholar Yii-wen Mou-chao and presented to the Chin court shortly before 
the fall of the dynasty. In its present form, however, the work is clearly a 
product of the period after the fall of K’aifeng to the Mongols in 123^*. What­
ever the history of the text, the Ta Chin kuo-ohih contains much useful material 
on the rise of the Mongols and the last years of Chin rule, much of its infor­
mation drawn from sources now lost.31. On the equivalency of ahiu and the Jiiyin of the Secret History see the 
discussion in Wang 1927.32. Fan has two meanings in texts of the period. One is simple "barbarian 
tribes" but the other is specifically "Tang'ut barbarian tribes." The word is 
possibly used here in its second sense, probably in reference to Tang'ut allies 
of the Chin not included among the Juyin.
33. TCKC, ohuan 21, pp. 22-23.
3U. The Meng-Ta pei-lu is an account of a Sung mission to the Mongols of 
1220 composed the following year by one Chao Hung , a member of the mis­
sion.
35. On the Chin frontier walls see above and note 9.
36. The character tw which means, among other things, "chief," may be in­
terpreted here to mean that this Jiiyin had a controlling role with respect to 
the others. The Yeh-la, incidentally, were the former royal lineage of the 
Khitan.37. Chao Hung, Meng-Ta pei-lu, in Wang Kuo-wei, ed., Meng-ku shih-liao ssu 
ahung, pp. UU8-9. For a complete list of the Jiiyin peoples allied with the 
Chin see the CS, ohuan 2k, pp. 570-571.38. For his biography see the Tuan shihy(j^^ (Peking: Chung-^a sh:^-chii,^^
1916), henceforth YS, ohuan II8, pp. 2923-U, and Su T'ien-chiieh , Yi^n
wen-lei j Tvnshu cha-chi ts'ung-k'an, henceforth 71®, 23, pp. 20-21.
39. This name possibly represents the Islamic Hasan.
ItO. Secret History, ohuan l82. All citations of the Secret History, henceforth 
SH, are to the de Rachewiltz edition in de Rachewiltz, op. oit.
4l. SH, ohuan I90. See also the account of these events in the YWL, ohuan 23, 
p. 20, and in Rashid-ad-Din's Jami’ al-Tavdrix, edited by A. A. Romaskevicha,
A. A. Khetagurova and A. A. Ali-zade (Moscow, 1968), henceforth JAT, p. 309.
i;2. On the significance of the chiliarchy and the chiliarch for the early 
Mongol empire see the discussion in Buell 1977, loo. oit.
It3. SH, 202. Note the variable size of a "chiliarchy."
itU. The history of the marriage alliances between the house of Alaqus and 
that of Cinggis-qan is complicated. See the detailed discussion in Buell 1977, 
pp. 1*5 ff-
1*5, "Tatar" was used in texts of the period in reference to a variety of 
Altaic-speaking peoples. These "Tatar," of course, were Onggiit.
1*6. For the Huan-chou of the text read Huan-chou 'I’l'l , the more common 
form of this place name.1*7. To distinguish between the various "Tatar" the Onggiit were sometimes 
called "White Tatar" and the Mongols and their like "Black Tatar."
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They are used here^8. Chou and ohun were obsolete administrative units, simply in the srase of "territories."
k9. The , "false," of the text implies the illegitimacy of the Hsi-
hsia ruling house.
90. TCKC^ ^Tuan 22, pp. 27-28. An almost identical, account is found in Li 
Hsin-ch uan ''<j' If , Chien-yen i-lai ah'ao yeh),Ts-ung-shuchi-ch"eng TsSnT^U
1936), ahucm 19, pp. 591-592, except that there the younger brother is made the 
murderer of the elder brother, whose name is given as She-shu..^^, and the 
date of the murder is given as 1190. None of this additional information con­
flicts directly with the testimony of the TCKC or that of other sources with 
the exception of the name assigned the elder brother, given as Binui in the JAT^ 
p. 310. Quite likely, however, She-shu is not a name but a title since the younger 
brother, whom we know to have been Alaqus, is also called She-shu in Li Hsin- 
ch'uan's version of the events.
51. See note hj.
52. TCKC, ahuccn 22, pp. 27-28.
^ 53. In Rashid-ad-Din's usage an amir was usually a chiliarch or some such 
similar potentate.
5I*. This was the Mongolian name for the Chin ruler. On altan, "golden, im- 
2r(S62)!^pp“^?57-37r'^^’ = ’imperial,'" Momanenta Sevlaa
Rashid-ad-Din the Onggut are made guardians of the frontier walls for 
the Chin and their name is connected with a hypothetical 3n^, "frontier wall " 
See the discussion in Doerfer, pp. 152-153. In fact, this conception is based 
upon a misunderstanding of the nature of Chin frontier defenses at that time 
which nowhere had the solidity or completeness of the Great Wall of Ming times 
for example. Nonetheless the tradition does do justice to the strategic im­
portance of the Onggut whose territories could be an important base for nomadic 
assault or a first line of defense against nomadic incursions. The campaign 
mentioned here, however, was not directed against the Altan-qan of Chin but 
against Hsi-hsia, first raided by the Mongols on a large scale in 1205. For a 
history of Mongol raids and wars against Hsi-hsia see Ye.I. Kychanov, "Mongolo- 
Ta^gutskiye voiny i gibel* gosudarstva Si Sya," Tataro-Mongoly v Azii i Europe 
(Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Nauka, 1977), pp. h6-6l.
56. Note the careful distinction made between Alaqus' position among the 
Onggut and that of his elder brother Binui. Quite probably Rashid-ad-Din's 
informant did not recognize Alaqus as legitimate ruler of the Qnggiit.
57. The manuscript tradition favors "Kenduk" but this is clearly an error for 
Tenduc.
58. Something has fallen out of the text at this point since the "place" in 
question is not named. Reference is probably to some other Onggut city where 
Alaqus had his (seasonal?) residence at that time.
59. JAT, pp. 308-310.
60. This is the title under which Po-ssu-p'o occurs in the YS {ahuan II8, 
p. 292i*) and the YWL, ahuan 23, p. 21.
61 The date of the Juyin uprising is not given exactly and our sources only 
record that it was in the year after 1206. Most Jiiyln elements, if not all, 
however, were exclusively pastoral and it was easiest for pastoralists to go on 
campaign during the slack season of late autumn and winter when work was light 
and reserves of food readily available. The spring, on the other hand, was 
lambing time, demanded intensive labor and was a period of tight food supplies
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and frequent famine. If the Juyin people were mobilized in 1206 it was most 
likely during the autumn and their demobilization probably took place during 
the early spring of the following year, in time for lambing. Their revolt must 
have taken place at about the same time, when environmental pressures were
greatest.
62, SE, p. 239.
63. See the discussion in Buell 1977, toe. ait.
6U. On the Mongol campaign of 1209-1210 against Hsi-hsia see Kychanov, op. 
ait.
65. On the Mongol wars against the Chin during the time of Cinggis see H.
Desmond Martin, The Rise of Chingis Khan and his Conquest of Northern China 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, ].950). i. jta
66. See the account in the Sheng~wu oh’in aheng Zm ^ ^ ,
in Wang Kuo-wei, ed., Meng-ku shih-liao ssu ohung, pp. 170-17^.
67. See Paul D. Buell, "Kalmyk Tanggaci people: Thoughts on the mechanics 
and Impact of Mongol expansion," Mongolian Studies 6 (1979)> forthcoming, 
henceforth Buell 1979.
68. See the detailed discussion of the tarona as an institution in Buell 1979.
69. There are two dating traditions, a Mongolian and a Chinese. It is un­
certain which is correct.70. On Muqali see his YS biography in 15, ahuan 119j PP. 2929-2936.
71. On the organization and history of the China tanma see Buell 1979.
72. See the detailed discussion of this thesis in Buell 1977.
73. On Yeh-lii Ch'u-ts’ai see his biography in the YWL, ahuan 57, PP. 9-2U, 
and in the YS, ahuan IU6, pp. 3^55-6^. On his role in early Mongol China see 
N.Ts. Munkuyev, Kitaiskii Istoahnik o Pervykh Mongol'skikh Khanakh (Moscow,
1965), pp. 3-129, and Igor de Rachewiltz, "Yeh-lu Ch'u-ts'ai (II89-I2U3): Bud­
dhist idealist and Confucian statesman," in Arthur F. Wright and Denis Twitchett, 
eds., Confuoian Personalities (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962),
pp. 189-216.
7^. For a full discussion of the office of the bieikei see Sechin Jagehid, 
"Shuo Yiian-shih chung ti ’pi-she-ch'ih' ping chien-lun Yuan ch’u ti' ohung-shu-
Pien-aher^
yen-ahiu so nien-pao 2 (1971), pp. 19-113.
75. For a discussion of this tax system and the role of the Khitan minister 
in its creation and administration see Buell 1977, PP. 82 ff.
76. See the detailed discussion of this phenomenon in Buell 1977.
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TIBET AMD MONGOLIA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY; 
THE NATURE OF A SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP
Alicia J. Campi 
Indiana University
When examining the panorama of Central Asian history after 1000 A.D., it 
quickly becomes evident that the histories of Mongolia and Tibet are signifi­
cantly intertwined. Both nations have been faced with the unending task of 
preserving their unique cultures in the shadow of the Chinese giant, and both 
have been remarkably successful up until the modern era.^ Sharing a common 
problem with a common protagonist, Mongolia and Tibet have often joined forces 
usually in the form of Mongol political and military might interlocked with 
Tibetan cultural and religious dynamism—for their mutual as well as particular 
self-interests.
This examination of the "Mongol protectorate" in Tibet during the mid­
seventeenth century is an effort to place this experience within the repeated 
pattern of Mongolian-Tibetan relations. Always on the horizon is China, so 
this study must also concern Itself with the catalytic role played by concur­
rent events in the Middle Kingdom. This does not mean, however, that Mongolia 
and Tibet created their foreign policies solely in reaction to Chinese stimuli. 
On the contrary, much of the evidence reveals that Mongolian and Tibetan inter­
nal politics determined the ultimate direction of their special relationship.
To understand the nature of the special relationship forged between Mongolia 
and Tibet during the seventeenth centuiy, one must look first at alliances es­
tablished by Qubilai Qan and the ’Phags-pa Lama and by Altan Qan and the Third 
Dalai Lama. In additiaii, examining the unique example of Mongol-Tibetan co­
operation in the person of the Fourth Dalai Lama is vital to comprehend the 
subsequent events of the seventeenth century in Central Asia. After briefly 
discussing these three historical precedents, we can then turn in more detail 
to the establishment and functioning of Gushi Qan's Mongol protectorate in Tibet 
and partnership with the Fifth Dalai Lama in the l600s.
Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama
Although hit by the shock wave of the Tanguts’ defeat at the hands of Chingis 
Qan in 120T, the Tibetans themselves did not have to contend with the Mongol 
armies until 12U0 when Prince Koden sent a military force from his Kokonor base 
into Tibet proper as part of the Mongol strategy to outflank the Sung armies. 
Faced with the sacking and burning of monasteries north of Lhasa, the Tibetans 
sent the abbot of the Sa-skya sect tq negotiate with the Mongol prince. The^ 
parties agreed that Tibet would acknowledge Mongolian suzerainty and pay a fixed 
tribute, and that the Sa-skya leader should become the Mongol representative in 
Tibet. The Mongols sent tax collectors to supervise the payment of tribute, 
while the Sa-skya Pandita remained in Koden's camp as a well-treated hostage.
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An insurrection by the Tibetan nobility in 1251 was suppressed by Mongol troops, 
thus ending effective Tibetan armed resistance to Mongol arms.2 The Sa-skya 
Pandita's nephew, 'Phags-pa Blo-gros (l235-8o), grew up as a hostage and was 
educated at Prince Koden's Kokonor court, assuming his uncle's place as abbot 
of Sa-skya in 1251.3 The newly enthroned Mongol emperor Qubilai, who had met 
'Phags-pa ^o-gros in the Koden court years before, made the 'Phags-pa T.aTnn his 
kuo-shih "g-p , "national mentor," in 1260. At the Mongol imperial co\irt 
the Phags-pa Lama devised a Tibetan—derived script for the Mongol language and 
propagated Buddhism airong the Mongol nobility. Qubilai bestowed upon him an­
ther title, ti-shih "imperial mentor," and patronized the Sa-skya sect
in its power struggles with other Buddhist schools in Tibet.
The Sa-skya sect needed Mongol military assistance to maintain its dominance 
over rival sects contending for power in Tibet. Like the protectorate of Korea, 
Tibet proper was never occupied by Mongol troops. Rather, the Mongol army woiad 
come in to aid the Sa-skya in specific crises, such as the rebellion at the 'Bri- 
gung monastery in 1290. The Mongols set up a native government in Tibet to 
watch out for their interests and to maintain control of internal affairs—a 
policy the Mongols were to use in many places throughout their empire.
Significantly, the Sa-skya school customarily divided power between the spir­
itual leader or abbot, e.g. 'Phags-pa, and the secular authority or regent known 
as the Dpon-aheriy e.g. the 'Phags-pa's brother. In theory these two were equal 
in rank with two distinct functions. The Tibetans took this theory and applied 
it to the relationship they had Just formed with the Mongols. Thus the 'Phags- 
pa Lama was the spiritual leader of the Mongol empire, and Qubilai or any Mongol 
emperor was the temporal regent, sharing power equally. In reality, Qubilai and 
the Mongols saw themselves firmly in control over the entire empire. Neverthe­
less, the fiction of the spiritual equality of the Sa-skya abbot fit their pur­
poses as rulers over vast populations in East Asia which adhered to one school 
or another of Buddhism. To be sure, members of the Mongol nobility were com­
mitted converts to the Buddhist faith, but the shamanistic Mongols throughout 
the Yuan court saw significant political gains in maintaining the theory of a 
Tibetan Buddhist sharing power and thus lending legitimacy to the non—native 
Yuan government in China. The Mongols did appoint their own Mongol dopugaahi 
with nominal authority over the Sa-skya Dpon-ahen to supervise Tibetan govern­
mental affairs. However, the Tibetan Dpon-ohen in point of fact governed Tibet 
for the Mongols instead of his theoretical superior, the Mongol dwmgaohi.
Alton Qan and the Third Dalai Lama
With the weakening of Mongol control in China and Inner Asia, reaction set 
in against foreign domination and the Mongol-allied Sa-skya sect. Rival sects 
assumed power in Tibet and the Sa-skya, without strong Mongol military support 
available, lost their position of control. However, the relationship between 
Qubilai's court and the Sa-skya was to be the model for Altan Qan of the Tiimed 
and Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho, the Third Dalai Lama, at their famous meeting in 1578.
The participants in this new drama were quite different from those of two 
centuries earlier. The Mongols had lost their empire and been replaced in China 
by a native dynasty, the Ming. The tribes on the Mongolian steppe, while still 
an effective military power, were disunited and at war with each other more than
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with the Ming enemy. In Tibet, the Sa-skya had declined in political power and 
was no longer an important force in national politics. Power now lay with the 
in-spungs-pa of Gtsang, who patronized the Karma-pa sect. In the early fif­
teenth century the reformed Dge-lugs-pa sect, often referred to as the Yellow 
Hats, was foi^ded by Btsong-kha-pa. By the time of Altan Qan this sect, imbued 
with evangelistic and political spirit, was competing with the Karma-pa and the 
many other sects in Tibet for religious and political supremacy. There were 
military clashes between Dge-lugs-pa and Karma-pa adherents, until with the rise
of Gtsang, Dge-lugs-pa lamas were circumscribed in their activ­
ities. 5
The Tibetan sects of the late sixteenth century were different, yet the an- 
tagonism and competition found then was very reminiscent of the situation in 
Tibet prior to the first Mongol intervention in IPUo, and the fundamental prob- 
ems encountered by Tibet and Mongolia were remarkably similar. In Tibet 
religious factions struggled for political power, but no sect was sufficiently 
strong to vanquish its opponents. Concurrently, on the Mongolian steppe various 
claimants for power still faced the key question of legitimacy. Altan Qan in 
e latter part of the l600s sought to reassert the supremacy of the Eastern 
Mongols over the Oirad or Western Mongols, claiming that he was the legitimate 
successor of the Chingissids. He, with his grand-nephew Qutugtai Secen 
Qungtaiji of the Ordos, had extended their power over most of Mongolia. Still 
contentious rivals threatened the establishment of a unified state.
Tobahi that Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji invaded 
iibet in 1566, sending messengers to the heads of various monasteries "offering 
to accept their religion if they submitted and threatening to treat them as 
enemies if they did not."D This incident can be interpreted as a raid for 
empire-building or perhaps a scouting expedition at Altan Qan's behest.
Why Altan Qan invited the Dge-lugs-pa leader, Bsod-nams rgya-mtsho, to Mon­
golia IS not clearly understood. Traditional Buddhist histories credit this 
event to Altan Qan’s conversion to that religion in 1571. The qan's first in­
vitation to the Dge-lugs-pa head in 157^* was declined.( Two years later Sagang 
Secen indicates that Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji visited Altan Qan and reminded 
him that for the well-being of this and the future life," religion was neces­
sary, g Mention was made of following the example of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa 
Lama. Therefore a second embassy was sent to the Dge-lugs-pa which he
accepted. At the meeting between these two men in Mongolia in the summer of 
1576 titles were exchanged, l.e. Altan Qan conferred the title Dalai Lama on 
Bsod nams Rgya-mtsho, and the conscious emulation of the Qubilai-'Phags-pa Tama 
precedent was emphasized. Zahiruddin Ahmad has compared the account of Sagang 
Secen with that of the Third Dalai Lama.9 The Third Dalai Lama's Rnam-thar 
^Biography) says that Altan Qan identified himself as Qubilai. Sagang Secen 
states that Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho claimed that Altan Qan and he were reincarna- 
tions of Qubilai and the ’Phags-pa Lama,
These sources appear to reveal Altan Qan's motivations for the invitation to 
the Third Dalai Lama. Altan Qan and his grand nephew, Qutugtai Secen Qungtaiji, 
were seeking to prove their right to re-establish the Mongol empire, for if the 
Phags-pa Lama had been reborn in the Third Dalai Lama, Altan Qan then was the 
reincarnation of^QuMlaii. As for Bsod-nams Rgya-mtsho's motivations for ac­
cepting the invitation, surely missionary zeal was a factor, but the political
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realities of the Tihetan scene lead me to conclude that he wanted to attract a 
Mongol patron to guarantee his own success at home.
The "alliance" created by Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama drew the Mon­
gols directly into the religious politics of Tibet and likewise expanded the 
religious struggle between the Dge-lugs-pa and the Karma-pa sects into the new 
arena of Mongolia.10 Because his patron, Altan Qan, had died in 1582, the Third 
Dalai Lama visited Mongolia a second time to strengthen his ties with other mem­
bers of the nobility as well as to propagate the faith. Upon the death of the 
Third Dalai Lama in 1588, the Chahar princes, who had been converted to the Dge- 
lugs-pa sect and retained their Tibetan contacts,H foiind it politically expe­
dient to have the Dalai Lama line reincarnated in the family of Altan Qan.
The Poicpth Dalai Lama
The Fourth Dalai Lama, Yon-tan Rgya-mtsho, was Altan Qan's great-grandson.
Born February 15, 1589 in Kokonor, he was confirmed in his selection by a large 
Tibetan contingent of Dge-lugs-pa monks who traveled to Mongolia and met with 
the Chahar Mongol princes to strike a blatantly political deal. The Fourth 
Dalai Lama remained in Mongolia until he was about twelve years old. During 
his brief reign (d. l6l7), he traveled around central Tibet to gain support for 
the Dge-lugs-pa. However, warfare again broke out in the Dbus region in l6l2 
and by l6l6 Gtsang forces had occupied the whole territory of Skyid-sod and 
large sections of Dbus in central Tibet.
The brief and rather unsuccessful reign of the Fourth Dalai Lama was especially 
important as a political model, because it represented the ultimate mesh of the 
'Phags-pa Lama-Qubilai relationship. The Mongol representative or regent, if 
you will, was in the person of an individual who at the same time was the head 
of Tibetan and Mongol spiritual and political power. Nevertheless, the Fourth 
Dalai Lama never claimed temporal authority over Mongolia, even though as a 
member of the Altan Qan family he could theoretically do so.
We already noted the gap between reality and theory during imperial times.
Then theory held that the Tibetan 'Phags-pa Lama was the spiritual leader of the 
empire, but in practice the Mongols never shared any power, not even spiritual 
power. During the reign of the Fourth Dalai Lama, theory presupposed Mongol 
predominance in the new alliance. But there was no empire left and Mongol dis­
unity on the steppe precluded any temporal power for the Fourth Dalai Lama in 
Mongolia. Furthermore, in Tibet the Dge-lugs-pa sect and its Mongol patrons 
did not have the power to ensure the Fourth Dalai Lama's spiritual, let alone 
temporal, ascendancy.
The failure of the Chahars to successfully support militarily the Dge-lugs- 
pa was evidenced by the king of Gtsang, a Karma-pa supporter, attacking Lhasa 
and expelling the Mongols in l605. The failure of the Tibetan-Chahar alliance 
was due in large measure to the strategic problems of military support from 
Chahar to Lhasa in the face of less than effective control of the Intervening 
Mongolian steppe. For both Mongolia and Tibet, the fusion of their powers in 
the person of one ruler with temporal and spiritual authority in both nations 
just did not prove workable in the temporal realm, and they could see that the 
alliance was mutually unprofitable. Notwithstanding, because of the continued 
ascendancy of rival Western Mongol tribes, the Chahars, now led by Ligdan Qan,
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To Gushi Qan:
"We hear that some have heen guilty of disobedience and rebellion against 
the religion (of the Buddha), but you have already re-established order.
We reflect that from the time when the ancient Holy Kings established 
government, the religion of the Buddha has endured without interruption.
Now We wish to show Our great respect for the Eminent Sages among the 
Tibetans, so We are sending envoys with the Ilakviksan Hutuketu to all 
alike, regardless of the colour of their robes, whether they be red or 
yellow, seeking everywhere for the religion of the Buddha for the protec­
tion of the Empire. This you should know. We are sending you with this 
letter a complete suit of armour."29
The two letters quite obviously differ in tone. The letter and large gifts to 
the king of Gtsang indicate Mukden's support.30 The Manchus indicate they are 
up-to-date on the military situation in Tibet. The pro-Gtsang attitude is per­
haps best explained as a divisive strategem and an anti-Oirat measure. Gushi 
Qan and his Dzungar ally Baatur Qung Taiji rivaled the Manchus for the loyalties 
of the Eastern Mongols. It is natural, therefore, that the Manchus should not 
sanction their rivals' increasing domination over Tibet.
In 1639 Gushi Qan gained further temporal power in Tibet with his successful 
eighteen-month campaign against the king of Beri in Khams. The Fifth Dalai Lama 
in his autobiography writes that he sent a message to Gushi Qan to subdue Beri 
and then return to his own country.31 When Gushi Qan approached central Tibet 
in I6U1, the Fifth Dalai Lama maneuvered unsuccessfully for him to return to 
Kokonor. Gushi Qan fought a major battle with the son of the king of Gtsang, 
and the victorious Mongols proceeded to take over all of Gtsang, capture its 
king and sew him up in leather to die. The Fifth Dalai Lama further relates 
that he attempted to stop the fighting through negotiation via the Panchen Lama, 
because he was afraid the ruler of Gtsang could perhaps defeat Gushi Qan and 
thus destroy the Dge-lugs-pa.32 But the Dalai Lama's chief attendant Bsod-nams 
Chos-'phel worked to thwart any possible negotiations and actually Joined Gushi 
Qan's forces, providing them with food and supplies. In a final great battle 
in early I6U2 the Gtsang capital Shigatse and the Karma-pa monastery Tashizilnon 
were captured together with the entire royal family of Gtsang.
Gushi Qan thereupon invited the Dalai Lama to Shigatse where, with the lat­
ter's sanction, he "ascended the throne of Tibet with dignity and grandeur" in 
an elaborate ceremony on April 13, 16U2.33 in a hall with three thrones Gushi 
Qan and Bsod-nams Chos-'phel sat a little lower than the Dge-liigs-pa hierarch. 
Gushi Qan presented a series of offerings to the Dalai Lama, one invoking 
Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama.
The Mongol-Tibetan relationship thus created harked back to the model of 
Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama, the same model which had inspired Altan Qan and 
the Third Dalai Lama. The alternative model exemplified by the Fourth Dalai 
Lama was rejected. Also during this time Bsod-nams Chos-'phel was installed as 
regent, sde-srid, to handle civil administration, with functions similar to the 
Dpon-ohen of Mongol imperial days. This regent was the Mongol-supported admin­
istrator for the still young Fifth Dalai Lama. It was not the custom of the 
Dge-lugs-pa school to divide authority between a spiritual leader or abbot and 
secular regent, as was the Sa-skya practice. However, Gushi Qan in 1642 created 
such a division of power by invoking the precedent employed by the Sa-skya.
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In l6k2 not only did Gushi Qan control the Fifth Dalai Lama, hut even the 
"Great Fifth's" chief minister Bsod-nams Chos-'phel had actual temporal authority 
over him. Nevertheless, the Fifth Dalai Lama's spiritual supremacy over the two 
others was never questioned. From the political point of view, this relation­
ship favored the Qoshod Mongols. Gushi Qan, while in fact holding the reins of 
political power in Tibet, did not govern Tibet as part of his empire. This is 
why Tucci has correctly called Gushi Qan "une sorte de protecteur du Tibet."3^ 
Following the example of Qubilai Qan, Gushi Qan had in effect enfeoffed the 
Dalai Lama and his sde-srid to rule Tibet as they pleased, so long as their ac­
tions did not conflict with Gushi' s interests. Until his death in iS’jh, Gushi 
spent most of his time not in Lhasa but on the steppe north of Lake Tengri or 
in Kokonor, wrapped up in Mongol Internal politics. It is incorrect to maintain 
that Gushi Qan gave Tibet to the Dalai Lama. Rather this formal act must be 
viewed from the traditional Mongol practice of enfeoffment which is a quid pro 
quo relationship subject to revocation.
This approach to the relationship between the Fifth Dalai Lama and Gushi Qan 
underlines the difficult position the Tibetan leader faced in 1642. The Fifth 
Dalai Lama's greatness lay not in the fact that he re-established a strong tie 
with the Mongols—because he actually had little to do with delineating the 
nature of this relationship and was himself controlled by his own regent—but 
rather in the manner in which he used the theory of his spiritual superiority 
to gain real political power after Gushi Qan's death.
Conclusion
This has been a study of the special relationship between Mongolia and Tibet 
during the seventeenth century. The nature of the relationship created in 1642 
by Gushi Qan and the Fifth Dalai Lama ultimately resulted in a Dge-lugs-pa gov­
ernment in Tibet with temporal and spiritual authority that remained in power 
until the Commiuiist Chinese conquest. This relationship can, however, only be 
understood by examining the two models for alliance known to both nations—the 
first established by Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama and the second established 
by the Fourth Dalai Lama and the Chahars. The first model proved successful 
for both parties but collapsed with the waning of Mongol imperial power. This 
fact in itself speaks for the predominance of the Mongols in the relationship. 
The second model, which attempted to fuse a spiritual and temporal leader into 
one Mongol person—the Fourth Dalai Lama—was neither very successful nor endur­
ing. This was because the Mongols could not sustain the military obligations 
of the relationship and force Tibet to accept their agents, the Dge-lugs-pa.
Altan Qan and the Third Dalai Lama had sought to revive the first model, but 
Altan's death brought a quick end to that attempt. When Gushi Qan and the Fifth 
Dalai Lama again reached back to the example of Qubilai and the 'Phags-pa Lama, 
they consciously were rejecting the experiment attempted via the Fourth Dalai 
Lama.
Throughout its history, the Mongol-Tibetan relationship was always much more 
profitable politically for Tibet, even though the Mongols held military superi­
ority. In striking contrast to the fate of the Sa-skya sect is the Dge-lugs-pa 
school's success in acquiring temporal power in Tibet in the face of the dis­
solution of Mongol military might. When Mongol power ebbed during the imperial
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period, the Sa-skya in turn lost control over the Tibetan political scene. The 
Dge-lugs-pa sect, on the other hand, masterfully entrenched itself so well in 
Tibet that when a power vacuum was created, it could step in. Thus the Dge- 
lugs-pa school, led by the Fifth Dalai Lama, used the Mongol-Tibetan connection 
to create a strong theocracy modeled on the precedent of the Fourth Dalai Lama 
but personified this time by a leader of Tibetan blood. This theocracy survived 
not only the breakup of the special relationship developed with the Mongols, 
but even withstood later political crises with the Chinese, Indians, and British. 
Meanwhile in Mongolia the institution of the Jebtsundamba Qutughtu grew to fill 
the spiritual loss incurred by the breakup of the seventeenth-century Mongol- 
Tibetan alliance while still exhibiting spiritual obeisance to the Dalai Lamas.
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golia has fared somewhat better. Although "inner Mongolia" has been broken up 
into three provinces within the PRC, "Outer Mongolia" has maintained its inde­
pendence since 1911, although securely within the Soviet Union's sphere of 
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13. In 1615 the Fourth Dalai Lama refused the invitation from the Shen- 
tsung Emperor of Ming China. "Because of his responsibilities at the Drepung 
and Sera monasteries, the Dalai Lama had to decline the invitation; however, 
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Khalkha ans suggested to the Manchu emperor that he send envoys to Gushi Qan, 
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THE ROLE OF INNER MONGOLIA IN THE INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT, 1911-191 i*
Paul Hyer
Brigham Young University
In 1911 the Mongols declared their Independence from China under the Manchu- 
Ch ing dynasty and were thus one of the first non—Western nations in modern 
times to escape alien subjection. They strengthened their nation through the 
following decades, were admitted to the United Nations and recently celebrated 
their fiftieth anniversary with broad recognition in the world community. But 
the independence movement fell short of success for more Mongolian territory 
remained part of China and more people were eventually left under Chinese dom­
ination than successfully escaped.
This especially important aspect of Mongolian history has been obscured.
Most historians have concentrated on the event's international aspects, empha­
sizing the fate of the new Mongol state as it was subordinated to Russia and 
China, or they have concentrated on the complex developments within Outer Mon­
golia, the focal point of the independence movement. The role of Inner Mongolia 
has been ignored almost as an irrelevancy.
^The Mongols originally intended to create a new empire, a Greater Mongolia 
[BugUde Mongghot) under a new holy emperor, the Jebtsundamba Khutughtu who, by 
the way, was actually a Tibetan. The new state was to encompass the huge areas 
of Inner Mongolia extending from Hulun-buir (Buteha and Barga) on the Siberian 
border to Ordos in the southwest on the border of Chinese Turkistan.
Specialists at least are familiar with the general reasons for the failure 
of Inner Mongolia as a whole to become unified in an independent Mongolian state 
after I9II. But the story has still never been told in all its detail and com­
plexities, nor will this narrative entirely clear up this obscured event.^
The factors working for independence are quite clear. A common language and 
culture, a consciousness of past empire and glory, vague desires for a broader 
Mongolian political association and antipathy to Chinese exploitation were in­
tegrating elements for the Mongols. These factors prompted a widespread, spon­
taneous, favorable response for independence from the Manchu empire or from any 
revolutionary Chinese regime that might replace it. But this response was not 
unanimous or without hesitation on the part of many important leaders, a circum­
stance which requires further explanation.
To begin with, there was virtually no effective cohesion between the various 
Inner Mongolian regions—administratively, economically or in general. While 
certain broad generalizations may be made regarding them as a whole, one must 
penetrate beyond the superficial and analyze the situation and response of each 
region individually to gain a true perspective. Although Mongolia was more than 
a decade into the twentieth century, national consciousness was weak. A gmai 1 
group of the elite had begun to think of the fate of their country and people 
but the old cohesion of the empire, limited as it had been, was long gone and
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the new cohesion of modern nationalism was just beginning. One was soon to hear 
of pan-Mongolian sentiments, but from the beginning these were but romantic no­
tions, impossible of realization within the geopolitical context of Northeast 
Asia. There were no mass media, no modern transportation, nor other cohesive 
factors to coordinate groups in an integrated movement and offset the strong 
regionalism which fragmented the Mongols and which was characterized by divisive 
stereotypes and prejudices.'^
To understand Inner Mongolia's role in the Mongolian independence movement, 
one must see the great difference in the various regions collectively referred 
to as Inner Mongolia.3 The Hulun-buir region had a historical experience and 
geographical situation very much different from the Kharachin and East Turned 
region (Josoto league) in the southeast near the Great Wall, and different again 
were the western regions of Shilin-ghol, Ulanchab and Ordos.
If an understanding of the final settlement for Inner Mongolia in the inde­
pendence movement requires a region-by-region analysis, then also within each 
region the reaction of key leaders was an important factor. The matter was not 
decided by a plebiscite or a public opinion poll in each banner. Needless to 
say, these leaders made their decisions on the basis of their perception of such 
OTerriding factors as geography and military power, political and economic ties. 
Examples will be given here of a variety of responses of particular leaders to 
the momentous event of Mongolian separation from China. The response and motiva- 
tions of certain other leaders is unclear. The Inner Mongolian hero, Togtokh
for example, fled to Khalkha and was valiant in the fight, but one wonders 
what his true, most basic motivation may have been.^
In sorting out the complex responses of people in the various regions to the 
announcement of independence, first to be noted was the strong emotional support 
for the movement. But intellectually the response was more complex. While 
there was a momentary joy and excitement on the part of most people throughout 
Inner Mongolia , there was not a simple reaction to this momentous event. Among 
the leaders there was soon a general consternation and ambivalence as the various 
areas each received communications and official documents from Urga setting forth 
the reasons for Mongolia breaking its ties with Peking and calling for broad sup­
port and imity throiighout Mongolia.
A tentative assessment points to the conclusion that the majority of the 
leadership of the ten regions of Inner Mongolia—six leagues with forty-nine 
banners plus four related regions (the aimaghs of Chakhar, Hulun-buir, Alashan 
^d Echina, and the Kokonor Torghuds)—initially showed spontaneous support for 
independence. Most banners apparently sent word confirming their approval of 
the movement. According to the scholar Sh. Sandag of Ulaanbaatar, there is 
evidence that thirty-five of the forty-nine banners sent communications of sup­
port for the Jebtsundamba's new government. The thirty-five Sandag lists include 
all banners of Shilin-ghol league (lO), seven of Jerim (lO), six of Juu-uda (ll), 
five of Ulanchab (6), two of Josotu (5), and five of Yeke-juu league (T).
The real problem comes in weighing the actual substance of this support, for 
even a cursory examination of this list immediately points up problems. Shilin- 
ghol, for one, was certainly not united, as will be seen. Moreover, the list 
does not include Barga (Hulun-buir), where possibly the greatest sustained sup­
port arose, nor does it include Echina and Alashan, led by Prince Tawangburijala, 
which seem to have been greatly influenced by the independence movement. The
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list also omits the Torghud banners of Kokonor whose Prince Palta reportedly 
saved the day during the siege of Khohdo by warning Urga's forces of Chinese 
reinforcements being sent from Shara-sume in Sinkiang to augment their forces 
in the city.®
Some banners openly favored the movement while others were more cautious and 
secretly sent representatives to check on the new development. Most leaders 
were pleased and hopeful for the move but at the same time were reserved and 
adopted a wait-and-see policy. Wise and farsighted leaders saw the threat of 
Chinese colonization of Mongolia, but they also saw the dangers inherent in an 
attempt to break away from their Chinese overlords. Emphasis here will focus 
on the two most crucial areas of Shilin-ghol and Kharachin; the first because 
the key military campaigns were decided here, the second because of its decisive 
role in the political settlements with Peking.
Situation in Shilin-ghoZ
The situation of Shilin-ghol league (region) in the trauma of the independence 
movement was one of the most critical. Of all the regions, Shilin-ghol, along 
with Jerim, seems to have been the most divided internally as to what course to 
take. It did not move decisively for independence like Barga nor was it so re­
luctant as the Ordos, Chakhar or Western Tumet (Kueihua). Shilin-ghol was caught 
in a true dilemma. It was special because, like Ulanchab, it was the most ex­
posed of the ten subregions (leagues and aimagh), having the longest border with 
Outer Mongolia. Traversed by the main trade routes, Shilin-ghol was the cross­
roads between China and Outer Mongolia. It was also the largest region, the 
most nomadic in life style and, in this respect, the most similar to Outer Mon­
golia.
The split in Shilin-ghol is confirmed in a unique oral history account of the 
situation from the Kanjurwa khutughtu (Living Buddha), who lived most of his life 
in Shilin-ghol. He reports that there was a complex situation in his region 
with a great many debates among the princes and banner leaders and, to some de­
gree, among the lamas about what should be done regarding the independence and 
the appearance of a new government in Urga. The Kanjurwa says that there was 
no consensus in the banner. Some leaders strongly opposed any support to the 
new government in Urga while others fled north with many of their people to join 
the movement. It would seem that support among the common people surpassed that 
among the elite.
The Kanjurwa notes that after a period of chaos the Chinese were soon able to 
again take full control of Inner Mongolia. He says that "in those days the lamas 
had no objection to developing a Greater Mongolia and supporting the Jebtstindamba 
as Bogdo khan (holy emperor)." He continues, "l heard many stories of how the 
lamas felt that the new Mongolia would be a Buddhist nation, a thing they all 
greatly desired," particularly in view of the fact that the rising Chinese geming 
(radical revolutionaries) were determined to tear down their Buddhist religion 
and destroy the faith.°
An example of a simple positive response for Independence was the case of the 
two Khauchld (Hochlt) banners of Shilin-ghol league. The Prince of East Khauchid 
gathered about half of the banner population and migrated to Outer Mongolia, fol­
lowed by a large part of the population of the neighboring banner. West Khauchid.^
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fere the break was definite and permanent and the refugees made a new life in 
Khalkha territory. Moving the Khauchid population en masse was traumatic but 
was easier than the problem facing the Barga Mongols whose case is better known 
ut less successful. The tension was compounded in central Shilin-ghol when 
p^t of the two Khauchid banners fled north, because neighboring banners were 
a so affected due to the lack of a clear-cut boundary separating the two eastern­
most Abagha and Abaghanar banners.
An important factor in the tension or trauma of the split was caused by the 
conservative opposition—some would say realism—of Prince Yangsanjab against 
independence and the new Urga regime. Yangsanjab was the hereditary ruling 
prince {jasagh) of the Abagha left banner, neighboring the Khauchid groups that 
split off. He was also head of the entire Shilin-ghol league. He was capable, 
in luential and Inclined to be more loyal to the Manchu-Ch'ing dynasty. While 
most other Shilin-ghol leaders were for unification with Khalkha, he was skepti­
cal about the Greater Mongolia movement and accordingly argued for neutrality or 
maintaining connections with Peking. He had a rather strong mental fixation on 
of it fo continuity of the Middle Kingdom with Inner Mongolia as part
Since Shilin-ghol was the mainline of confrontation, Yangsanjab was captured 
y invading Outer Mongolian forces in 1913, imprisoned in Urga but later freed.H 
Yangsanjab remained conservative throughout his life. He boycotted the important 
autonomous movement launched in 1933 at Batu-khalagha (Pailingmiao) by Prince 
Demchugdungrub, and he remained aloof from the Japanese all during their long 
occupation until 19^5.12 ^
1913 was a critical year in Shilin-ghol and most of western Mongolia when 
Outer Mongolian troops invaded Inner Mongolia. This was known locally as the 
ukher g^l^^n mmeen disturbance of the year of the cow." According to popular 
slogans and folklore the disturbance was for the "unification of the Mongolian 
people and the protection of the faith." One important leader of the invading 
ongolian troops was Jalkhantsa gegen, a powerful lama and intimate friend of 
the famous Dilowa khutughtu. There were stories abroad in those days of great 
miracles performed by Jalkhantsa and other powerful lama generals of the inde­
pendence movement. It is of interest that the previous incarnation of the late 
Kanjurwa khutughtu met this famous Jalkhantsa gegen in Shilin-ghol during one of 
the incursions of Khalkha troops.
But the independence movement was a personal tragedy for the fourth incarna- 
tion of the Kanjurwa Living Buddha for it directly caused his death. He was an 
influential and powerful ecclesiastical figure and rather inclined to be involved 
in politics. He was sympathetic to the independence movement and welcomed the 
troops from Outer Mongolia. However, the Jangjiya khutughtu, a famous incarna­
tion and rival of the Kanjurwa, together with his advisors and staff were tied 
to Peking and exploited the situation to gain advantage in the religious compe­
tition between the two men. The disciples of the Jangjiya and his pro-Peking 
supporters made secret accusations to Peking that the Kanjurwa was disloyal and 
sympathetic to the rebels. As a consequence, when the tide turned and Chinese 
troops arose to force out the invading Mongol troops, the Kanjurwa was killed, 
his temple center at Dolonor on the border of Shilin-ghol and Chakhar was burned, 
and many other lamas were killed or mistreated. One of the reasons motivating 
the Kanjurwa's support of Urga was the fact that he had many patrons and con­
siderable wealth including thousands of horses in Khalkha and Barga, particularly
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concentrated in San-Beise banner in Sechen-khan aimagh (province). lit
The Battle for Shilin-ghol
The battle for Inner Mongolia in the independence movement was very largely 
determined in the frontier area of Shilin-ghol, and it is fitting here to give 
the essentials of the struggle.The main leader was Damdinsuren of the Barga 
area in eastern Inner Mongolia. He was early recognized as a hero of the inde­
pendence movement for his valor in the successful Khobdo campaign of 1912. In­
deed, after a half century he is still viewed as one of the most outstanding 
political and military leaders of the entire period. He has been eulogized by 
his biographers as being a "true son of Hulun-buir CBargal," who had the "most 
r advanced ideas of his time." He was regarded as one of the best educated among 
the nobility of his period and wrote his own official letters in excellent Mon- 
, golian or Manchu. Those who knew him said he was close to the common people, 
had their respect and love and was comparatively democratic in his manner. Not 
least, he is praised as having "revived once more the old glory of the Mongols’ 
superiority in military arts."l6
Daminsiiren was appointed by Urga as the commander-in-chief of the great cam­
paign into Inner Mongolia. The climax came in 1913. Comparatively well-trained 
^ and equipped Chinese troops had earlier looted much of Shilin-ghol, burning 
temples and generally creating havoc. By the autumn of 1913 Damdinsuren, com­
manding some 1,000 men Including an estimated 300 from Barga and an additional 
700 drawn variously from the Inner Mongolian areas of Sunid, Kliauchid, Abagha, 
Ujumchin, and Chakhar, had cleared the Chinese troops from most of Shilin-ghol. 
The Chinese were making sorties from their main base at Dolon-nor into the Mon­
golian hinterland, and the first big battle came at Khoshmog, Chagaan-nor, a 
sandy steppe area northwest of Dolon-nor.
Until then the Chinese had been defeated in virtually every encounter. The 
important Inner Mongolian leader Babujab from the Mongoljin-Tumed banner was 
involved in this crucial campaign and was later to gain considerable notoriety 
for a major uprising which he led in 1915-16. Another important compatriot of 
Damdinsuren in the battle for Inner Mongolia was Magsarjab. He occupied Dolon- 
nor for a time, destroyed the Chinese garrison at Darkhan-uul and led an attack 
on Chinese troops stationed at Byaruu (Chin. Ching-peng).
The last great contest between the Mongols and the Chinese came at Dolon-nor 
in September and October. Damdinsuren and his troops fought valiantly but were 
forced to withdraw after nine major battles, the last of which came at Jun- 
naiman Temple not far from Dolon-nor. From the beginning Mongol supplies, guns 
and ammunition were low and Urga had found it impossible to replenish them. The 
end came in October 1913 when supplies were gone and heavy snow and bitter cold 
set in. The protracted nature of the war wore the Mongols down, and they became 
I a heavy burden on the local population in Shilin-ghol where they were quartered.
I It was impossible to continue the struggle to regain or hold Inner Mongolian 
territory as the ammunition and supplies ran out and as the troops were unfed 
! and suffering.
Apparently the problems of the Mongolian patriots increased when Nasanarbijikh 
(Na Wang) "turned traitor." According to Mongolian accounts, his defection to 
the Chinese induced other Mongolian troops to flee or to submit as Chinese
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Situation in Ulanahab
While our assessment is still Incomplete, it appears that the initial
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spontaneous response in Ulanchab was an enthusiastic support of the movement.
The league's head at the time was Prince Lhawangnorhu, ruling gasagh of Durbed 
banner, and his lead was followed by neighboring banners. The three Urad ban­
ners did not have distinct borders and tended to be united in sending emissaries 
and messages of support to the new regime in Urga. In western Inner Mongolia, 
one cause of Mongolian alienation was the activity of I-ku, a Manchu governor- 
general who actively promoted the Chinese colonization of Mongolian land, killed 
a Mongol noble who opposed him, and generally distressed the people and leaders 
of the Ulanchab and Yeke-juu leagues. After I-ku was removed in 1905, his suc­
cessor, the governor-general of Suiyiian,. Chang Shao-tseng, continued to seize 
land for Chinese settlement.
As initial enthusiasm subsided, the leaders of Ulanchab realized that they 
had to reckon with certain confrontation with the Chinese. The main figure of 
concern was Governor-General Chang, stationed in Suiyiian with security forces. 
During the transitional period following the proclamation, of independence, the 
Ulanchab princes drew up a document that was critical of Chang's rule of the 
Mongol-China border region, particularly his continuation of the land grabbing 
policy of I-ku who had been dismissed and even imprisoned for his exploitation 
of the Mongols in Ulanchab and Ordos. Finally, on orders from Yuan Shlh-k'ai 
in Peking, Governor-General Chang called a conference of the various leaders in 
western Mongolia in an attempt to resolve the problems.
The meeting was a sobering occasion for the princes as it was made clear to 
them that Chang's strategy was a steel hand in a velvet glove. They soon 
learned that if they remained within the Chinese sphere, they would be rewarded 
by a promotion in princely rank and an annual salary {feng-tu) or financial grant. 
But if they chose to leave they would inevitably meet the determined militaxy 
power of General Chang and the Chinese troops at his disposal. In view of the 
overwhelming forces against them, the main result of the conference was the 
"pacification" of the Mongols or rather an intimidation of their leaders, ef­
fectively neutralizing their move to independence.
Settlements in Western Mongolia
For most of western Inner Mongolia, the areas of Shilln-ghol, Ulanchab, Chakhar 
and Ordos, the crucial time was not 1911 when independence was declared but rath­
er 1912-13 when the real political and military contest came between the Mongols 
and Chinese forces for a final settlement to determine control over the border 
areas. Most banners with their sparse population were not prepared to defend 
themselves when set upon by military forces from both Outer Mongolia and China.
The Ujumuchin banner of Shilin-ghol league may be taken as an example. It 
was one invasion route of Outer Mongolian forces, and the particular threat here 
was the proposed stationing of Chinese military forces to guard against further 
incursions of Khalkha troops, but also to intimidate the Mongols and neutralize 
continuing sentiment for a separation and alliance with a Greater Mongolia.
Such an occupation by a large number of undisciplined Chinese troops would in­
deed have been a great plague to the area, but it was avoided through the media­
tion of Kharachin leaders in Peking who were able to obtain a special ordinance 
from President Yuan Shih-k'ai. This document confirmed that the Mongol leaders 
and their people were not involved in any political movement and that Chinese
i
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“'ili'tary occupation was thus unnecessary. This measure avoided certain suffer­
ing of many Ujumuchin Mongols.19
The neighboring banner of East Khauchid (Hochit), whose ruling prince had 
migrated with many of his people into Outer Mongolia to join the independence 
movement, was left without any administration. The most pressing problem in 
this banner, after Shilin-ghol's failure to break away from China, was to restore 
order and to create a new administrative structure recognized by Peking, since 
the area was to remain within the sphere of Chinese power. The task fell to 
Sungjinpangchugh, younger brother of the jasagh who had fled. Again through 
the mediation of the Kharachin, Lobsangchoijur, the young prince Sungjingwangchugh 
was recognized by the Peking government and confirmed as the new jasagh of the 
banner.
The Key Role of Kharachin Banner and Prince Gungsangnorbu
In any assessment of Inner Mongolia's response to the Mongolian independence 
movement, a key role is played by the ICharachin banner of Josotu league. Its 
leaders were among the most experienced and sophisticated. They had the longest 
contact with the Chinese and had good connections in Peking. These factors which 
made the Kharachin prominent were resented by other Mongols but were important in 
each crisis when the necessity arose of dealing with the Chinese. In this quarter 
of Mongolia the situation was particularly complex. And primary focus is best 
given to Gungsangnorbu, prince of Kharachin, head of the Josotu league and the 
most progressive prince in Inner Mongolia. He was the first to establish modern 
schools, visited Japan in 19C3 and was generally a pioneer in the modernization 
of Inner Mongolia.
In the crisis which was mounting in the fall of 1911 with Cuter Mongolia 
moving toward independence and with increased Chinese revolutionary activity, 
Gungsangnorbu was caught in a dilemma. He was concerned with Mongolia's fate, 
but he was naturally even more concerned for the people of his own banner and 
the surrounding region of southeastern Mongolia—Josotu, Juu-uda, and Jerim.
Here the image of the Chinese revolutionaries was most radical, and he was de­
cidedly opposed to any new regime in China dominated by revolutionaries.
The Wuhan mutiny on Cctober 1C, 1911, which sparked the revolution, was fol­
lowed by discussions at court regarding the fate of the Manchu dynasty. The 
Mongol princes, mainly Ghonchoghsurung of Bintu, Palta of Torghud and Bodisu of 
Khorchin, Gungsangnorbu, Nayantu of Khalkha, representing the sentiment of many 
Mongols, strenuously opposed a Manchu abdication. Gungsangnorbu made it known 
that if the Manchus surrendered to the revolutionaries, he would seriously con­
sider proclaiming the independence of eastern Inner Mongolia. When the Manchu 
abdication and Cuter Mongolian independence became a reality. Prince Gung real­
ized that foreign assistance was absolutely necessary for the Mongols to resist 
Chinese forces. There were but two possibilities, Russia or Japan.
Before seeking Japanese aid. Prince Gung, together with Prince Ghonchogsurung 
of Bintu banner (Khorchin league), visited with the Russian deputy minister 
resident in Peking and discussed the possibility of Russian assistance for Inner 
Mongolian unity in a Greater Mongolia. This diplomat explained that Russia was 
sympathetic to Inner Mongolian independence but that Russian assistance was out
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of the question—hecause of geopolitical factors Russian assistance would be 
limited to Outer Mongolia. Prince Gung immediately contacted the Japanese to 
gain their support. His liaison was Naniwa Kawashima, advisor to his Manchu 
brother-in-law. Prince Su.22
Kawashima was a special agent of the Japanese military, and through him 
Gungsangnorbu was successful in gaining the support of the Japanese foreign min­
ister Yasuya Uchida and General Yasumasa Fukushima of the Japanese general staff, 
whose contact with the Mongols extended back at least to 1900. Prince Gung ar­
ranged to borrow 200,000 yen from Japan, secured on the development of the 
mineral resources of Josotu league. Following Gungsangnorbu's lead. Prince 
Jaghar of Baarin right banner (Juu-uda league) and Prince Ghongchoghsurung of 
Bintu sought similar agreements with the Japanese.23
While it is not possible to follow the day-to-day actions and decisions of 
Gungsangnorbu, it is clear that he had two major priorities. First, he wanted 
to develop a new unity integrating the banners and leagues of southeastern Mon­
golia (josotu, Juu-uda, and Jerim) preliminary to some greater alliance, and 
second, to negotiate the support of Japan.
Immediately following the Manchu abdication on February 12, 1912 Prince Gung 
returned to Kharachin and convened a conference at Ulaan-khada (Ch'ih-feng) with 
leaders and delegates from the various banners of the three leagues of south­
eastern Mongolia. As a key leader and spokesman in the discussions he made it 
clear that he favored separation from China and unification in a Greater Mon­golia. 2^ Another strong leader at the conference was Yao-shan, a commoner from 
Keshigten banner (Juu-uda league), who also supported a move for independence.25
Fragmentary reports of the conference confirm that most of the Inner Mongolian 
princes were ambivalent about independence, more precisely that they were appre­
hensive about separation from China. If such a move were successful and all 
lived happily ever after there would be virtually no objection. But if a Greater 
Mongolia {Biigude Mongghol) was to be a romantic dream crushed by Chinese armies 
all would be lost, including their official rank, personal wealth and the luxuri­
ous life most had gained from their economic contacts with the Chinese world, 
mainly from the lease or sale of land. They were emotionally attracted to a 
united Mongolia but restrained by rational considerations which were usually 
overriding. Their natural impulse was to pursue independence as proposed by 
Prince Gung. At the same time they realized that such a move was dangerous be­
cause their territories were in southern Inner Mongolia, close to the political 
seat of Chinese power and such military garrisons as Mukden and Cheng-te.
They favored establishing close relations with the Urga government. A unifica­
tion of all Mongolia on the cultural basis of language, religion and tradition 
appealed to them but their national consciousness was weak. The independence 
movement predated the real rise of a Mongolian nationalism, and narrow, regional 
loyalties exhibited themselves. The concept of a unified nation state was for­
eign to them. The Naiman prince, among others, voiced the opinion that Prince 
Gung or he himself should become khan (emperor) of Mongolia and not a Tibetan 
monk like the Jebtsundamba Living Buddha. The Ulaan-khada conference failed to 
produce any definitive agreements, and action was suspended until it was clear 
as to what support was forthcoming from Japan.
Prince Gimg was disappointed at the indecisive action of the Ulaan-khada
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conference; nevertheless he dispatched a personal emissary, Lohsangchoijur, to 
Outer Mongolia to establish contact with the new government.
Meanwhile Altanochir (Chin-yiin-ch'ang) was sent to the Japanese base at Dairen 
to obtain weapons according to agreements made in January 1912. Altanochir was 
successful in obtaining military supplies which were transported by railroad to 
Cheng-chia-t*un. From here the materiel was to be further transported by oxcarts, 
but the operation was almost immediately attacked by Chinese forces, several men 
were killed and Altanochir barely escaped after a harrowing experience.2° This 
was but one of a series of events that scuttled further attempts to effectively 
unite and arm the Josotu, Juu-uda and Jerim leagues for the crisis and to take 
them out of China's orbit and into a new Mongolian state.
A most serious problem was the loss of Japanese support that was crucial for 
the success of any movement. The Japanese were initially skeptical of Yiian 
Shih-k'ai and the new Republic of China but soon moved to support his plan for a 
new imperial dynasty. At the same time, the Japanese were also involved with 
Chang Tso-lin, soon to emerge as the strongman over eastern Inner Mongolia and 
all Manchuria. A course of action supporting either Yuan Shih-k'ai or Chang 
Tso-lin was inconsistent with a policy of supporting Mongolian separatist move­
ments. Ambitious lower-level Japanese like Kawashima continued to support the 
Mongols, but that was not enough to tip the scales in favor of Mongolian inde­
pendence.
Meanwhile, Gungsangnorbu was indirectly associated with the Tsung-she-tang, 
the Manchu restoration movement of his brother-in-law. Prince Su, but this was 
a peripheral movement which needs no detailed description here. It is reported 
that even Prince Gung's relations with his wife were strained because he was 
interested in Mongolian independence while she was more interested in a Manchu 
restoration.
As Yuan Shih-k'ai consolidated his control in China, it soon became unavoid­
able or expedient for Gungsangnorbu to respond to Yuan's summons to go to Peking. 
With this move and Prince Gung's immediate involvement in Peking political life 
although continuing his efforts for the welfare of the Mongols, the chances of 
the three southern leagues of eastern Mongolia to join with Khalkha and the 
Jebtsundamba's new government virtually evaporated. First Japanese support was 
lost and then the major leader of the Inner Mongolian movement.
One key was that the mainline of Japanese policy was still controlled by 
cautious elder statesmen and senior officers; the yoiing officer expansionists 
had not yet come on the scene. Actually Japan's relations with Gungsangnorbu 
and the Mongols in 1911-12 foreshadowed their policy in the 1930s and 19^0s.
But in both situations Mongolia was subordinated to Japan's interests in China 
and Manchuria.
Other Kharaohin Leaders Involved in the Movement
At least three prominent Kharachin Mongols were directly or indirectly in­
volved in the Outer Mongolian movement. The first to leave Kharachin and even­
tually become a sojourner in Urga was Sodnam, who had broken with the banner head 
over problems arising from Chinese settlement of Mongolian land. He then became 
involved as a reporter and editor of a Mongolian newspaper in Hailar.2T Sodnam
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was followed dy Khaisan, a strong promoter of Mongolian independence, and then 
by Lobsangchoijur, representative of Prince Gungsangnorbu.
Khaisan's departure for Outer Mongolia was symptomatic of the problem of 
several Inner Mongolian leaders. He held an official position in Kharachin 
{meiren?) and became involved in the confrontation between the Mongols and the 
Chinese settlers over land problems. It must be borne in mind that as recently 
as 1891 there had occurred a major uprising of the Chinese Chin-tan-tao, result­
ing in the massacre of tens of thousands of people in Kharachin, Tumet and neigh­
boring areas of the Josotu and Juu-uda leagues. In this conflict the influential 
Chinese leader Chang Lien-sheng was arrested and apparently quite brutally inter­
rogated by Khaisan. Subsequently Chang committed suicide, and officials in the 
neighboring Chinese districts brought charges against the Mongols. Khaisan, 
fearing for his safety, fled to Urga.
While in Urga Khaisan became an active promoter of Mongolian independence and 
later deputy war minister under Prince Khandadorji, the real spirit behind the 
move for independence. Because of his excellent command of the Chinese language 
Khaisan, assisted by a fellow Kharachin, Sodnam, drafted many official memoranda 
for the new government's correspondence with the Chinese.^8
Later, as factions and problems arose in the politics of Urga, Khandadorji 
was poisoned and Khaisan returned to his native Kharachin and eventually took up 
residence in Peking. Here Yiian Shih-k'ai, new president of the Republic of China, 
awarded him the rank of beise, one grade higher than the rank of hung conferred 
upon him in Outer Mongolia. In his later years in Peking he was noted for his 
scholarly work, particularly a Chinese-Mongol dictionary published under the title 
Wu-fang yuan-yin, a rather complex dictionary that classified Chinese characters 
according to their soiind and tone pattern.
Lobsangahoijur's Mission to Urga^^
Prince Gung's envoy to the new Urga government and the story of the mission 
itself are both worthy of note. Lobsangchoijur was no ordinary figure when he 
was welcomed in Urga by the new khan. His family had served the Kharachin ban­
ner as an administrator (jakiraghohi) for eight generations. Lobsangchoijur 
himself had been a lama leading a monastic life until he was in his forties, and 
he was the temple abbot (da-Zama) when he left the monastery to take up a secular 
career. He soon became well known through his negotiations with the Li-fan yuan, 
as an interpreter and advisor to the prominent Manchu Prince Su, and as an ad­
visor and representative of the Thirteenth Dalai Lama of Tibet. He also became 
prominent in Peking in later years as an appointed member of various parliamen­
tary assemblies.
After the Ulaan-khada conference, in order to keep open various options and 
courses of action. Prince Gung dispatched Lobsangchoijur as his personal repre­
sentative to establish ties with the new Urga government and to officially offer 
his regards to the Jebtsundamda as the new chief of state. Traveling through 
Harbin and Siberia he arrived in Urga and immediately contacted an intimate 
friend and fellow bannerman, Duke Khaisan who, as already mentioned, then served 
as deputy war minister to the famous Khandadorji.
Lobsangchoijur was welcomed by the Jebtsundamba and other officials in a
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series of important talks and ceremonies. The most significant outcome of the 
meetings was a proposal hy the Urga government to appoint Gungsangnorhu of 
Kharachin as governor of the six leagues and forty-nine banners of Inner Mon­
golia. Lohsangchoijur was requested to transmit the official seal of appoint­
ment and office back to Prince Gung, but he hesitated. His observations of the 
situation during his stay in Urga had left him with very negative impressions 
and a pessimistic view of the future of the new regime. He was also certainly 
aware of the dilemma of the Inner Mongolian banners and the unpromising outcome 
of the Ulaan-khada conference. Consequently, while it would be an honor for^ 
his banner head to have a prominent position in a new Greater Mongolia, he dip­
lomatically declined the delicate responsibility. He informed the Boghdo Khan's 
government that he would convey their wishes to Gungsangnorhu and persuade him 
to come personally to accept the seal or to make some other arrangement.
While in Urga Logsangchoijur lost hope that a new day was really dawning for 
the Mongols after having witnessed the disunity among the leaders and the general 
political and economic chaos in the capital. An added factor in his particular 
case was his impressions of the Lamaist chvirch. Having spent much of his life 
as a lama, he felt a strong commitment to Buddhism. But he was disillusioned 
and critical of the Boghdo Khan who was supposed to be a holy lama, but who had 
a wife, was too political and generally had a bad reputation for being involved 
in scandalous activities.
His friend Khaisan, who was much more committed to the cause of independence 
and the new government, was very eager for Inner Mongolia to be involved in the 
movement, and it was apparently on his recommendations that the new government 
proposed to give official seals to Prince Gungsangnorhu as head of Inner Mon­
golia.
Thus while Khaisan and some other Inner Mongolian patriots stayed on in Outer 
Mongolia, Lohsangchoijur returned to his native area. In time he became involved 
in the life of the comm\inity of Mongol officials and leaders in Peking while 
maintaining his strong concern for the welfare of the Mongols. He realized that 
it was necessary for those Mongols close to China to accommodate to the economic 
and political realities in their relationship to China. In a sense he person­
ified the problem of most of Inner Mongolia, attracted to a new hope but even­
tually forced to accommodate to China.
The international context of the Mongolian independence movement was decisive, 
as Russia and China blocked the legitimate interests of the Mongols and as Japan 
failed to be supportive, but the internal military, political and economic factors 
noted above were also crucial though less well known.
With Inner Mongolia's failiire to join a new independent Mongolia, settlement 
with the Chinese was negotiated mainly through Kharachin leadership. It was 
these Mongols who tended to be most important in many key institutions and move­
ments concerned with Inner Mongolia in this century. While they have been crit­
icized at times, it was this group of Mongol leaders who won many Important con­
cessions from the Chinese and continued to speak for the Mongols under overwhelm­
ing difficulties.
Kharachin Mongols became the leaders of the Mongolian-Tibetan Ministry in 
Peking, set up soon after the revolution of 1911 to administer affairs in China s 
border areas. They were also successful in organizing the Mongolian-Tibetan 
Academy in Peking which trained h\indreds of leaders for all of Mongolia. Much
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of Kharachin lobbying was done through the Mongolian Association of Allied 
Princes and Nobles {Meng-ku wang-kung lien-ho-hui), a quasi-political organiza­
tion in Peking. In the mid-twenties a Kharachin Mongol, Pai-yiin-ti, was the 
head of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party {Nei-Meng-ku kuo-min- 
tang), and a capable representative of this group, Wu-ho-ling, led the Mongolian 
delegation in 1928 to negotiate a new policy or settlement for Inner Mongolia 
with the new Nanking government and the leaders of the ruling Kuomintang. In 
the 1930s and 19^0s men from this same group were strong supporters of the Inner 
Mongolian Autonomous Movement led by the Shilin-ghol prince Demchugdungrub, and 
they held important positions in the Kalgan Mongolian government until its de­
mise in 19^5.
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THE INNER MONGOLIAN RESPONSE TO THE CHINESE REPUBLIC, 1911-1917
Sechin Jagchid 
Brigham Young University
After the outbreak of the Opium War, and especially during the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, the political environment of continental East Asia 
changed considerably. The power of the Western imperialists and Tsarist Russia 
expanded to both China and Mongolia. The Manchu defeat in that war created hard­
ships for Chinese peasants, and the Ch'ing dynasty replaced its ban on Chinese 
migration into Mongolian pasture lands with a positive policy of encouraging 
such migration in order to fortify against the Russian threat and ease the sit­
uation inside China. In doing so, however, the Ch'ing violated the Mongolian 
people's right to a livelihood in their own homeland. The dynasty placed the 
better grazing areas under Chinese occupation while undermining the Mongolian 
"feudalistic" league and banner organizations through establishing Chinese-style 
local governments under the pretext of administering the affairs of the Chinese 
settlers. The ensuing resentment and growing sense of instability gave rise to 
anti-Manchu movements among the Mongol nobility. A Mongolian volunteer force 
under Prince Senggerinchin did assist the Manchus against the T'aip'ing rebel­
lion {I85O-I86U), but thereafter Mongolian rebels, recorded in Chinese materials 
as "Mongolian bandits," became a continuous phenomenon.
Also during this period, the Ch'ing court witnessed a gradual but steady de­
cline in the number and frequency of visits by Mongolian nobles coming to render 
personal homage to the Manchu emperor. This was especially marked after the 
Boxer Rebellion in 1900.
The Ch'ing's "self-strengthening movement" to modernize the country generally 
had little influence on the Mongol nobility. Yet it did serve as a stimulus to 
some ambitious leaders, such as Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin, who sought 
knowledge and assistance outside Mongolia. In 1903 he visited Japan to observe 
the effects of the Meiji Restoration, and after his return he established his 
own modern schools for both boys and girls and a military academy. He also ad­
vocated changes in the Manchu administration in Mongolia, but his proposals 
were rejected by the court. On the contrary, court policy toward Mongolia 
changed for the worse, increasing Manchu-Chinese domination of decision-making 
as to Mongolian affairs which, of course, only fueled Mongolian ire against the 
Manchus. For example, even in Prince Gungsangnorbu's Kharachin Right Banner 
several leaders had already left for Urga where they joined the independence 
movement within a short time.
In 1911, the independence movement was about to be inaugurated in Outer Mon­
golia, while in China the revolution headed by Sun Yat-sen began to make some
''This paper is a draft of research in progress, a collaborative work of the 
author with Paul Hyer, Brigham Young University. Accordingly, revision and 
documentation is yet to be finished.
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progress. During this period, the Ch’ing court was nominally ruled by a three- 
year old emperor, P'u-yi, and the Empress Dowager Lung-yii who had neither polit- 
ic^ experience nor ambition. The real power was I-k'uang, or Prince Ch'ing, 
but he gradually transferred power to the shrewd Chinese minister Yuan Shih-k’ai 
who eventually betrayed his Manchu lords and made himself the first president 
ot the Republic of China in 1912.
The slopn of the Chinese national revolution was "expel the barbarians, 
restore China, build the republic, and divide the farm lands equally." Because 
Chinese revolutionary proclamations lumped the Mongol Yuan and the Manchu Ch’ing 
pasties together, Mongols who were literate in Chinese realized that the rev­
olution portended disaster for the Mongols as well as for the Manchus. In ad- 
dition, the word_ revolution," which in Chinese is ko-ming and which should have 
been translated into Mongolian as khub'Lsghnl, was transliterated into ghaminq 
or gem-ing in Mongolian. These latter terms are defined as a group of people un­
lawfully attempting to overthrow proper institutions, to implement an illegiti- 
+ destroy all established values and morality, aiming especially
at the destruction of the orthodox religion. Buddhism. A fear of revolutionary 
hinese attacks on their lifestyle and religion generated among the Mongols fear 
ana hatred of the so-called ghaming movement. Even during the 1930s, after the 
rise of the Inner Mongolian autonomous movement, the herdsmen of Inner Mongolia 
were still fearful of the pernicious influence of ghaming and of Chinese pene­
tration into Inner Mongolian pastures. Many publications in the present-day 
ngoian People s Republic continue to use the word ghaming or geming to repre-LTgoS\n SirainS!
On October 10, I911 the Chinese declared an end to the Ch'ing dynasty and a
Eichtw''^+ ° Wu-ch'ang. Shortly thereafter, theEighth Jebtsmdamba Khutughtu, the Living Buddha of Urga, supported by Outer
Mongolia nobles and people, declared Mongolian independence. Sun Yat-sen, 
just retm-ned from abroad, was elected provisional president on January 1, 1912 
and on that same day in Nanking he declared the founding of the Republic of 
China. In the midst of these drastic changes, the empress-dowager Lung-yii ap­
pointed Yuan Shih-k ai to negotiate peace with Sun Yat-sen and his revolutionary 
gover^ent. Delegates of the two sides met at Shanghai in mid-December I9II to 
consider terms. The talks focused of course on the terms for abdication and 
treatment of the Manchu imperial household after the establishment of the 
republic. The delegates from the South demanded that Mongolia be made the equiv­
alent of a province, but this was vetoed by the Northern delegates. After a
finally concluded that all Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans should be treated as equal to the Chinese so as to protect their 
private property and preserve ranks among the nobility.
movement in Outer Mongolia and the anti-Chinese movement in Tibet drew the attention of the newly established provisional government in 
Nanking to the problems created by early revolutionary declarations and persuaded 
It to consider some concessions. In Sun Yat-sen's declaration at his inaugura- 
provisional president, he proclaimed that "to unify China, Manchuria, 
Mongolia, Moslem lands, and Tibet into one nation and to imify the Chinese 
Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans as one man, this should be regarded as 
true unification of the nation.”
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In Inner Mongolia, the independence movement in Urga had great influence on 
the people and their leaders, especially since it had the prestigious personal 
support of the Eighth debtsundamba, who had been proclaimed the Boghoda Khan 
(Holy Emperor) of Mongolia. After the downfall of the Ch'ing dynasty, many 
Inner Mongols looked to the North. At the same time, Mongolian nobles in Peking 
organized the Meng-ku wang-kung lien-ho-hui (Association of Mongolian Princes 
and Dukes) in an attempt to influence the Shanghai talks. Prince Nayantu, who 
was originally from Outer Mongolia, acted as spokesman for the twenty-four Ban­
ners (eight Manchu banners, eight Mongolian banners and eight Chinese banners) 
by conveying their collective decision to support the Manchu emperor. This 
same sort of anti-republicanism characterized the attitudes of Mongolian leaders 
in Peking, which also influenced the talks in Shanghai. These factors eventually 
prompted the southern delegates to explain that the revolution was not limited 
to achieving narrowly defined Han-Chinese aims; rather, its purpose was to es­
tablish a commonwealth of Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans.
They also made it clear that the newly established Chinese government would 
honor the ranks and positions of the Mongolian nobility.
At the same time a group of Mongolian princes in Peking allied Itself 
with the Manchu Prince Su (Shan-dh’i) and others in an attempt to sustain the 
court by force of arms. But, soon realizing that the dynasty was doomed, they 
turned to the Japanese for assistance.
On January 17, 1912 a conference was held in the presence of the empress 
dowager and Manchu and Mongolian princes and nobles, such as Prince Nayantu of 
Khalkha, Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin, Prince Palta of Torghud, Prince 
Ghonchungsurung of Bintu, and Duke Bodisu of Khorchin. At that time, the Mon­
golian nobles all voiced their strong opposition to the abdication.
On January 28, Sun Yat-sen, as provisional president of the newly-established 
republic, sent a telegram to the Mongolian nobles in Peking explaining the value 
of the commonwealth of the five peoples, pointing out the importance of a com­
mon defense against Russia, and inviting the Mongols to send a delegate to Nan­
king to participate in the newly established government. On February 3 the 
empress dowager had the young emperor P'u-yi declare his abdication which took 
place on the 12th. On February 5 the Senate in Nanking passed a measure, advo­
cated by Sun Yat-sen, which (l) placed the Chinese and all other nationalities 
on an equal basis, (2) allowed for succession of rank and title among the 
princes and dukes, and (3) provided for maintenance of religious prerogatives 
among the Manchus, Mongols, Moslems, and Tibetans. On February 11 Sun Yat-sen 
as president promulgated the provisional constitution of China. Article 3 de­
clared that "the territory of the Republic of China includes twenty-two provinces. 
Inner and Outer Mongolia, Tibet and Kokonor (Ch'inghai)." On February 13 Sim Yat- 
sen resigned as provisional president, and the Senate elected Yiian Shih-k'ai as 
his successor. In his oath of office Yuan used the words "the five great peoples 
(Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Moslems and Tibetans) all enjoy happiness and priv­
ilege. "
As these events unfolded in Peking and Nanking, Prince Gungsangnorbu returned 
to his own banner, Kharachin, and soon gathered the leaders of the three eastern 
leagues of Inner Mongolia, Jerim, Juu-uda, and Josuto, at Ulaan-khada (Ch’ih-feng), 
where he tried to persuade them to organize an independence movement in Inner 
Mongolia. Before this conference. Prince Gungsangnorbu had contacted the Japanese
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and had already received a positive response from the Japanese military author­
ities. His own banner, however, was located too close to Peking for it to act, 
and after the two and one-half centuries of enforced fragmentation under the 
Manchu, it proved too difficult to organize the other banners into an effective 
alliance. Nevertheless, the prince himself still wanted to pursue his plans 
for independence. He sent envoys to Dairen to obtain weapons with which to 
equip his own troops and simultaneously dispatched his delegate, Lobsangchoijur 
(the author's father), to visit Urga and contact leaders there to learn whether 
Inner and Outer Mongolia could really be unified. Meanwhile, the group sent to 
Dairen for equipment was attacked at Cheng-chia-tixn and the weapons were con­
fiscated by the Chinese army. Before his delegate to Urga could return. Prince 
Gungsangnorbu was convinced or forced by Yuan Shih-k'ai to proceed to Peking, 
and his independence movement came to an end.
At about the same time the Manchu noble Shan-ch'i, or Prince Su, also escaped 
from Peking under Japanese protection and arrived in Dairen where he established 
the Tsung-she tang, the Loyalist Party, in an attempt to restore the Ch'ing 
dynasty. The movement enjoyed support from conservative Mongols in Inner Mongolia 
as well as from conservative Manchus and Chinese. Among Mongol supporters was 
the famous "Mongolian bandit" Babujab. Although Gungsangnorbu was related by 
marriage to the Manchu prince he did not, at least not openly, participate in 
this loyalist movement. His own movement was aimed at securing independence 
for Inner Mongolia or for a Greater Mongolia including the Outer Mongols. Prince 
Ghonchungsurung of Bintu was also well known for his progressive policies, partic­
ularly his establishment of schools but, convinced that the cause of Inner Mon­
golian independence was hopeless, he left his own banner for Outer Mongolia.
This was a very frustrating and crucial period in Inner Mongolian history. 
Those who had tired of Manchu domination and possessed no faith in the Chinese 
revolutionaries all looked northward, and some of them journeyed to Urga to join 
the great movement. This group included the Prince of Khauchid of Shilinghol 
League, the anti-Chinese guerrilla leader Toghto Taiji of Jerim League, Khaisan 
of Kharachin and others. In addition, the entire Hulun-buir district of north­
east Inner Mongolia declared independence and joined the Urga government. The 
nobles of Ulanchab League under the leadership of Prince Lhawangnorbu of Dorbed 
were also antagonized by the ghaming and showed strong interest in membership 
in the Urga movement.
In Peking, Yuan Shih-k'ai invested his resources shrewdly in the Mongolian 
situation and, of course, used Mongolian nobles as political capital. Being 
forced to deal with the problem of Outer Mongolian independence, he moderated 
his attitude toward the Inner Mongols in order to draw Outer Mongolia into his 
camp. It was for this reason that he regularly instructed the delegate from 
the Ch'ing court to discuss better future treatment of Mongolian nobles in talks 
with the delegate of the revolutionary government. At the same time he used 
proclamations by the Association of Mongolian Princes and Dukes in Peking to 
illustrate their trust in him and their demands for special treatment. In this 
way he was able to win over several Mongol leaders in Peking such as Prince 
Nayantu, who was originally very hostile toward Yuan and strongly opposed to 
abdication. Prince Amurlingghui, the grandson of Senggerinchin of the Jerim 
League, and other minor Mongol nobles. These shifts caused the Association of 
Mongolian Princes and Dukes to issue a public telegram on February 10 to
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Chinese authorities in both Nanking and Peking recommending Yuan Shih-k'ai for 
president. On April 1* Yuan Shih-k'ai appointed Amurlingghui director of the Office 
of Mongolian Affairs. On the tenth of that month the Association of the Alliance 
of the Five Great Peoples was established in Nanking, and three days later Yuan 
issued his statement accepting and promoting intermarriage of the five great 
peoples. On February 22 he declared that the republic would treat all citizens 
equally, tolerating no distinctions between the Chinese and the so-called sub­
ordinates. Accordingly, the Li-fan Yuan was formally abolished. On May 13 the 
Peking Government declared the creation of the Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Bureau 
to function iinder the prime minister's office. By July 2k Yuan Shih-k'ai again 
declared that this bureau should report to the prime minister directly, and Yuan 
soon appointed Yao Hsi-kuang deputy director to oversee the affairs of the bureau. 
At the end of the Ch'ing dynasty Yao had been involved in Mongolian matters, but 
he was decidedly chauvinistic. He had sought cultivation of Mongolian lands and 
Chinese migration into those lands and to weaken and replace the Mongolian 
feudalistic-autonomous administrations by placing Mongolia directly under the 
Manchu-Chinese administration, similar to other provinces and prefectures. As 
a consequence, the Mongols hated him. Unfortunately, his doctrines have served 
as the blueprint for China's Mongolia policy up to the present time.
On August 10 the Peking government promulgated the Organization Law of the 
Parliament of the Republic of China which provided for twenty-seven Mongolian 
members in the senate and the same number in the lower house. Candidates could, 
however, qualify for membership only if they were at least twenty-five years 
old and could speak Chinese, which eliminated most Mongols from membership in 
the Chinese parliament. It was not long before Yuan Shih-k'ai realized that 
these provisions, coupled with his appointment of Yao Hsi-kuang, would not be 
welcomed by the Mongols. At the same time, though, he realized that the situa­
tion in Outer Mongolia was subversive to Chinese interests, so he ordered his 
foreign ministry to declare that Mongolia, Manchuria and Tibet were integral 
parts of China and would not be permitted to conclude treaties or borrow money 
from any foreign countries. This pronouncement set forth not only a defensive 
policy against the subversive influence of Urga but was aimed as well at pre­
venting future potentially subversive contacts between Inner Mongolian leaders 
and foreign nations, such as those between Gungsangnorbu and Japan earlier. In 
addition, on August 19 Yuan Shih-k'ai promulgated the Regulations for the Treat­
ment of Mongols, which recognized the governing power of the Mongolian princes 
over the political administration of their banners, as had been the case for 
over two centuries, and furthermore recognized the ranks, titles and special 
privileges of the Mongolian nobility.
It was about this time or earlier that Prince Gungsangnorbu of Kharachin 
arrived in Peking and was soon involved with the officialdom of the new republic.
On August 2k Sun Yat-sen, the former provisional president of the Nanking govern­
ment, arrived in Peking. The next day the party headed by Sun Yat-sen, the 
Tung-meng-hui, joined several other parties in a special conference and reorgan­
ized as the Kuomintang. Gungsangnorbu attended this political gathering and was 
elected a member of the executive board, along with Sun Yat-sen, Huang Hsing,
Sung Chiao-Jen, Wang Ch'ung-hui, and several others. On November 3 Gungsangnorbu, 
Huang Hsing, Sung Chlao-Jen, Wang Ch'ung-hui and others composed a letter to Sun 
Yat-sen formally electing him chairman of this newly organized party. The inti­
macy of the relationship between this progressive Mongolian noble and the leader
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of the Chinese revolution of course prodded the politically astute Yuan Shih- 
k'ai into action. On September 10 Yuan appointed Gungsangnorhu director of the 
Mongolian-Tibetan Affairs Bureau in order to draw him away from Sun and to at­
tract the support of the Mongolian nobility.
Prince Utai of Khorchin Right Flank Front Banner of Jerim League was a rebel­
lious pro—Russian Mongolian leader even before the end of the Ch'ing dynasty. 
After the republic was established, his suspicion of any new revolution and 
government caused him to organize militant independence activities directed 
against the Chinese. He joined with Duke Rashiminjur of the Khorchin Right 
Flank Rear Banner to "evacuate" all the Chinese settlers who migrated into these 
two banners under pressure from the viceroy of Manchuria at the end of Ch'ing. 
They then attacked two Chinese prefectures, Tao-nan and K'ai-lu, that had been 
organized in the lands of the Mongolian leagues and banners. They occupied the 
towns and destroyed them but were soon engaged in battles with Manchu-Chinese 
forces from Mukden, Kirin, and Heilungchlang provinces at whose hands they were 
defeated. Both Utai and Rashiminjur escaped to Urga to join the Outer Mon­
golian government. During the same time, the two Chinese cities Hu-lun and Lu­
pin in the Hulun-buir area were also attacked and occupied by the Mongols.
Later, on October 7, demonstrating the Chinese government's intransigence in 
refusing to compromise with anti-republican Mongol movements, Yiian Shih-k'ai 
stripped Utai of all ranks and titles and appointed another noble as head of 
the banner. On October 28 Yuan Shih-k'ai, to placate angry Mongols, removed 
Yao Hsl-kuang from the deputy director's position in the Mongolian-Tibetan Bu­
reau. He also appointed Prince Amurlingghul to proceed to the Jerim League to 
discuss problems in that region, persuade Mongolian leaders to support the 
Peking government, and in particular to encourage them to accept the new five- 
color national flag (five peoples) and obey the new republic's law forbidding 
Mongols to buy weapons from other countries.
Although this sort of proselytizing might have somewhat expanded the Peking 
government's influence among the Mongols, its general thrust was still negative. 
On November 17 Ghombujab, the tusalaghohi (the head official under the prince) 
of Jarud Left Banner of Juu-uda League, joined officials and people of the Jarud 
Right Banner in killing the prince and his followers who were for the republic 
and protective of the Chinese settlers. They occupied Chinese centers, includ­
ing the city of K'ai-lu, and destroyed them, but within a short time a Chinese 
army arrived from Jehol and routed the Mongols who escaped to Outer Mongolia.
As a former imperial official. Yuan Shih-k'ai was thoroughly familiar with 
the Ch'ing court's Mongol policies and thus able to adopt and implement the same 
shrewd ploys. His first move was to promote in rank and title all Mongol nobles 
who supported him, while his second maneuver was to take full advantage of the 
Mongols' devotion to Buddhism. Near the end of September he invited two Mon­
golian high lamas, Jangjia Khutughtu and Kanjurwa Khutughtu, to come to Peking 
where he treated them with great respect in order to pacify recalcitrant Mongols. 
The problem, however, was that these two revered lamas held differing opinions. 
At that time Jangjia Khutughtu was still quite young and strongly influenced by 
his pro-Chinese disciples. On the other hand, Kanjurwa Khutughtu was possessed 
of strongly nationalistic feelings and was decidedly pro-Urga. Until his death, 
Jangjia Khutughtu acted as a loyal instrument for the Chinese in their attempts 
to mollify the Mongols, while Kanjurwa Khutughtu was eventually assassinated 
because of his pro-Outer Mongolian attitude.
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In western Inner Mongolia the leaders of Ulanchab League sided quite clearly 
with Urga. When on orders from the Peking government the Chinese general of 
Suiyuan, Chang Shao-tseng, contacted the Ulanchab leaders, they openly informed 
him of their belief that the new ghaming republic would destroy Mongolian tra­
ditions and their pastoral lifestyle and force them to abandon Buddhism. In 
response, the Peking government again promulgated the new principles for the 
treatment of Mongols, giving special emphasis to the government's willingness 
to honor the Mongols' devotion to Buddhism. Finally, by the end of 1912, princes 
of the Ulanchab League became convinced of the hopelessness of unifying Inner 
and Outer Mongolia and reluctantly turned to the Chinese. Greatly encouraged 
by this. Yuan Shih-k'ai promptly elevated all nobles in rank. As a special ges­
ture designed to encourage Mongol acceptance of the new government. Yuan ap­
pointed most of the Mongolian leaders in Peking to the position of Yu-wei shih, 
or officers in the president's special guards. Even this was a restoration or 
continuation of the old Manchu policy of assigning Mongolian princes to positions 
of imperial service before the emperor himself. By the end of the year. Yuan 
Shih-k'ai had authorized special promotions for Prince Nayantu and Prince Gung- 
sangnorbu to reward their help in establishing the republic.
On November 3, 1912 the Russo-Mongolian Treaty was signed in Urga, evidence 
of the fact not only that the Russians wished to reinforce the Outer Mongolian 
separation from China, but also that they refused to allow the Outer Mongolian 
government -to make further moves toward merger or unification with Inner Mongolia 
This treaty represented a turning point for the Inner Mongols who had been look­
ing toward Urga with increasing anxiety. It may also have been the reason why 
the Ulanchab leaders abandoned their pro-Urga attitude in favor of a compromise 
with Peking.
1913, known in the lunar calendar as "the year of black ox," was another very 
crucial year for the Inner Mongols. It saw numerous skirmishes and intrusions 
by both Chinese forces into remote districts of Inner Mongolia and by forces 
from Outer Mongolia. Among Mongols that chaotic period became known as "the 
t\umioil of the year of the ox." The area first disturbed was in Shilin-ghol 
League. As mentioned earlier, after independence was declared in Urga many 
Shilin-ghol leaders joined the movement; some even migrated to Urga in 1911, 
and the influence of the independence movement persisted in the area through 
1912. In 1913 the head of the league. Prince Yangsangjab of Abagha Left Ban­
ner, was arrested by Outer Mongolian forces because of his anti-Urga attitude. 
Yangsangjab was a conservative individual always loyal to the Manchu emperor.
Even after the abdication he was convinced that the Peking regime would govern 
the Middle Kingdom of which Mongolia was a part, and he refused to join the 
Outer Mongolian government. Moreover, he was convinced that there was no hope 
for the unification of Inner and Outer Mongolia. He reasoned, therefore, that 
it would be better for Shilin-ghol to remain neutral or somewhat pro-Peking.
After he was taken to Urga he was questioned and imprisoned although, of course, 
the Urga government later freed him. At the same time Outer Mongolian troops 
passed through the eastern part of the league from (Jjumuchin to the Dolonor area, 
which was located between the Shilin-ghol League and the Chakhar aimagh. Be­
sides being an economic center, Dolonor was also the Holy Land of Mongolian Bud­
dhism where the Kanjurwa Khutughtu and his temple were located.
In Chakhar Jodbajab, the canban of the Mingghan and the Darighanghai pastures, 
the latter now known as the Suke-baator aimagh of the Mongolian People's Republic
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shared Yangsangjah’s conservative hent. When at the beginning of the independ­
ence movement Darighanghai leaned toward Urga, Jodbajab made attempts to restore 
it to his own administration by marching into Darighanghai, where he was captured 
by Outer Mongolian authorities and imprisoned in Urga. Later he, too, was set 
free, and in appreciation of his efforts the Peking government promoted him to 
lieutenant-general. The efforts of those leaders who opposed Outer Mongolian 
independence generally failed to alter the pro-Urga sympathies of the Inner Mon­
golian people who found the turmoil generated by the gnaming particularly dis­
gusting.
In Peking the situation was somewhat different. The government had been rec­
ognized by many world powers and smaller nations because of the creation of an 
elected parliament. Yet several of Yiian’s appointees among the Mongolian sen­
ators and representatives were not even Mongols. Yiian naturally found it bene­
ficial to have his own people occupy parliamentary seats, but the conspiracy 
angered the Mongols and damaged their confidence in the new government.
Gungsangnorbu, with the support of Mongolian senators and delegates, intro­
duced and engineered the passage of a resolution creating the Mongolian-Tibetan 
Academy in Peking, his great dream since his return from Japan in 1903. He con­
sidered education for Mongols to be of primary importance and believed that the 
alternative would condemn them to backwardness and inferiority in the modern 
world. While this first step toward modernization signaled progress for Inner 
Mongolia, it became a personal stumbling block in his political life. Most 
conservative Mongol leaders considered this a substantial step toward a revolu­
tion that would damage or destroy the prerogatives of the Mongolian feudalistic 
and religious hierarchy, and they were openly hostile to this farsighted prince. 
Students at the academy were gradually introduced to democratic ideas and insti­
tutions, and their new awareness encouraged them to struggle for the elimination 
of Mongolian feudalistic institutions. They began to doubt whether this en- ^ 
lightened prince, Gungsangnorbu, would actually be willing to join them in t eir 
struggle. As a result, a wedge was driven between Mongolian liberals and con­
servatives with Gungsongnorbu in between, and the gap continued to grow.
The Peking government promulgated and rendered lip service to the Regulations 
for the Treatment of Mongols and proclaimed its intent to protect traditional 
Mongolian administrative institutions and power. However, it soon organized 
Jehol, Chakhar and Suiyuan into three special administrative districts and 
strengthened its administrative apparatus in those areas. The governors-general 
of these three areas were generally personal supporters of Yuan Shih-k ai, and 
they enjoyed a free hand in bringing more Chinese settlers and in widening the 
reach of their Chinese administrations. Eastern Inner Mongolia fell under the 
shadow of the three eastern provinces of Manchuria and their non-Mongolian ad­
ministrative power and suffered even more. While the governors of the three 
new special administrative districts were military or civilian holdovers from 
the Ch'ing period, the leaders of the three Manchurian provinces were newly 
emerged "heroes" who had been Chinese bandits whose attitudes toward the Mongols 
were exceedingly harsh.
Because of this harshness a well-known "Mongolian bandit," Babujab, joined 
the Tsung-she-tang, the Manchu loyalist party of Prince Su. He received Japanese 
weapons and carried out a guerrilla campaign in eastern Inner Mongolia (eastern 
Chakhar, northeastern Jehol, and parts of Kirin and Mukden provinces) and became
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one of the most outstanding "Mongolian bandits" during the early republican 
period. Along with him there appeared many so-called Mongolian bandits in Man­
churia and eastern Inner Mongolia who, though known as Mongols, were generally 
Chinese. Babujab soon became famous throughout eastern Inner Mongolia. Those 
who were suspicious of the republic or the infamous ghanttng and those who were 
angered by Chinese settlement in Inner Mongolia rebelled around him. His po­
litical goals were never clear. It is still not known whether he fought for 
the restoration of the Ch'ing dynasty or against the Chinese settlers, or 
whether he planned to Join Outer Mongolia. But his supporters grew in number 
in the wake of his successful guerrilla engagements in the above-mentioned 
districts. Finally, in 1916, as he approached the walls of the city of Lin-hsi, 
a stronghold of the Chinese army and administration in northern Jehol, he was 
unexpectedly killed. After his death his followers gradually dissolved until 
only a group headed by his oldest son went to Outer Mongolia.
After the Year of the Ox, 1913, both Shilin-ghol and Chakhar became the site 
of skirmishes between Chinese and Outer Mongolian troops. However, these en­
gagements never gave rise to any events of great political significance. In 
1917 in the Mingghan pasture of Chakhar a young official, Mukdenbu, unexpectedly 
gathered several thousand Chakhar youths and declared independence. His group 
soon took action and attacked Chinese forces in Kalgan, but this movement was 
seemingly an isolated incident with little impact on Mongolian leaders in other 
areas. The group was soon overwhelmed by superior Chinese forces from Kalgan, 
and Mukdenbu was executed. This was the last ripple of the anti-republican 
: military movements that had swept through Inner Mongolia.
■' Just prior to this event, in Peking Yuan Shih-k'ai had defeated his major 
political opponent. Sun Yat-sen, and had begun to establish himself as emperor 
of the Middle Kingdom. Before taking any action, however, he had instructed 
his supporters to generate public opinion favorable to him throughout Peking 
and North China, and the Association of the Mongolian Princes and Dukes in 
Peking became one of his prime tools. Through this association he encouraged 
many Mongol leaders to express their desire for a restoration of the monarchy 
with Yuan Shih-k’ai as emperor. Prince Nayantu, the leader of the group, be­
came the movement’s leading proponent. Prince Gungsangnorbu, however, was 
hesitant to become active in the campaign. His reluctance to participate en­
thusiastically may have been due either to his personal association with Sun 
Yat-sen or to his relatively liberal view of matters in general. Although he 
concealed any forceful opposition he may have felt, neither did he actively 
support the movement.
Aware of Yiian Shih-k’ai’s ambition, the Japanese government issued an ulti­
matum to the Peking government known as the Twenty-One Demands. In accordance 
with its secret treaty with Tsarist Russia, Japan forced China to recognize 
eastern Inner Mongolia and southern Manchuria as special spheres of Japanese 
privilege. This new diplomatic ingredient won the support of many Mongols, who 
hoped to see greater Japanese intervention in eastern Inner Mongolia as a counter­
weight to Chinese power. Of course,this expectation also met with disappoint- 
j ment.
On December 12, 1915 Yuan Shih-k’ai proclaimed that he would accept the 
people’s request and ascend the throne, but revolt soon erupted in southern 
China, and most governors and military leaders in other provinces responded to
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the revolutionary party. Yuan Shih-k'ai was forced to abdicate, and he died 
on June 5, 1916. During this short restoration of Chinese monarchism, Yuan 
again manipulated Mongolian conservatives in Peking and tried to retain their 
loyalty hy promoting them, hut his reign was so short that nothing of political 
significance occurred in Inner Mongolia during that period.
After the death of Yiian Shih-k'ai China entered a new era, an era of warlord- 
ism. Until 1928 China had no unified government. In North China warlords 
appeared one after another. The warlord in Manchuria, Chang Tso-lin, was es­
pecially anxious to cultivate more Mongolian land for Chinese settlers and his 
own followers, and the situation among the Mongols worsened considerably. Chi­
nese warlords ignored Gungsangnorbu and his ideas, though he was retained as a 
figurehead in Peking. The outbreak of World War I in Europe and the fall of 
Tsarist Russia forced the Urga government to alter its policies. The agreement 
between China, Russia and Mongolia, signed in Khyakhta on June 7, 1915, forced 
the Urga government to renounce independence, but it was recognized by both 
China and Russia as an autonomous territory under Chinese suzerainty. These 
changes also forced the Inner Mongols to acknowledge Chinese domination of Mon­
gol affairs. The Implications of this new political alignment and increasing 
oppression by Chinese warlords were the major factors that stimulated organiza­
tion of the Inner Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party, also known as the 
Inner Mongolian Kuoraintang. It tried to forge an alliance with the Outer Mon­
golian People's Revolutionary Party to achieve full independence for Inner 
Mongolia with the assistance of the Outer Mongolian party and government, the 
Comintern and the Kuomlntang under Sun Yat-sen's leadership. All of these or­
ganizations and events were influential to various degrees in the rise of the 
autonomy movement of Inner Mongolia in 1933.
THE PREHISTORY OF MONGOLIA AND THE ROOTS OF MAN IN NORTH AMERICA
Georgeanne Lewis Reynolds 
University of Connecticut
The contribution of Mongolia to the peopling of the New World is substantial.. 
Prehistoric cultural events, reflected in cultural remains, indicate Mongolia's 
early, direct impact on Siberia and later, indirect impact on New World popula­
tions. Prehistoric cultural remains in Mongolia share characteristics with 
Siberia to the north and China to the south, yet their nature is distinctive, 
reflecting man's adjustment to a harsh environment and his prehistoric contact 
with neighboring ethnic groups.
The role of the environment cannot be underestimated in any study of Mongolian 
history or prehistory.1 Climatic conditions, especially climatic changes, may 
have been responsible in part for prehistoric fluctuations2 as well as historic 
nomadic expansions and contractions.3 Man's relationship with the environment 
was recognized by N. C. Nelson, archeologist for the American Museum of Natural 
History's Central Asiatic Expedition during the 1920s. He noted that the quantity 
and quality of cultural remains varied with the local environmental conditions.
The distribution of artifacts illustrated that "the relation between Nature and 
primitive man is almost as close as is the relation between any other organism 
and its environment."^
The Gobi desert and surrounding areas are not the most habitable regions of 
the earth, yet they have been occupied more or less continuously since the Late, 
and probably. Middle Pleistocene. Northern Mongolia aboriginally was less in­
hospitable than it is today. It lay south of the ice sheets which covered Siberia. 
During glacial maxima, Mongolia was probably too cold and dry to support human 
occupation. It is therefore likely that it was first inhabited during a humid 
phase, corresponding to the pluvials of glacial interstadials in Siberia.5
An early, widespread Paleolithic horizon is present in Mongolia. It consists 
of a group of sites containing the Levallois-Mousterian technique of stone work­
ing, a characteristic usually associated with the Middle Pleistocene. At Ottson— 
Han't on the Chinese frontier, Okladnikov found Levallois disc-shaped cores as 
well as the more specialized prismatic cores and the long, wide blades struck 
from them.D On the basis of typology, he dated the site to between 50,000 and 
Ho,000 years ago. The inhabitants may have been transitional between H, 
neandei’tlvxZsnsis and H. sapiens. Another Paleolithic location in this group, 
Moil'tyn-am, near Karakorum, is one of the few stratified sites in Mongolia. The 
combination of Levallois cores with prismatic cores was again found. Skreblos— 
scrapers characteristic of the Siberian Paleolithic—indicate northern influence 
in the assemblage, while choppers and chopping tools indicate Chinese and South­
east Asian affinities. Kuitan-Bulak, near Choibalsan, may also belong to this
group.T
I In the area between Ulan Nor and the Artza Bogdo mountains Nelson found a
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quarry-workshop belonging to a later phase of the Paleolithic. The surface scat­
ter was incredibly widespread and dense. Nelson remarked that "the artifacts lay 
scattered in such abundance that one could scarcely avoid stepping on them."®
The workshop artifacts consisted of scrapers, choppers and Mousteroid points.
The assemblage as a whole most closely resembles the Classic Mousterian tradition
0 the Middle Pleistocene. This stage also includes similar finds in the Orok 
Nor region.y
It has been argued by Derevianko that the Levallois technique is probably in­
digenous due to its wide distribution in Mongolia.10 Others favor a western 
origin for this component.il Powers suggests that Mongolia was a contact zone 
between western Mousterian technologies and the North Chinese pebble tool tradi­
tion and that early stimulus from the west did occur.12 Because Mongolian Paleo­
lithic sites include artifacts characteristic of western and southern cultures,
1 believe Powers' interpretation to be the most plausible.
The nature of the Mongolian Mesolithic is not fully understood. Chang notes 
that assemblages are microlithic in nature,13 but Larichev sees nothing micro- 
lithic in sites of this age.l^ Okladnikov observes that the raw material avail­
able in the Gobi consists in large part of small pebbles, which would lend a 
microlithic aspect to assemblages but would not necessarily imply a microlithic 
nature. 1-5
This controversy extends into the Neolithic. It is partly on the basis of this 
criterion that the nature of and the distinction between the Mesolithic and the 
Neolithic is blurred. One factor adding to the confusion is apparent regional 
specialization.1° Assemblages in interior Mongolia are simple; along the Chinese 
and Siberian borders, they display a greater range of artifact types. Regional 
PJ^ol'a-bly reflect adaptations to local environments and do not neces­
sarily imply different periods of time.
Archeological remains unfortunately do not clarify the problem. This is il­
lustrated by the principal site of this period, Shabarakh-usu in the central Gobi. 
Whether this stratified site is entirely Neolithic or contains a non-ceramic 
Mesolithic layer has yet to be determined. Nelson and Maringer saw both com­
ponents,^ but Soviet researchers, in an unpublished report, have apparently found 
pottery in both levels. As far as I know, the problem remains unresolved.
What can definitely be said about the Mongolian Neolithic? Nelson defined it 
by the appearance of pottery, certain agricultural implements and arrow points, 
reflecting a continuing dependence on hunting in combination with incipient agri­
culture in northern Mongolia.19 The Neolithic is closely associated with con­
temporary cultures in the Soviet Far East and the Baikal area—dwelling and 
settlement patterns are similar, hearth arrangements are Identical, and distinct 
similarities are present in prismatic cores and pottery.20 Furthermore, the 
combination of tools made from large and small blades, as well as tools from 
flakes, and the persistence of the Levadlois-Mousterian technique in Siberian 
assemblages suggest ties to the south.21 a later Neolithic stage brought red 
painted pottery, querns and pestles from China,but Siberian influence remained 
dominant.
How can the overall prehistoric sequence be assessed? I suggest that Mongolia 
was first inhabited during a humid interval during the Middle Pleistocene. Espe­
cially arid areas were occupied only intermittently. Consequent periodic disper­
sion of the inhabitants, as well as intrusions by outsiders, permitted cultural
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exchange. Mongolia seems to have come under the increasing influence of Siberia, 
and there seems to be more communication between these two areas than with China. 
The Mesolithic should not be defined in terms of microliths. Large blades are 
found as well. Of the Neolithic, I would say that the stone tool inventory re­
mains conservative and that it developed from local Mesolithic cultures. Agri­
culture may be a product of stimulus diffusion from the south. Finally, I would 
suggest several migrations during the Late Pleistocene and Early Holocene between 
Siberia and Mongolia. These movements had Impact on the steppe and forest tribes 
and this Impact was eventually felt in the New World.
The initial peopling of the New World is an intricate problem, involving many 
points of origin, ethnic groups and time periods. Mongolian hunters did not 
consciously migrate north and east to populate the New World. There were several 
"haphazard" movements by people in response to changing environmental conditions 
and to the migratory patterns of the fauna they depended on. I should like to 
emphasize the point that there was no mass exodus from Asia to the New World at 
any time. It would be better stated that at various times different people from 
many areas of East Asia found their way to America.
Several migration routes can be distinguished. Miiller-Beck dates a movement 
from the west at about 28,000 years ago.23 I suggest that the date of this mi­
gration, which probably originated in Central Asia, might well be pushed back due 
to the discovery of increasingly older sites in Siberia. I would further postulate 
at least two such movements. The first probably occurred anywhere from 50,000 to 
30,000 years ago and brought with it the Mousterian tradition and the Levallois 
technique. A second movement took place, around the time Miiller-Beck suggests, 
of people bearing Upper Paleolithic traditions—the Aurignacian, Solutrean and 
Gravettian among them. This is not to say that Siberia was a "technological 
extension of subarctic Europe during the Late Pleistocene," as Miiller-Beck sug­
gests. 2^ No sites in East Asia exactly duplicate European sites, just as no sites 
in the New World duplicate sites in Asia.
There were at least two routes of northward migration. The first was an inland 
route, beginning in Southeast Asia and continuing through China and Mongolia, to 
Siberia. This movement of people brought with it a flake tool technology and the 
chopper/chopping tool tradition. Perhaps the widespread wedge-shaped core was 
dispersed in one of these migrations. Ramifications of this movement were felt in 
interior Siberia where many sites exhibit these archaic components. These sites 
include Mal'ta near Irkutsk,25 Afontova Gora on the Yenesei2° and Ust’ Kanskaia in 
the Altai mountains. 2'?^
A second, later movement involved northward expansion along the Pacific Coast, 
with some inciarsions inland. It consisted of people from the Amur River, Japan, 
Manchuria, Korea, North China and, in all likelihood, Mongolia. Luring glacial 
maxima, Japan was joined to the mainland and a coastal shelf 20 to 30 miles wide 
existed, facilitating movement from the mouth of the Amur and along the shores 
of the Sea of Okhotsk. From here these groups may have traversed the coastal 
ranges until they reached the Anadyr Gulf.28 This group of people might well 
have introduced certain innovations such as the Araya diagonal burin from Japan, 
a trait found at Verkholenskaia Gora near Lake BaikaJ.29 and also along the Pacific 
Rim at Ushki Lake on the Kamchatka Peninsula30 and at Anangula Island in the 
Aleutians.31
The Bering Land Bridge during times of glaciation was approximately 1300
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kilometers wide32—atout the same distance from the southern shores of Lake Baikal 
to the northern reaches of the Ordos desert.23 Therefore, it was vast enough to 
accommodate several groups at once without their being aware of each other. It 
has been postulated by Laughlin that the interior of the Land Bridge was crossed 
by tundra-adapted big game hunters, ancestral to the Paleo-Indians and that the 
southern coastal route was taken by the ancestors of the Eskimos and Aleuts who 
had a marine-focused economy.3^ Along similar lines, Dikov postulates a movement 
of Paleo-Indians during the main Wisconsin glaciation which traveled down through 
Alaska and was responsible for such sites as the Marmes Rock Shelter in Washington 
State.35 A later, post-Wisconsin movement by Paleo-Eskimos and Paleo-Aleuts 
brought with it the wedge-shaped core and populated early Alaskan localities, 
such as portions of central Alaska (the Denali Comple) and Anangula Island.
This may account for some earlier dates in interior North America and later dates 
in the Arctic.
Mochanov distinguishes two cultural groups in Siberia during the terminal 
Pleistocene—the unifacial "Mai’ta-Afontova" cultural tradition and the bifacial 
"Diijktai" tradition.36 TI10 people of this second tradition, who are named after 
the Diuktai cave site on the Aldan River, made pebble cores, Levallois cores, 
wedge-shaped (or Gobi) cores and skreblo—in other words, artifacts similar to 
those found in prehistoric Mongolia. It is suggested by Mochanov that elements 
of the Diuktai people migrated to North America between 18,000 and 11,000 years 
ago, bringing bifacial technology with them. However, independent invention in 
Alaska of this technological advance is quite probable. It is quite likely that 
elements of both the Mai'ta-Afontova and Diuktai populations founded the early 
core and blade technologies in Alaska. It must be pointed out in a discussion 
on possible dates of entry of man into the New World that the Bering Strait, only 
56 miles wide between Cape Dezhnev and Cape Prince of Wales, freezes each winter 
so that contact between eastern Siberia and western Alaska has always been pos­
sible, even when the Land Bridge was submerged during interstadials, and during 
the Holocene as well.
Certain Alaskan assemblages retain a configuration of Asian traits and there­
fore merit discussion. The four I will discuss are all early—between 11,000 and 
7,000 years ago—and are defined as core and blade technologies.38 The first of 
these is the Akmak Complex of Onion Portage on the Kobuk River.39 The assemblage 
in this basal stratum includes large, wide blades struck from polyhedral cores, 
microblades, burins, and crude bifaces used as scrapers and knives. Gallagher 
Flint Station, locality one, on the North Slope contains a wide variety of cores 
and unifacially retouched blades, but no burin or bifaces. The Denali Complex 
in central Alaska^O includes the famous Campus Site near Fairbanks .^1 This group 
of sites is composed of wedge-shaped and polyhedral cores, microblades, burins, 
end scrapers, a chopping tool or scraper, a number of biface blanks and knives or 
spearpoints. Anangula Island in the Aleutians^2 is a completely unifacial in­
dustry. It consists of a wide variety of core types (including wedge-shaped cores), 
burins, and prismatic blades.
Anderson sees several similarities in the Akmak Complex to Siberian assemblages.^ 
Core bifaces, blades, burins and bifacial knives are reminiscent of Mal'ta,
Afontova Gora and Verkholenskaia Gora. He sees only one connection with Ushki 
Lake—the wedge-shaped microcores. In Alaska, Akmak has more correspondences with 
the Denali Complex than with Anangula. I suggest that part of the explanation 
involves the different environmental foci of each site.
Il6 Georgeanne Lewis Reynolds
Gallagher Flint Station, locality one, is most like Anangula in Alaska because 
both lack bifaces. On the other hand, there are no burins in the assemblage, 
while Anangula exhibits a dependency on this artifact. Dixon has suggested that 
the two sites are remotely linked to a common ancestor, perhaps Tadusha in the 
Maritime Territory of the Soviet Union.
It was N. C. Nelson who first recognized the close correspondences between the 
end-scrapers, wedge-shaped cores and prismatic blades of the Campus Site to those 
of the pre-Neollthic Gobi.^5 Rainey also noted similarities to the Baikal area.^o 
More recently. West has identified components of the Denali Comple as being re­
lated to Afontova Gora, Verkholenskaia Gora, Ushkl Lake and certain localities in 
Japan.Cores of the Kobuk Complex, which overlies the Akmak Comple of Onion 
Portage, resemble Campus cores, but the overall context of Akmak separates it 
from the Denali finds. Anangula and Gallagher Flint Station contain elements in 
common with the Denali Complex, but the assemblages, taken as a whole, are quite
distinct from each other. 48Okladnikov has identified seven Asian traits in the Anangula assemblage.
They are the Levallois technique, Gobi cores, pebble tools, Mousteroid points, 
skreblos, diagonal burins and transverse burins. The burins are most like those 
of the Araya Complex of Preceramic Japan. The assemblage is just as reminiscent 
of Japan as it is of Siberia.^9 This suggests direct influence of the Pacific 
Coastal migration route. Okladnikov and Laughlin examined Nelson's Gobi material 
and found that "the identity of artifacts is in some cases remarkable."50 The 
Denali Complex and Akmak share similarities with Anangula, but close correspond­
ences are rare. As noted above, the principal trait shared with Gallagher Flint 
Station is that of a completely unifacial technology. Beyond this, the two sites 
are quite different.
Despite the significant differences apparent in these assemblages, certain 
components link them together and point to a common ancestor in East Asia. The 
presence of wedge-shaped cores and prismatic blades, both common in prehistoric 
Mongolia, reflect this. Differentiation has occurred due to the several routes 
taken by the Paleo-Eskimos and Paleo-Aleuts as they approached the Land Bridge 
and moved across it. Regional variation, different subsistence strategies 
various ecological adaptations also explain the distinct nature of each site.
The exact nature and extent of influence of Mongolia on the New World is hard 
to put into concrete, quantifiable terms. At this point only general statements 
can be made. There are several cultural attributes which occur early in Mongolia, 
are found later in Siberia and reappear in the New World. Entire duplication of 
assemblages will not be found and direct correspondences of individual artifacts 
are rare. The basic fact that a Gobi core was fashioned in the desert-steppe 
about 20,000 years ago and that a Campus core was manufactured in a forested zone 
about 8,000 years ago is crucial in the interpretation of man's ability to adjust 
to new situations through time and space. Human beings evolve and adapt to dif­
ferent surroundings and this is reflected in their material culture.
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SLIDES PRESENTED
Left: Large Mongolian blade of red Jasper 
from the general vicinity of Shabarakh-Usu. 
Right: Large blade of metamorphosed argellite 
from Anangula Island.
Length of both approximately 12 cm.
Anangula wedge-shaped core of brown chert, 
frontal view. Maximum height: 4.5 cm.
Left: "Pencil-shaped" conical core of chert 
from the general vicinity of Shabarakh-Usu. 
Maximum height: 5.5 cm.
Right: "Pencil-shaped” conical core of chert 
from Sagan-Saba, Lake Baikal area.
Maximum height: 6.75 cm.
Two conical cores of obsidian from Anangula 
Island. Maximum heights: 3.5 cm. and 2.75 cm
Mongolian and Siberian specimens courtesy of A.P. Okladnikov. Anangula specimens courtesy of W.S. Laughlin.
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THE OYROT UNDER MANCHU RULE: 
SOCIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES
Keith Scott
University of Saskatchewan
In this paper I propose to examine quite briefly some of the circumstances 
surrounding the transfer to Manchu sovereignty in the mid-eighteenth century of 
those areas of steppeland to the west of the Altay which had formed the pastures, 
or were under the control, of Zuiingar or Oyrot clans. Under what kind of social 
and administrative arrangements did the Manchus envisage accommodating their new 
subjects, once the "pacification" of these areas had been completed?
It must appear that, by choosing such a topic, I have laid myself open to 
the serious charge which every responsible historian seeks to avoid: that of
dealing with the irrelevant, of indulging in vain speculation about "what might 
have happened if . . ." For it is well known that after the 1755-59 pacification, 
campaign only a small remnant of the Oyrot peoples survived, and though this 
remnant became subject to the Manchu emperor, its allegiance was a mere for­
mality, a minor item of business for the attention of the hastily constituted 
military administration of the Western Regions.
My intention, however, is not to speculate about a non-existent Oyrot settle­
ment and its equally hypothetical consequences, but to suggest that there is 
some profit to be gained from going further back in time and retracing the his­
torical byway that leads to this particular dead end. The conventional wisdom 
has it that the annexation of Zuiingar lands by the Manchus was the realization 
of a long-range strategy, an objective kept constantly in view, despite periodic 
changes in short-term tactics, throughout the first century of Manchu rule from 
Peking, and consistently pursued from the time of the war against Galdan in 
1690-96. This position, implicit in much Western historiography, has found no 
less favor with Soviet historians who, in discussing the 1755-59 campaigns, use 
such phrases as "the fulfillment of their Csc. the Manchus'i expansionist plans, 
and with contemporary Chinese apologists who see the campaigns merely in terms 
of the "suppression of rebellion" and the "restoration of national unity."2 
My own reading of early eighteenth-century Chinese materials has impressed me 
rather with the indecision attendant upon so much Manchu policymaking in this 
area, and has persuaded me that at no time—not even when the campaigns referred 
to had already gotten under way—was their eventual outcome intended or fore­
seen. I have elsewhere propounded this view on the basis of an examination of 
the debate at the Manchu court, conducted throughout the reign of the Ch'ien-lung 
emperor, on economic policies and military attitudes toward the Zuiingar.3 Per­
haps some further light might be shed if a brief attempt were made to trace the 
evolution of Manchu attitudes towards Zuiingar society in the pre-conquest period. 
Hence the present Inquiry, an inquiry that must be inconclusive but is not, I 
would hope, entirely futile.
The Ch'ien-lung {Tengeriyn tetegsen) reign period began in 1736, the new
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emperor having succeeded to the throne late in the preceding year. At this 
time the interest of the Peking government in Ziiungar affairs was centered 
upon the negotiations aimed, at least from the Manchu standpoint, at achieving 
a military disengagement and some form of peace settlement along the Altay 
frontier between Ziiiingar and Khalkha lands. The negotiation process had al­
ready been initiated in 173^ with the dispatch of a Manchu mission to Hi, 
residence of the Chores khan Galdantseren whose envoys in turn reached Peking 
early in 1736.^ Certain elements emerge from imperial edicts and official re­
ports Issued during the course of negotiations that shed an instructive light 
on the Manchus' understanding of Ziiungar social dynamics, and on their per­
ception of actual and possible future Manchu-Zuiingar relations. To start with, 
there was apparently no disposition to regard the tribes known to them at that 
time under the collective designation Zuiingar as anything other than a unified 
people under the leadership of Galdantseren; no distant memory remained, for 
example, of the discrepancy acidly noted by Nurhachi in l6l9 between Ligdan's 
claim to hegemony over forty tiunen and the polycentric reality of post-Yuan 
society.5 Instead, the Choros khan is repeatedly enjoined to act as the ben­
evolent patriarch of all the people (sc. the Oyrot) and to conclude the peace 
which would serve their long-term interests better than war.6
The general approach adopted by the Manchus in their direct dealings with 
the Ziiungar during the negotiations of 1736-Uo is well represented by such 
paternalistic tenders of advice. On more than one occasion in the course of 
his correspondence with Galdantseren, the Ch'ien-lung emperor emphasized the 
common interests shared by the Ziiiingar and the Manchus rather than the issues 
that currently divided them. His expressed willingness to treat them on the 
same basis as the KhalkhaT or the people of ChinaS may be interpreted, if one 
so chooses, as an invitation to move into a closer formal relationship. On the 
other hand, the model which the Manchus favored as the basis for a settlement 
was the treaty concluded with the Russians at Kyakhta in 1727 rather than the 
Doloonnuur convention of I69I which made the Khalkha princes vassals of the 
imperial throne. I submit that the Manchus chose the Kyakhta model for three 
reasons. First, its emphasis on frontier delineation accorded best with the 
immediate geopolitical concern, that of keeping the Khalkha and the Ziiiingar 
physically apart.9 Second, the Manchus harbored the illusion that one man, 
Galdantseren, spoke (like the Russian tsar) for all his people, and that it 
would be pointless to conclude individual agreements, as at Doloonnuur, with 
all who could be identified as tribal leaders and clan heads. Third and per­
haps most importantly, the Manchus thought that the Ziiungar were profoundly 
unwilling at this time to make the requisite sacrifice of autonomy and that 
they could not be pressured into making such a sacrifice, even had the Manchus 
wished to do so.
In actuality the 17^0 agreement does not stand comparison with Kyakhta.
Even after its conclusion, it remained apparent that the Ziiiingar had little 
interest in, or appreciation of, the concept of a precisely delineated border 
line,10 and the most that could be expected was that unilateral observance by 
the Khalkha of the line theoretically determined through the negotiating proc­
ess might by itself contribute to a lessening of tensions in the frontier zone.H 
The distinction between fChalkha and Ziiungar is emphasized more than once in 
Manchu government statements after 17^+0. Officials are chided for confusing 
the Mongols in allegiance to the Manchu throne, who are to be referred to as
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Meng-ku, with the Zuiingar who are i ("barbarians") and thus outside the emperor's 
dispensation.
The first sign that this attitude was about to undergo some modification may 
e detected in an edict of 17h3 in which Galdantseren is described as wai-fan 
rather than 'V, This change in terminology does not seem to me too significant 
in itself. I am not convinced that the Ch'ing regarded all those whom they 
called hm-fan as being in at least a nominally feudatory relationship with the 
imperial throne, as Fairbank and others have suggested.!^ The term seems, on 
occasion, to be used in a much looser geographical sense.
Later in the same decade, however, a Zuiingar envoy was received at court and 
a dressed in te:ms which would not have been inappropriately directed towards 
he representative of a vassal prince. The emperor declared his satisfaction 
with the tone and content of the letter sent by Tseveendorzh Namzhil,
Galdantseren's successor. He commended the new khan for his efforts to keep 
the peace among his subjects, though by now he must already have felt consider­
able uncertainty concerning the extent of the latter's authority, both titular 
and actual, over the Oyrot twmen.15 Manchu and Khalkha officials had increasing- 
y to deal with refugees—one of them a defector from the very mission that 
rought Tseveendorzh Namzhil's letter—16 refugees whose reports furnished a 
detailed picture of rivalries and dissensions within the Ziiungar steppe. We 
may reasonably infer that voices were now beginning to be raised in Peking in 
favor of bringing every identifiable Oyrot group into vassalage, although I 
ave no evidence from this date explicitly supporting such an inference. But 
some indirect indications may be found in the official reaction to Ziiungar moves 
towards renewing their links with Tibet.
Tseveendorzh Namzhil wisely decided to allay Manchu fears by involving the 
imperial government in his plans and by presenting his interest in Tibetan af- 
fairs as arising from purely religious motives. This indeed had been the burden 
ol the letter just mentioned which so pleased the emperor. Since a constant 
low of Zuiingar subjects to and from Tibet could not be permitted for security 
reasons, an alternative offer was made to Tseveendorzh Namzhil; young men might 
be selected and sent to Peking for three or four years to be trained as lamas, 
presumably at the Yung-ho kung.l' khan did not respond, and the offer was
almost certainly never taken up, but the Manchu government must have been aware 
that the mere act of making it carried at least two implications of moment.
First, the Manchus now accepted, and would be recognized as accepting, some 
responsibility for the Internal evolution of Zuiingar society inasmuch as they 
sought to impose a particular direction upon the development of its religious 
institutions. Secondly, the extended presence of the young trainees in the 
capital woind bring to an irreversible end the previous isolation of the Ziiiingar 
from the Sino-Manchu cultiiral milieu, and would in all probability lead to the 
creation of an influential body of opinion within the Oyrot community advocating 
formalization of the Manchus’ role as protecting power.
This summary of contacts between the Manchu court and Tseveendorzh Namzhil 
has entailed some telescoping of events; the latter's first mission to Peking 
arrived there early in 17^6, but the offer to undertake the training of lamas 
was not put forw^d until some four years later. Tseveendorzh Namzhil died 
soon afterwards in a coup engineered by his half-brother Lamdarzh, who then 
found himself embroiled in a struggle for supremacy with Davaazha, a distant
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cousin whose main support came from non-Choros taizh and zaysan (most notably 
the Khoyd Amarsanaa). This intensification of internal feuding among the Oyrot 
clans, while rendering the Manchu offer inoperative and irrelevant,1° neverthe­
less strengthened the hands of those Manchu officials who advocated implementing 
a more active and constructive policy. The illusion of Zuungar ixnity, and the 
trust in one man’s capacity as overall khan to enforce that unity,19 could no 
longer be sustained. By early 175^, Peking had broadly accepted that some 
format for relations with individual Oyrot groups must now be established, and 
the only questions that remained to be settled concerned the precise timing and 
the specific modalities of the approved course of action. The idea of military 
intervention, either in support of Davaazha or to impose a general settlement, 
was still firmly rejected,20 but the recent surrender of heads of leading Dorvod 
clans^l appeared to offer a practical alternative. After a substantial segment 
of each Oyrot twnen had come over to place itself under Manchu protection, the 
emperor should Invite the khan of that twnen to become his vassal, and any logis­
tical support required to enable the Oyrot of the twnen in question to recover 
and consolidate their position in their traditional pastures should be made 
available.
It soon became evident that an effective settlement would, after all, involve 
some commitment of Manchu military forces; by J-une 175^ preparations were al­
ready under way for an expedition to Hi in the following summer.22 Yet the 
objectives remained the same, and it is to these that we ought in the present 
instance to devote our attention, rather than to the methods used to attain them. 
The historical concept of the four Oyrot tianen was adopted, but as the Manchus 
themselves recognized to a certain extent, this was a very general and ill- 
defined concept—it still remains a fruitful source of scholarly controversy— 
and an unsuitable basis for a framework of feudal relationships which would be 
recognized by all the Oyrot peoples. Four ttbnen had to be selected arbitrarily 
from several contenders with good historical claims. Even these four differed 
from one another in their degrees of social cohesion, with the Choros (at least 
until latterly) displaying a more clearly defined feudal structure than the 
loosely federated Dorvod for instance. Besides, there were the twenty-four 
otog which had formed part of the appanage of the Choros khans but were not of 
the same lineage. One assumes that the Manchus expected the four khans, chosen 
by themselves since none (with the possible exception of Amarsanaa) was self- 
evident, to play a role in the imperial system similar to that of the four 
Khalkha khans, but conditions in the two Mongol groups, eastern and western, 
were by no means analogous. By the time the Khalkha khans were accepted into 
vassalage, their ascendancy over their subjects had long been established through 
diplomacy and force of arms, and made permanent through the system of subin­feudation they themselves had created.2^
Despite these difficulties and differences of circumstances, the Manchus 
went ahead with designating four twnen on the basis of their own interests and 
incomplete information: the Choros, chosen in recognition of their historical
leadership of the Zuungar empire; the Dorvod who had already surrendered in sub­
stantial numbers and were thought to exhibit a touching loyalty to the imperial 
throne—though some were already hurrying back to the northwest to take part in 
the struggle for land and power;25 the Khoyd, since Amarsanaa was clearly a 
force to be reckoned with; and the Khoshuud, presvunably because the Manchus 
relied on their kinsfolk in the Tibetan borderlands to help maintain the
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stability of that sensitive frontier region.
At first the pieces of this tidy scheme seemed to be falling neatly into 
place. Amarsanaa, the unchallenged leader of the Khoyd, gave allegiance in 
September 175^.^ Tseren was thought to he the most distinguished and most 
compliant of the Dorvod taizh^ and his colleagues Tserenubash and Tserenmonkh 
seemed unlikely to dispute his confirmation as khan of this timen. There were 
strong indications that Tserenmonkh, far from having ambitions in the Dorvod 
political arena, was in fact casting covetous eyes upon the pastiires of the 
Khoyd. This was understandable, the Dorvod having been most seriously af­
flicted by the land shortage that had latterly developed in the Zuiingar steppe. 
BMzhil, grandson by primogeniture of the renowned Lazhan Khaan who had ruled 
Tibet for more than a decade earlier in the century, was the natural choice for 
the leadership of the Khoshuud. Only the Chores khanate was left vacant, pend­
ing the removal of Davaazh ^ho represented the old order and was, on that account, 
unacceptable to the Manchus.28 jjj any event, upon proclamation of these new 
administrative arrangements in February 1755, his status became by definition 
that of rebel, since he had not previously come forward to tender his alle­
giance. 29
Throughout 1755 the Manchu government stuck doggedly to the basic concept of 
the four khanates; only the list of nominees changed from time to time as one 
taizh after another incurred their disapproval on account of actions that showed 
little respect for the symmetry of Peking's grand design.30 g^t as more precise 
information was received about the diverse character of Oyrot internal relation­
ships, the authorities grudgingly but realistically admitted certain modifica­
tions to the original plan.
The first important innovation was the creation of ohuulgan (councils), 
theoretically to advise the khan, but in practice to provide some recognition 
of other interests within the timen. As early as November 175k the Dorvod 
chuulgan had been constituted, and the appointment of Tserenubash as head of 
one of its two wings helped to clarify his status, previously undefined and 
therefore potentially threatening, in relation to Tseren.31
By the end of the following year, the structural diversity and variety of 
interests within each timen had been further recognized by the designation of 
the ahuulgan as the central timen Institution. The khan would not, after all, 
be a hereditary chieftain or the emperor's nominee, but would be elected by the 
members of his timen and would serve as ahuulgany darga "chairman of the coun­
cil." A similar system had been introduced into Khalkha in 1728. There, 
however, the positions of khan and ahuulgany darga were often kept separate, 
presumably as a means of encouraging a creative tension between traditional and 
elective authority, one that could be expected to serve Manchu interests.33 
The merging of the two positions in the Oyrot situation may, I think, be taken 
to reflect an appreciation of the need to weld the Oyrot into fewer, more co­
hesive units, and to discourage any growth of the practice of subinfeudation 
endemic among the Khalkha. Nevertheless, since it was predicated on the sur­
vival of the Oyrot and the need to support their efforts to manage their own 
affairs, it is hard to accept that the long-range intentions of the government 
which took such a socially constructive step, even at this late stage, included 
the establishment of direct administrative control over Oyrot territory and (as 
some have suggested, arguing retrogressively from subsequent events) the virtual 
elimination of its occupants.
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The Manchus were also made aware of, and addressed themselves to, the question 
of the twenty-four otog which had formed a part of the Zuiingar empire as direct 
dependencies of the Chores khan.3^ The original assumption that these, like all 
other groups falling under the general rubric of "Oyrot," would be neatly ab­
sorbed into one or another of the four designated tumen was now seen to be un­
realistic and, indeed, \indesirable since it was a much simpler matter to preserve 
them as separate administrative units, and for the Manchu emperor to assume the 
seignorial rights. At the same time, it came to be appreciated that these rights 
were accompanied by certain special responsibilities, particularly with respect 
to the boundaries of the otog pastures. It was the enforcement of these boiind- 
aries that had formed the basis of the otog's relationship with the Chores khan, 
since the otog was characteristically a small, economically defined unit, its 
member households linked one to another by the bond of copasturage rather than 
kinship. Only strong, effective Chores leadership of the Zuiingar empire had, 
while it lasted, prevented serious encroachments on the otog pastures by numer­
ically stronger and more powerful Oyrot groups such as the Dorvod and Khoyd.35
Yet a third indication of the growing sophistication in the Manchus' knowl­
edge of Oyrot affairs is seen in the elaboration of special administrative 
arrangements for the zhas or monastic institutions.36 one integral and note­
worthy feature of these arrangements was the decision taken in September 1755 
to proceed with the appointment of a head lama,37 even though a few years earlier, 
before the evident disintegration of Zuiingar power, the prospect of a second 
khutagt west of the Altay had been one which the Manchus scarcely dared to con­
template. 38
Even as the policymakers and bureaucrats in Peking were busily refining their 
administrative proposals, the irrelevance of these proposals to what was actually 
taking place on the Central Asian frontier became increasingly clear. Amarsanaa, 
of course, had his own ideas about the future of the region, predicated upon the 
elimination of every vestige of traditional Choros power. His eventual goal 
being a restored Zuiingar empire under Khoyd leadership, he was nevertheless 
willing to accept the establishment of four separate khanates as an interim 
measure. But a fear that this arrangement might become inconveniently permanent 
was apparently aroused in his mind when a taizh of the Choros, Galsandorzh, came 
forward as a willing candidate for the vacant position of khan and was eagerly 
embraced by the Manchu court. This was before Peking had adopted the concept of 
an elective ahuuZgany darga, but Amarsanaa himself proposed that a ahuulgcm of 
Choros zaysan and demah (administrative officers) should be convened to elect 
as khan someone of the lineage of Galdantseren, an operation over which he un­
doubtedly felt capable of exerting some influence. At the same time, however, 
he put forward as an alternative plan his own desire to see a unitary Oyrot 
state, suggesting that the Oyrot, unlike the Khalkha, were incapable of managing 
their own affairs peaceably and, in particular, of defending the frontiers of 
the empire against external threats without strong leadership—leadership which 
he, of course, stood ready to provide.39
The emperor firmly rejected Amarsanaa's propositions; the Manchus were quite 
satisfied to see the Khalkha system extended to the Zuiingar steppe, with the 
sole difference, already mentioned, that the positions of khan and ckuutgany 
darga would be merged. Partly to allay Amarsanaa's alleged anxieties, but also 
to keep a watchful eye on the very type of ambitious Oyrot that he himself repre­
sented, it was decided that assistant military commanders (fu-ohiang-chun) and
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resident liaison officers (chu-ta ta-oh'en) would be appointed by Peking to 
each of the tumen.^^
The parallel with the Khalkha situation was formally and publicly enunciated 
in the premature 'Victory proclamation" of November 21, 1755.^1 This official 
declaration is of interest, if only because it draws attention to the complete 
transformation which Manchu policy had progressively undergone in less than 
twenty years, away from the determination to differentiate at all costs between 
Oyrot and Khalkha which was paramount at the time of the negotiations with 
Galdantseren.
In fact, at the moment when the victory proclamation was issued, the pacifica­
tion of the Northwest remained a distant dream. Amarsanaa was in open revolt, 
and instead of helping to create a stable framework for the new social and ad­
ministrative order, what remained of the Manchu expeditionary force was desper­
ately fighting for its own survival. After its senior commanders were ambushed 
and killed by partisans of Amarsanaa,^2 the Manchu authorities devoted their 
entire attention to the exigencies of the military situation. No new administra­
tive proposals were forthcoming,' though we need not conclude that a firm decision 
had yet been taken to dismantle completely the old social system. But by the 
spring of 1756 a note of bitterness and betrayal is already detectable in of­
ficial statements on the Ziiungar situation. Amarsanaa had shown gross ingratitude, 
of course, but it was implied that even loyal and cooperative Oyrots such as the 
Dorvod taizh Tseren and Tserenubash shared some of the blame for their weakness 
and inability to provide effective leadership.^3
Then, in August of the same year, it becomes evident that a new policy had 
begun to take shape. The concept of the four tumen had been tacitly abandoned— 
though this is not confirmed in official documents until a year later^^— and 
attention had shifted to the lower level angi as the effective unit of social 
administration, with executive authority entrusted to clerks {tushmel) and mag­
istrates (zargaoh)It seemed likely, too, that Manchu garrisons would now 
have to be maintained in the Northwest on a regular basis.^6
A particularly interesting commentary on the entire process of policymaking 
during the first twenty years or so of the Ch'ien-lung emperor's reign was an 
edict which he issued in January 1757 in response to court criticism of the 
Manchu military involvement in Oyrot affairs. In it he pointed out that, though 
his hopes for peace and stability had unfortunately not been realized, he had 
taken all decisions as part of a carefully considered and relatively modest 
plan. He had to resettle the four tumen in their original pastures if the 
Khalkha were to be left undisturbed and the burden of supporting refugees de­
prived of their traditional livelihood lifted from the shoulders of the imperial 
treasury. Though post hoc apologetics are not uncommon in the Ch'ing annals, 
this statement is consistent with the course of events which we have been examin­
ing and thus has an unusual ring of honesty about it. "in sum," said the emperor, 
"our attitude has not been one of seeking glory; it has been entirely dictated 
by the exigencies of the situation."^?
We may fittingly terminate our inquiry at this point, for we have reached the 
end of the byway we set out to explore. Subsequent events are too well known 
to warrant repetition here, and the context in which they took place is that of 
warfare, geopolitics and diplomacy. At this stage no worthwhile social policies 
could have been devised for the Oyrot as a whole, though an edict declaring them
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to be an endangered species and imposing a closed season on hunting them might 
not have been inappropriate.
By way of summary, I suggest that the following stages may be identified in 
the development of Manchu policies concerned with Oyrot social organization.
1. Up to 17^0 the only concern of the government in Peking was to disengage 
itself, and its Khalkha vassals, from unnecessary involvement in Ziiungar affairs.
2. Between 17^3 and 1750, i.e., during the reign of the khan Tseveendorzh 
Namzhil, the Manchu court decided that the Ziiiingar khanate should be treated as 
if it were an outlying vassal state, though this relationship was never formal­
ized.
3. After 1750, with the intensification of internal feuding among the Oyrot 
and the increasing flow of refugees, the Manchus moved towards establishing 
relations with individual Oyrot groups.
By 175^ four Oyrot tumen had been identified; these were to become vassals 
of the Manchu emperor in a similar fashion to the Khalkha khanates.
5. In 1755 the Khalkha model was modified to take account of features pecul­
iar to the Oyrot situation, i.e., the diversity of status and interest within 
the tumen, the traditional relationship between the Choros khan and the twenty- 
four otog, and the semi-independent status of the monastic lands.
6. In 1756 the Manchus abandoned the tumen system in favor of direct control 
over the otog and angi, and finally:
7. Sometime during the following year, all previous plans were jettisoned as 
the traditional Oyrot social structure broke down completely and the Oyrot them­
selves faced extermination. The Ziiungar steppes became a military territory of 
the Manchu empire, and the new masters of this territory were faced with a major 
problem of an entirely different order from those of the preceding hundred years 
of Manchu-Oyrot relations. Instead of concerning themselves with trying to 
understand and to regulate a complex social system, they were suddenly forced to 
find ways of filling up huge tracts of empty pasture land from which it appeared 
that man, the "social animal," had altogether disappeared.
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ACTIVITIES AND PUBLICATIONS OF 
THE MONGOLIA SOCIETY (1978)
John R. Krueger 
Indiana University
The Mongolia Society, founded in I96I as a non-profit, non-political organ­
ization devoted to all aspects of Mongolia, has given much of its energy over 
the years to publications. Beginning with a Newsletter (vols. 1-3, 1962-i^),^ 
then a Bulletin (vols. U-12, 1965-73), the Society now issues Mongolian Studies: 
Journal of the Mongolia Society, a periodical containing scholarly research 
articles, embracing a cross-disciplinary approach to Mongolia past and present. 
Volume 5 for 1978 will appear presently. A series of Occasional Papers treated 
the Mongolian economy, literature, religion, travel and history; and the series. 
Special Papers, gives works originally written in Mongolian. The Society also 
sponsored some other publications, like a set of maps and the popular reprinting 
of F. D. Lessing's large Mongolian-English Dictionary.
In 1978 the society issued as Occasional Paper 9, Ramstedt's memoirs of his 
travels in Mongolia and Asia, Seven Journeys Eastward, 1898-1912 (277 pages in­
cluding fifty-two photographs), an adventure-filled account of his studies and 
research, including valuable political information about the period of Mongolian 
autonomy. Occasional Paper 10 is A. M. Pozdneyev's account of life in a Mon­
golian Buddhist (Lamaist) monastery 100 years ago, now titled Religion and 
Ritual in Society: Lamaist Buddhism in Late 19th-Century Mongolia (69^ PP-)*
It treats the divine services, the ritual, the clergy, the temple furnishings, 
and the relation of the church to the people.
Early in 1978 the Society issued Part One of John R. Krueger's projected 
large Oirat-Mongolian citation dictionary (20U pages covering the first seven 
letters, the vowels). The additional parts, to a total of 900 pages, will be 
issued later. This unique work gives the entire vocabulary of the Western 
Mongolian literary language for the period of about I6U8 to 192^, drawing on 
all known edited and transcribed dictionaries and texts, plus numerous unedited 
documents.
Special Paper 6 is devoted to L. Dindub's Brief History of Mongolia, in the 
Autonomous Period (2lU pages in Mongolian); the editor. Dr. Hangin, gives an 
English introduction about the work and an index of persons treated. It is a 
valuable primary soxirce scarcely available even in Mongolia any more. Special 
Paper 7 deals with the famous Bewitched Corpse Cycle of folktales from Indian 
sources. Thirteen Kalmyk-Oirat Tales, with script text, keyed glossary and lit­
erary translation into English by J. R. Krueger. It serves as a convenient 
handbook and introduction to Oirat (West Mongolian) Studies (120 pp.).
Occasional Paper 11 will be a new English edition of Prof. Nicholas Poppe's 
Russian work. Heroic Epic of the Khalkha Mongols. It is translated and edited 
and, after a retyping, will probably appear in mid-1979 (210 pp. typescript).
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The Society hopes to issue another reprinting of Lessing's Dictionary, an 
important and standard reference work indispensihle for English-speakers. The 
pressure of other duties and the cost of printing have thus far combined to 
delay this much-needed publication. Volume 6 of Mongolian Studies for 1979 is 
already organized and will go into preparation presently.
Admission to the Society is open to all persons and institutions having 
interest in any aspect of Mongolia; dues are $15 annually (students $7.50).
The Mongolia Society, Inc.
P.O. Drawer 606 
Bloomington, Indiana k'Jk02
MONGOLISTIC ACTIVITIES AT INDIANA UNIVERSITY
The Mongolia Society is housed in facilities of Indiana University at Bloom­
ington, though it remains a distinct and independent institution.
Since several important projects in Mongolian studies are now under way at 
Indiana University, I take this liberty to mention them in the thought that some 
readers may thus seciire information about them.
The National Endowment for the Humanities is supporting a three-year project 
for a new major Mongolian-English dictionary, directed by Hangin and Krueger, 
with research staff. The project is about half-complete, and letters A-M (about 
350 typed pages) are finished in draft. The total may run to about 900 pages; 
after revision and limited circulation the dictionary will be printed, but it 
will certainly be at least two full years before it is available. This is a 
Cyrillic-order modern dictionary with definitions and examples in English, 
stressing social sciences, literature, history, etc.
The same institution, NEH, is also supporting a Mongolian folklore project 
which will produce an annotated volume of translated Mongolian folklore in dif­
ferent genres (eight to ten chapters to cover epic, tales, riddles, invocations, 
proverbs, etc.). A supplement will give the Mongolian texts. This will be 
finished in 1979 and probably published at a later time.
The Mongolian Studies Hiimanities Curriculum is sponsored by the Office of 
Education and will present a one-or two-volume introduction to Mongolian history, 
civilization and area studies suitable for college courses in Asia. The com­
pletion of this project, delayed by many factors, is soon expected, and one 
would hope it might also soon be published for general use.
John R. Krueger
THE BIBLIOTHECA MONGOLICA
Henry G. Schwarz, Man-kam Leung, and Michael Underdown
General Remarks and Part I: Works in English, French, and German
The project got its start in 1975 as a result of Henry Schwarz's conclusion, 
arrived at after some careful thought on the matter, that the field of Mongolian 
Studies needed to he strengthened, certainly in the United States and perhaps 
elsewhere too, and that one important way of going about this was to create a 
comprehensive bibliography that in a single set of volumes encompasses most if 
not all that has been written in various languages about most aspects of Mon­
golia. Whereas such comprehensive bibliographies have been published for China, 
Japan, and Korea, nothing quite like this has ever been published for Mongolia.
The Bibliotheca Mongolica, as originally planned, will eventually consist of 
four parts. Part I, edited by Henry G. Schwarz, includes works written in Eng­
lish, French, and German. Part II, edited by Man-kam Leung of the University 
of Saskatchewan, includes works written in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean. Part 
III, edited by Mr. Michael Underdown of the University of Melbourne, contains 
works in Mongolian, Russian, and East European languages. Finally, Part IV, 
edited by Henry G. Schwarz, will contain works written in all other languages, 
additions and corrections to the first three parts, and a combined index.
This bibliography includes all subjects that have a bearing on that contig­
uous area which was inhabited by appreciable numbers of Mongols around l800.
In contemporary terms, this area is roughly coterminous with the Mongolian 
People's Republic and adjoining areas in Siberia, Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, and 
the northwestern provinces of China. Thus the bibliography includes studies of 
pre-Mongolian and non-Mongolian subjects, such as linguistic, historical, and 
archeological investigations of all the peoples who inhabited Mongolia before 
the Mongols. It also includes studies of foreigners on Mongolian soil during 
Mongol times, such as missionaries, traders, and armies.
In addition, the bibliography includes any subject placed exclusively out­
side the area just described and that has a substantial and specifically Mongol 
content, like studies of Mongol conquests, Mongol languages and dialects, and 
Mongol emigre communities. The bibliography, however, does not include studies 
of individuals and groups who, despite their own claims, cannot be considered 
Mongol, such as Timior and his successors. Nor does the bibliography include 
studies of any of the non-Mongol parts of the Mongol world empire that make 
little or no mention of the Mongols. Thus most of the considerable body of lit­
erature on Yuan China is excluded here because most of these studies are on 
purely Chinese matters with only scant reference to the Mongol overlords.
The Bibliotheca Mongolica includes most forms of publication with the excep­
tion of reviews, short notices, cookbooks, annual surveys in periodical publica­
tions such as Asian Perspectives, Asian Survey, and Far Eastern Economic Review,
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and most political tracts. Only some entries in handbooks, encyclopedias and 
conference compendia are included. Because we hope that non-Mongolists will 
use this bibliography, we also include works of popular literature. The bib­
liography includes all publications just described and published during the 
century ending in December 19T5* Only occasionally are older works included.
Each of the several parts of the Bibliotheaa MongoHaa consists of five 
major sections on general works, culture, history, society, and science and 
technology, comprising a total of thirty-four chapters, each of which consti­
tutes a particular category. The overall arrangement is similar to that used 
by the Library of Congress, with deviations where deemed necessary. Entries 
within each subdivision are, with few exceptions, arranged by date of publica­
tion. Each work is given only one entry hut is cross-listed by entry number as 
often as deemed appropriate.
An entry consists of the usual bibliographical elements like name, title,^ 
place and date of publication as well as any additional information such as il­
lustration, bibliography, and the like. In order to keep the bibliography with­
in manageable limits, annotations are held to an absolute minimum. In most 
cases, transliteration of proper names in annotations is the same as in the 
works in question. Thus any proper name is likely to appear throughout the bib­
liography with several slightly different spellings. Whenever a title in Eng-^ 
lish, French, or German is sufficiently descriptive, no annotation or translation 
is given.
The person index, a feature in all parts of the Bibliotheca Mongolica, de­
serves special mention. It includes, besides all authors, also editors, com­
pilers, and translators. I believe that such an arrangement may well help some 
readers to locate a particular work more quickly. The person index differs 
from indexes in most other bibliographies and monographs in at least two respects. 
First, translators are included because, contrary to conventional academic opin­
ion, I am certain that translations, especially good ones, are not only great 
aids to the scholarship of any field but can also be major intellectual accom­
plishments in their own right. Second, the person index does not follow the 
usual practice of listing only entry numbers or, worse yet, page niunbers. Such 
practice is a disservice to the reader whom it obliges in some cases to go back 
and forth between the index and the main body of the book dozens of times before 
he finds the entry he had been looking for.
Part I: Works in English^ French, and German is complete and has been pub­
lished by the Center for East Asian Studies as volume 12 of its Occasional 
Papers (since then renamed Studies on East Asia) series. Its 355 pages contain 
about 3,000 entries of which more than 95 percent were personally verified by 
me. Each of the remaining unverified entries is marked by the notation CNot 
seeni.
Western Washington University Henry G. Schwarz
Port II; Works in Chinese, Japanese, and Korean
Bibliographies on Mongolia in the Chinese and Japanese languages do exist. 
The present task is to update these bibliographies. In
Chang Hsing-t'ang's Meytg—l<u "bs ^'ccyi—h <20 shu-Tnu ^ ^
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(Taipei, 1958) an^ Term Yen-lin*s Chung-kuo pien-chiang tu-dhi lu
(Peking, 1958) are essential sources for this 
project. Chang's work was compiled hy consulting several existing hihliogra- 
phies on the same subject. It incorporates works in Chinese, Japanese, Mon­
golian, and European languages. The sections on works in Chinese and Japanese 
languages form an adequate basis for developing a better bibliography on Mon­
golia. The present task facing the compiler of this bibliography is as follows:
1. To verify and update the publication data of each entry in these two bib­
liographies.
2. To add new materials which are not included in these two bibliographies.
3. To screen important joiirnal articles to be incorporated into the new bib­
liographies .
The following gives a general description of the new materials which are going 
to be added to this bibliography.
The Chinese sources contain valuable primary information on Mongolia, espe­
cially on the period before the twentieth century. The recent massive re­
print of Chinese local gazetteers in Taiwan has made available many sources 
which have hitherto been difficult to come by. These local gazetteers are a 
treasure house of information on local history. The projected bibliography will 
try to classify and distill information contained in these gazetteers.
In 197^ the National Palace Museum in Taiwan began publication of the secret 
palace memorials of the Ch'ing dynasty (l6Ui+-191l). These memorials were sent 
secretly by provincial officials to the emperor reporting on the local situa­
tion and have, therefore, never been published previously. The publication of 
these memorials, for the first time, is very important not only in the field of 
Chinese studies, but also in other areas. So far only the memorials of the 
K'ang-hsi (l662-lT22) and the Kuang-hsu (i8T5-1908) reigns have been published. 
The memorials of the Yung-cheng reign (1723-1735) are in the process of publica­
tion. When this collection is complete, this set of materials will provide 
valuable insight to the Ch'ing government's policy towards Mongolia.
The publication of the diplomatic archives of the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
dealing with the Sino-Russian relationship between 1917 and 1921 by the Institute 
of Modern History, Academia Sinica in Taiwan throws much light on the complexity 
of diplomatic relations between China, Russia and Mongolia during this period 
in question.
In mainland China, the most significant development is probably in the field 
of linguistics. Three important dictionaries have been published: Ean-Meng
tz 'u-tien (Chinese-Mongolian Dictionary) (Nei-Meng-ku jen-min
chu-pan-she ^ ^ A ^ ^ Huhehot , 196U); Meng-Han
tz 'u-tien f i ft ^ (Mongolian-Chinese Dictionary) (Nei-Meng-ku chiao-yu
chu-pan-she ^ f di Huhehot, 1975); Meng-Han tz’u tien ^
ylL i'5 (Mongolian-Chinese Dictionary) (Nei-Meng-ku jen-min chu-pan-
she ^ it )lk- 5 Huhehot, 1976) all establishing lexical
standardization for translation between the two languages.
On the other hand, the publication of the punctuated edition of the Twenty- 
four Dynastic Histories is undoubtedly one of the most important academic 
achievements by mainland Chinese scholars. Each work in this series has been 
subject to rigorous textual criticism before publication, and modern Chinese 
punctuation marks are supplied throughout the text. This series, therefore.
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greatly facilitates research on Chinese history and makes the reading of geo­
graphical and personal names in these dynastic histories more intelligible, 
especially when these names are of foreign origins.
The two most important Japanese bibliographies on Mongolia are: ^ _
1. Yamane Yukio ih ^ ^ y Gendaishi k.enkyu bunken mokuroku
Classified Bibliography of Articles and Books concerning the Yhan 
Period in Japanese and Chinese), Tokyo, 1971. This book covers works pub­
lished between 1900 and 1970.2. Japan Association of Mongolian Studies, Mongoru kenkyu bunken mokuroku ^
> J" /L ^ ^ ^ (Bibliography on Mongolia), Tokyo, 1973.
This book includes works published from 1900 to 1972.
Both of these bibliographies are useful for this project. Generally speaking, 
Japanese works are excellent as secondary sources. Before 19^5, because of 
Japan's political and military ambitions in Continental Asia, Japanese scholars 
produced many works of lasting value in this field. The intelligence report of 
the Japanese army and cultural expeditions sponsored by various organizations in 
Japan provide a rich reservoir of Information for the period after 1911.
The Chinese part is expected to be complete in 1979, and the Japanese part 
in 1980.
University of Saskatchewan Man-kam Leung
Part III: Works in Mongolian, Russian, and East European Languages*
J^y work as editor of Part III of the Bibliotheca Mongolica is based on my^ 
very comprehensive working bibliography and on my cataloging and bibliographic 
experience. However, I am basically a historian, and there are areas which it 
is proposed to cover in the Bibliotheca Mongolica with which I am not very fa­
miliar. I refer especially to the fields of art and architecture, music, dance 
and theater, numismatics, archeology, manners and customs, education, law, 
economy, and science and technology. It is obviously possible for me to review 
all previous bibliographic sources to extract the relevant references. It is 
as equally apparent that outside assistance wo\ild greatly facilitate this task, 
but none has materialized to date.
I have encountered several objections to the project among fellow Mongolists 
The main objection to the project is due to the fact that it is seen as being 
superfluous and a duplication of perfectly good, existing bibliographies, such 
as Bibliografiya robot po Mongolii, D. Serzhmyadag, BNMAU-d 1973-1975 and 
khevlegdsen mongolin nomin burtgel (and its predecessors). The Mongolian au-^^ 
thorities are obviously working in the direction of a "national bibliography.
The project has now reached a stage where it is too late to turn back. My 
own bibliography is almost complete in all fields other than those listed above 
up to 1975. The task now remaining is to collect entries in the missing fields 
and to plug any gaps. I still need to organize my files into a form suitable 
for typing or otherwise reproducing. This is no mean task as I have no
*Mr. Underdown had to return to Melbourne a few days before the conference, 
and his report was read in his absence by Professor Schwarz.
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secretarial or financial assistance to undertake this work.
I am reluctant to put a completion date on Part III, not only because I do 
not know whether any assistance will be forthcoming following this conference 
or any further appeals the general editor might make, but also because my work 
on the project must necessarily be performed alongside my normal duties. How­
ever, assuming that I can devote the same amount of time to this project as 
hitherto and that the level of assistance remains nil, I would anticipate having 
my listings completed by mid-1979.
It is obviously desirable to have the Bibliotheca Mongolica published as 
soon as possible, so please send me those lists, etc.
University of Melboiame Michael Underdown
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